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

The role of Egypt's business elite in controlling post-Mubarak press

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This work is dedicated to my family back home in Egypt, especially my father's soul, who passed away in the very beginning of this journey, and to my generously loving mother and a long peaceful and happy life yet to come and enjoy.

ABSTRACT (NL)

Op 3 juli 2013 vond in Egypte een staatsgreep door het leger plaats die op brede steun kon rekenen, slechts twee en een half jaar na een volksopstand die de vorige president, Hosni Mubarak, ten val bracht en een einde maakte aan zijn bijna dertigjarige alleenheerschappij. Deze studie heeft als doel de macht te begrijpen die de Egyptische media hadden na Mubaraks val in het algemeen, en in de periode rond de staatsgreep in het bijzonder; de nadruk zal hierbij liggen op de particuliere geschreven pers. De rol die de media speelden zal geanalyseerd worden vanuit economisch perspectief – om de macht van de zakenelite in Egypte te begrijpen – alsook vanuit journalistisch oogpunt – om de hegemonie van deze elite te begrijpen, en de invloed die ze in de samenleving heeft door de kranten die ze bezit. Vanuit deze invalshoeken zoekt deze studie antwoorden op haar tweeledige hoofdvraag: *'Waarom en hoe controleert de Egyptische zakenelite de post-Mubarak pers?*'

De thesis benadert deze hoofdvraag eerst vanuit het oogpunt van de 'kritische politieke economie van communicatie'. Vervolgens wordt een framing-analyse gemaakt van de particuliere persproductie in de periode rond de militaire coup in 2013. Hegemonie, die haar kracht haalt uit het winnen van de goedkeuring van diegenen die ze onder de knoet probeert te houden, is één van de belangrijkste onderwerpen van dit onderzoek. Hegemonie kan niet zonder het uitoefenen van macht om deze goedkeuring te behouden wanneer de omstandigheden veranderen, zoals bijvoorbeeld in het geval van de revolutie van 2011 of de staatsgreep van 2013. Communicatie speelt een centrale rol bij hegemonie, omdat deze levensnoodzakelijk is voor het

succes van het behoud van de hegemonie. Het overbrengen van boodschappen en symbolen aan de bevolking is de bestaansreden van de massamedia. De rol van de framing- analyse in deze studie is om empirisch de hegemonische praktijken van de zakenelite aan te tonen en te begrijpen hoe dit in zijn werk gaat. Voor deze thesis werden de populaire Al-Masry Al-Youm en Al-Watan, beide in private handen, gekozen. Zoals de meeste kranten ter wereld beïnvloeden zij het publiek door middel van de inhoud die ze produceren en de boodschappen die daarin vervat liggen. Over de hele onderzoeksperiode werden interviews afgenomen van vooraanstaande bronnen in de Egyptische particuliere-pers-wereld, en deze interviews werden geïncorporeerd in alle argumenten in de thesis. Over het algemeen is de bevinding van deze thesis dat de politieke economie van de Egyptische particuliere pers, in het bijzonder in het post-Mubarak-tijdperk, in hoge mate onder controle is van de zakenelite, ten behoeve van henzelf, de politieke elite en het leger. Sinds het ontstaan van de particuliere persmarkt in Egypte was ze altijd in een hegemonische positie, maar in de nasleep van de relatieve schok die ze onderging door de revolutie in 2011 diende de hegemonie in stand gehouden en verstevigd te worden. Om deze hegemonische positie te veroveren en te behouden werd het nieuws beduidend geframed ter ondersteuning van de staatsgreep in 2013, vooral door de kaders van 'angst' voor de Moslimbroederschap, geweld en chaos, en de 'promotie' van het leger als de redder.

ABSTRACT

On the 3rd of July 2013, a widely celebrated military coup took place in Egypt, only two and half years after an uprising that brought down former president Hosni Mubarak, putting an end to his almost thirty-year authoritarian rule. This study aims at understanding the power the Egyptian media following Mubarak's fall in general, and around the coup period in particular, with a focus on the private press. The role played by the media will be analysed from both a political economic perspective to understand the power of Egypt's business elite, and from a journalistic perspective to understand the hegemony of this elite and the influence they have on the society through the newspapers they own. With these research objectives, this study answers its main two-part question of '*Why and how does Egypt's business elite control the post-Mubarak press?*'.

This thesis answers this major question through an approach of 'critical political economy of communication' followed by conducting 'framing analysis' for the private press production around the military coup period in 2013. Hegemony, which draws its strength from achieving the consent of those it seeks to control, is a major theme in this research. Hegemony requires the exercise of power to maintain consent under changing conditions, like the 2011 revolution or 2013 military coup for example. And communication here plays a central role in hegemony as it is vital to the successful maintenance of hegemony. The mass media is a system that serves for communicating

messages and symbols to society. The role of framing analysis in this study is to empirically prove the hegemonic practice of the business elite and understand how it works. This thesis chose the popular and privately-owned Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan, which like most newspapers in the world do influence the public through the content they produce and the messages contained within. Throughout the course of the research, interviews with high-profile primary sources from within the private press industry in Egypt were conducted and embedded into all arguments. The thesis generally finds that the political economy of the Egyptian private press, particularly in the post-Mubarak era, is highly controlled by the business elite in favour of themselves, the political elite and the military. Since the foundation of the private press market in Egypt, it always enjoyed a hegemonic position, but after it was to some extent shaken by the 2011 revolution, hegemony had to be maintained and reinforced. And in order to achieve and maintain this hegemonic position they engaged in significant news framing in support of the 2013 military coup, particularly using the frame of 'fear' of the Muslim Brotherhood, violence and chaos, and the frame of 'promotion' of the military as a saviour.

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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction

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> *"The ambitious and polite man walks his political path carrying on his shoulders savage creatures surviving on his blood, different in sizes from worms to rhinoceroses and aggressive monsters. Most of these [mentioned animals] don't like Gamal Mubarak as much as they are after gaining the most of political and financial gains from "his own living flesh". And the man is paying the price without knowing. And the price is creating more distance between him and the average citizen."* (Al-Gallad, 2009)

The above quote is not taken from a thriller novel, it is actually from an editorial by Magdy Al-Gallad. Al-Gallad was editor-in-chief of one of Egypt's top privately owned newspapers, Al-Masry Al-Youm from 2005 to 2012 before being appointed to the same position at Egypt's other top private newspaper, Al-Watan, from 2012 until present. The politically well-connected editor wrote this eulogy, titled "Life on the shoulders of Gamal Mubarak",[1] in July 2009, almost two years before the January Revolution in 2011. Ironically, when reading Denis McQuail discussing the development of the newspapers' industry in the 17th century, one can draw similarities that still exist until today when we focus on Al-Gallad's work. Newspapers were an extension into the public domain of an activity that has long taken place for governmental, diplomatic or commercial as well as for private purposes. The early newspaper was marked by its regular appearance, commercial basis and public character. Thus, it was used for information, record, advertising, diversion and gossip (McQuail, 2010). Al-Msry Al-Youm and Al-Watan might appear

[1] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 8 July 2009.

from a distance as modern as well-established international newspapers. However, having a closer look by the eye of a critical reader or someone from inside the news industry, one might have a strong sense of the 17-century journalism as McQuail describes it, disguised in a 21st century costume. Our same century that witnessed the 2011 revolution that brought down Mohammed Hosni Mubarak, the former Egyptian military leader and fourth president of The Arab Republic of Egypt since 1981. For a few years until the father's ouster under the pressure of mass protests across the country and particularly in the iconic Tahrir Square, the son, Gamal, was being prepared and introduced in both state-run and private media as the country's next president.

Concerning the revolution, it is true that media accounts have elevated the Tahrir episode to the status of a "pure event". Echoing a Biblical clash between Good and Evil, where Tahrir became the place where *Al-Sha'ab* (the people), fought a victorious battle against *Al-Nizam* (the regime) (Zemni, De Smet, & Bogaert, 2012). The fall of Mubarak on 11 February 2011 was not the fall of his regime's elites, contrary to how it was portrayed in local and international media. The political and business elites had been in control of the state's institutions for decades before that day. They were coordinating with each other to protect the political and economic gains they had made since Egypt's independence from colonialist Britain in 1952. Over the years until the fall of Mubarak, they have changed faces and control mechanisms several times. Among the most important tools in the elites' hands were the state-run media, the private media, and more specifically the private press, which is the focus of this thesis.

Egypt is not the only country in the world where elites can control and influence the process of news production. However, Egypt is relatively special in the influence this news production has beyond its national borders, throughout the Arab World, given the country's political importance in the region, as it will be discussed in later chapters. And simply the use of Arabic, as a common language in these countries, also gave the country's news (and media) industry extra importance and influence (The influence of the Qatari Al-Jazeera is also discussed in Chapter Three). And here comes to mind the American model of news industry, as a model

that will be reflected on every now and then throughout the course of this research. This does not necessarily mean that the two models are comparable in size and influence. The Egyptian news market is actually much smaller, and the American one has a global political influence beyond the use of English language. However, the adaptation of the American private news media model seems to be influential in how the Egyptian one has been developing for almost the past two decades. This is not to mention the political and economic influence of the United States on Egypt since the 1978 Camp David peace treaty and the shift to a free-market economy, discussed in Chapter Three.

In his analysis of the US news reporting, Torsten Kathke sheds light on practices that this thesis will eventually come across in the process of studying Egypt's private press market:

> *"Once a fact comes before the media, it gets interpreted. Often the very decision to treat it as news makes it news, a first interpretation by itself. A fireball explosion on the tarmac clearly indicates a newsworthy crash has taken place, but what about the dangerous-looking but arguably routine emergency landing that led only to a few burst tires and bruised shoulders? Actual facts (with all the caveats the term carries with it) and complete fabrications that have also made it into the news cycle, possibly through repetition of rumours by internet sources, join "faux facts," that is, facts that through their reporting have become distorted, laden with meaning and tainted by their very newsworthiness"* (Kathke, 2008).

Kathke's words on how news is being produced and circulated in the US do not sound foreign to my ears, as an Egyptian journalist. In fact, I find his analysis very similar to how the private (and the state-run) press market works in Egypt. Just more sensational than it is in the US and less professional, as we can tell when we go through what has been produced during the past two decades. The period that witnessed a significant rise of the private media in general and private press in

particular, which is the focus of this thesis along with the business elite that invested in it and their interests in the face of the 2011 revolution.

One of the major outcomes of Egypt's revolution in 2011, which was bringing to power a civilian and democratically elected president from the Muslim Brotherhood in 2012, Mohamed Morsi, seemed unacceptable to the historically politically engaged Egyptian army. A military coup in 2013[2] was the reaction. It was also supported by the masses who headed to the streets in unprecedented numbers across the country. News agendas controlled by political, business and military elites, besides fatal political mistakes by the Muslim Brotherhood, were main reasons for the mass support for this coup. This research *critically* discusses the political economy behind controlling news agendas in Egypt during that particular period in the privately-owned press market, and examines the *news frames* that encouraged 'fear of the Muslim Brotherhood' and the 'army publicity' as the only saviour in a hard choice between Islamism and militarism, regardless of existing aspirations for democracy that brought Mubarak down only two years earlier.

1.1 Research questions

In this thesis, I will question and analyse the role of Egypt's business elite in controlling post-Mubarak press. The findings of this research will provide us with explanations for an important aspect of the dynamics of power relations between the political and business elites in Egypt. Understanding these dynamics will help us understand why a newspaper like Al-Masry Al-Youm was founded in 2004, and why there was a need for another one, Al-Watan, to be founded in 2012. Both newspapers successfully developed and dominated the press market by the time a military coup was on the horizon in 2013, especially in the case of Al-Watan. It is also almost

[2] The period is also mentioned in many media sources including Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan, as 'June Revolution'. However, I call it military coup throughout this study, since a democratically elected president was arrested, detained and months later appeared in a courtroom, while the major face representing these events was a field marshal, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, who's now a president.

equally important to understand the role of some individuals belonging to those elites in a country where many of its businessmen belonged to the same former ruling party under Mubarak, The National Democratic Party (NDP). And of no less importance, to understand the role of chief editors at their service like Magdy Al-Gallad, who's quoted in the introduction of this chapter. Interestingly, many of the international sources, whether academic or journalistic, label Egypt's private newspapers as 'independent'. I refer to these news outlets as clearly 'private' not independent, since they are influenced by many political and economic factors. This clarification can open the door for more criticism to such newspapers' content and helps to better understand the political affiliations of their owners as members of the business elite.

To analyse and explore the influence of Egypt's business elite on news agendas in this period, the mentioned two major private newspapers, Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan, were selected for conducting *framing analysis* of the headlines of 682 relevant articles. However, to do so, it was necessary to first engage in discussions guided by theoretical literature on *critical political economy of communication* in order to analyse the background of Egypt's business elite and their interests in influencing the media. The findings of this thesis indicate that several factors and mechanisms can be contributed to the literature on Egypt's private press. This thesis presents an indication of the influence Egypt's business elite had on the direction political events had taken in 2013 leading to a military coup and mass violence.

"Why and how does Egypt's business elite control the post-Mubarak press? is the main question this study is answering by going through and analysing relevant literature critically covering Egypt's business elite and its private media sector, conducting interviews with media stakeholders, and conducting framing analysis of press contents around the military coup period in 2013. The thesis answers the above major question through answering the following set of related sub-questions in order to get the bigger picture:

- What is the background of Egypt's business elite and their affiliation with the media market?

- Why was there an interest for Egypt's political elite in a new private press and how did this interest develop?
- How did the private press respond to Mubarak's fall?
- How did the private press market develop following Mubarak's fall?
- How did the private press *frame* the news narrative of the 2013 military coup?
- As an outcome of the examined news frames, how did the status of freedom of the press change following the coup?

By answering the above sub-questions in the following chapters, I will bring evidential explanations to each subtopic. And by doing so, a general picture of Egypt post-Mubarak press will be gradually drawn while explaining how the country's business elite controlled the private press pushing for a certain political agenda, and how they continue to maintain this control until present. And in order to provide and analyse these details, I will also discuss their initial position before the 2011 revolution as a power group interested in protecting their privileges in a free-market economy.

1.2 Scope and limitation

This thesis is concerned with the study of the influence of the business elite on private newspapers in Egypt in response to the 2013 military coup and its preparations, the actual event and its aftermath. In other words, it focusses on the contemporary critical political economy of Egyptian media. In this thesis, I argue that the press in particular stands out in comparison to other forms of media, as it is a stable and accessible source of information for researchers that can reflect attitudes and positions toward a certain political event. A characteristic that is relatively less difficult, even with today's YouTube presence, whenever the public (or researchers) would want to seek information through produced media material in the form of TV or Radio programmes, as archived texts are still easier for researchers to find whether online

or in print. This is in addition to my professional background as a journalist (2006 to present) in TV, print and online journalism and a former editor-in-chief of The Daily News Egypt, which provide me with familiarity and expertise in this type of media, which in turn is useful to this research. My earlier background as an economic advisor in the Egyptian mining sector (2000 – 2006), which provided me with professional and social access to the top of Egypt's business and political elites, I also find useful in the course of conducting this research (my career history and how it benefits my research is discussed in the Methodology Section in Chapter Two). Having said this, I argue that the Egyptian press contains contents that can structurally tell us about the positions of private newspapers and those who own them as influential groups in Egypt's political and economic scenes. This study shows how the Egyptian society was influenced by these power groups – the business elite through their private press.

The framing analysis conducted in this thesis is limited to a period of 112 days. The thesis focuses on and analyses the significance of headlines produced in the period from 26 April (the launch of Tamarod Confidence Withdrawal Campaign, which will be discussed in Chapters Two and Five) to the 15th of August 2013 (the day following the Rabaa and Nahda massacres of Morsi supporters, which will also be discussed in the same two chapters). This period also includes about six weeks after Morsi's deposal on the 3rd of July. I argue that these 112 days constitute the most significant political period after the fall of Mubarak, taking into account the political change it brought and the violence that followed. This time period includes most relevant responses to the coup, which are required to understand the two sample newspapers' attitudes and consistency in relation to influencing public opinion.

It was a challenge to conduct the framing part of this research through accessing Al-Watan's archive in particular. Unlike Al-Masry Al-Youm and other upscale newspapers, Al-Watan did not have an online archive for their print edition during the course of research. I directly contacted the newspaper's administration in order to provide me with access to their archive, but I received no response. Later I used my contacts inside their news desk, and I was told that Magdy Al-Gallad bans access to the archive of the newspaper's print edition, even to their own

journalists. And this is why they ignored my request. Hence, I decided to use their general online archive, which contains all articles of the print edition mixed with the online ones, of which majority were the print ones anyway. And here I decided to analyse both types of articles – print and online – as it was very difficult to clearly separate between them. I decided to follow the same selection process with Al-Masry Al-Youm, although their print archive is accessible online, in order to create a balance between the two samples. Each article produced in this period was included in the framing analysis, whether it was news, feature or opinion, as each supposedly reflects the newspaper's editorial line and its relation to the occurring political change.

As mentioned earlier, this study aims to examine and analyse the influence of Egypt's business elite on setting news agendas of the newspapers they own in the period following Mubarak's fall. These analyses will identify the business elite's position toward the revolution, and by extension toward the political elite. And here, the thesis briefly spans three periods of news production: the first eighteen days of the revolution until Mubarak's fall (25 January – 11 February 2011); a period of about 16 months in which the country was directly ruled by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) until Morsi was elected as a president (13 February 2011 – 30 June 2012); and a more important period to this research which is the previously mentioned 112 days around the end of Morsi's rule including six weeks after his deposal (26 April – 15 August 2013)[3]. The 112-day period, with its political events and how they were covered in the private press, is inseparable from the important previous periods in the history of Egypt before and during Mubarak's era from political, economic and media perspectives. For this reason, a number of cases where the business elite set the news agendas prior to this period will be introduced as well.

[3] The significance and the reasons for deciding about these mentioned dates will be discussed in Chapter Two: Theoretical framework and methodology.

1.3 Importance and contribution of the study

The 2013 military coup and the events around it are considered a pivotal point in the direction taken by the 2011 revolution. The available literature suggests that the media in general and the press in particular played a very important role in influencing the public in that period (Hafez, 2013; Abdulla, 2014). There is indeed literature that focusses on the position of the media in general and the private press as well since the fall of Mubarak, like the work of El-Issawi (2014) and a few others. However, there are very few studies with a specific focus on Egypt's privately-owned newspapers, and particularly their position toward the military coup in relation to the interests of the business elite that own these newspapers. Most studies on this particular Egypt-related topic (influence of the private newspapers in relation to the coup) do not touch upon the political role of the private press. Most media serve as systems for communicating messages and signals to the general populace (Herman & Chomsky, 2002, p. 1); and the Egyptian private press is not different in this regard concerning its position towards the coup. Without clearly focussing on the economic benefits gained by Egypt's business elite from investing in the media, the literature usually suggests that their position is coordinated in a way or another, as the authoritarian power-holders could live with the rise of media tycoons, and the media tycoons could live with them (Ratta, Sakr, & Skovgaard-Petersen, 2015, pp. 181-183). This topic will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three in order to understand the cooperation between the business and the political elites through the media owned by the first. Where I also argue that analysing news content should go hand in hand with critically analysing economic backgrounds of owners of these private news outlets.

This research is meant to introduce a new contribution to the litrature, which investigates the control of the business elite over the post-Mubarak press through empirically analysing the specific event of the 2013 military coup in relation to the those owning it. The analyses that this thesis brings are important for the understanding and the evaluation of the coup's news coverage and its surrounding events. This evaluation would be very difficult to assess without investigating the relation between media investors and the history of their

connections to the political elites, whether the civilian or the military. Both before and after Mubarak's fall. And this would be hardly possible without an analysis of the concerned events in accordance to the mentioned elites' attitudes, relations among each other, and relations with the private press itself. Through this multi-layered analysis, the thesis reveals much about the opinions produced and delivered to the public concerning the mentioned events in those 112 days around the coup. In general, this study is meant to produce a contribution to the understudied area of political economy of Egyptian media, with the objective of a better understanding of the complexity of the sector. This study is meant to provide material that might help criticising, estimating and developing the sector's performance in the future with probable lessons or knowledge that can be transferrable to academic research focussed on other regions and countries.

1.4 Organization of the thesis

The core work of this thesis is focussed in three chapters, preceded by three introductory ones and followed by a conclusion. Each chapter discusses a specific subtopic derived from the main one: the role of Egypt's business elite in controlling post-Mubarak press. These chapters aim at understanding the controversy and structure of power groups in control of the media in general and the private press in particular. Each subtopic is a detailed analysis with the goal of clearing out ambiguities of factors, actors, discourses and outcomes of Egypt's privately-controlled press. Some chapters explore the genealogy of media history in Egypt and the influence of neoliberalism, while others are more focused on the practicalities of the press sector, and the power it possesses over the public as part of the power possessed by elite groups. The details of these chapters touch upon individuals and their stories, whether from the business elite itself investing in the private press and editors in chief working at their service who executively bring media projects, plans and news agendas to realisation. Both are labelled as 'moguls' and 'barons' in the book of "Arab Media Moguls" by Naomi Sakr and other contributors (Ratta, Sakr, & Skovgaard-Petersen, 2015). However, I will stick to calling them media investors and editors in

chief, as the majority of published literature do. In the end, the terms of moguls and barons sound too strong and probably dramatic, as we cannot practically estimate the amount of power needed to elevate a media investor to a mogul or the exact degree of editorial influence of a chief editor to become a baron. The aim of such stories is to add more colours and details to the picture, aiding the bigger general story of the control practised over the private press in the service of enforcing a free-market economy and accelerating capital accumulation. The paragraphs below provide an outline of the contents of each chapter, how they relate to each other and the consequential logic of the introduced narrative and analysis serving this study's hypothesis of Egypt's controlled private press market.

The second chapter, "Theoretical framework and methodology", provides a thorough overview of first the approach of *critical political economy of communication* and then *framing theory.* It also explains the relevant adapted methodology applied in the thesis in order to understand and empirically analyse news control by the business elite in the private press market. The chapter also explains and justifies the selection of such methodology, discusses its applicability and the challenges met along the research course and the writing processes of this study.

The third chapter, "A history of Egypt's business elite and press control", provides a critical historical understanding of the nature and emergence of Egypt's business elite and how it developed over time, based on political changes nationally and internationally. This in turn makes it easier to understand their interest in press control in order to protect their class's previously obtained privileges. The chapter also goes through the details of Egypt's press landscape with its two factions: the state-run and the private one. We will look at the circumstances that surrounded the latter's birth in the late 1990s and then its boom in the mid-2000s. And since the private press in Egypt consists mostly of investments by businessmen who initially had diverse portfolios that did not include media, it is necessary to sketch profiles of such new media investors in order to put things in context and add life to the whole story of the private press control. The chapter also discusses politics in free market economies and associated

social consequences, while touching upon academic views on the rise of investments in private media for the sake of political influence on the public. Furthermore, the chapter takes a necessary in-depth step into the details of the post-Mubarak press market and its politics by going through the legislations that organise this market and their associated biases. Beyond laws and regulations that control a newspaper tailored in favour of a media investor, the chapter ends with profiles of the two case study newspapers under focus in this thesis, Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan, those who own them, and their editors-in-chief as implementers of the owners' strategies.

The fourth chapter, "A review of the private press during and after Mubarak's fall", discusses how the private press covered the January uprising by analysing the lead stories of the privately-owned Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper in the period from 24 January until 12 February 2011. Towards the end of the chapter, a general overview of the editorial lines in post-Mubarak Egypt during the rest of 2011 and first half of 2012 is given, showing degrees of confusion at times, and power re-charging and coordination of politically controlled news agendas at other times. This chapter works as a necessary review of biased and controlled news agendas of the mentioned periods in 2011 and 2012, setting the stage for the concentrated news framing analysis of the period during and after July's military coup in 2013, which is the study's core examined period in the following chapter.

The fifth chapter, "An analysis of the private press in 112 days of Tamarod", is the core chapter in this thesis as it provides the empirical pillar of this research by conducting framing analysis of the news produced by two sample newspapers in the period around the military coup. The chapter introduces the Tamarod Movement and all the controversy raised around their foundation and their relation to the military before applying the selected news frames on headlines of stories produced in that period. Following the examination's results of this sample, the chapter goes on to observe how the private press was engaged in a process of producing a godly-pharaoh image of Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi portraying him as the 'only saviour' of a country living under the 'fear' of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The sixth chapter, “Press freedom in post-Morsi Egypt”, the final core chapter before the conclusion, discusses the issue of press freedom in post-Morsi Egypt and some of the important events that followed his deposal. The scene described in this chapter is, in a way or another, prevailing until the time this thesis is being written. This chapter suggests that an anti-brotherhood discourse was used to influence the public in a similar way as anti-communism was used as a control mechanism in US media (Herman & Chomsky, 2002, pp. 29-31). By using this technique, freedom of expression became a practice only allowed when it is against that political group or those who might sympathise with. Violence against journalists by the police and ordinary citizens is also discussed in this chapter, followed by an investigation into the waves of demonization of critical news outlets, which led to overwhelming organised and random violence. The chapter closes with an evaluation of the effort by international press freedom watchdogs reporting on violations in Egypt, shedding light on their strengths and weaknesses. As such, the basic contribution of this chapter is to follow up on developments that relate to findings of pervious chapters and draw a clearer image on the ground of the highly manipulated private press market, which plays a vital role in preserving existing power relations.

In the concluding chapter, a summary of the whole study’s arguments, discussions analyses and findings is presented with a clarification of the limitations and challenges of the research. It also leaves the door open for perspectives of further research on the same topic from different angles, for example concerning the broadcasting industry. Making this type of literature available to the general public (news recipients) in non-academic versions with the goal of introducing critical skills to them in order to shape own political opinions, is also as important as this research itself. Particularly, how to make the public aware of the dynamics of power controls and manipulations over news contents by the elites.

CHAPTER TWO: Theoretical framework and methodology

2.1 Theory: From Critical Political Economy of Communication to News Framing

2.2 Methodology

> *"Social production takes place in the economy, politics and culture. Humans produce use-values, collective decisions and meanings. The economy and work are not limited to the production of physical goods. Also, culture and politics are on the one hand part of the economy: humans produce and communicate meanings and collective decisions in social processes. But culture and politics are not identical with the economy. They are simultaneously part and no-part of the economy. Once produced, rules and meanings take effect all over society."* (Fuchs, 2016, p. 215)

The Westminster professor of communication and critical theorist Christian Fuchs brings us the argument in the above quote about the commodification of culture and politics, which cannot be separated from economic influences. The quote opens the door to us for a whole multi-layered discussion on the relation between the economy, politics and culture and how rules are communicated or, as I argue, enforced over a society as messages through the press. This chapter addresses the theory and methodology used to investigate the role of Egypt's business elite in controlling post-Mubarak press. This study brings together the theoretical domains of critical political economy of communication and framing theory. The first is to understand the power position of Egypt's business elite and the second is to empirically prove the use of this power in controlling news agendas in the private press, as a focus of this thesis.

The use of critical political economy of communication in this study starts with the theoretical discussion about the position of elites in general in relation to hegemony and social relations, which is argued in this chapter. I then apply this argument on the Egyptian case in

Chapter Three, where I discuss the available literature and combine it with interviews conducted in the course of this research. Occasionally, I will reflect on my own past experience as an economic advisor in Egypt's mining sector and then as a journalist. Following this discussion, I will test the validity of my arguments by conducting a framing analysis on the headlines of a sample of press articles. Framing analysis is used in this thesis to identify and count the occurrences of specific characteristics within the selected sample of articles, which I argue that they prove the findings discussed using an approach of critical political economy of communication.

2.1 Theory: From Critical Political Economy of Communication to News Framing

Believers of the democratisation theory and free-market economy recognise the mass media as a potential and influential democratisation actor since, unlike earlier instances of democratisation, the current 'global wave of democracy' takes place in a media-saturated environment (Jebril, Stetka, & Loveless, 2013). This argument is supported by a well-established 'conventional' political economy tradition, which argues that the free-market guarantees independence, diversity and accountability of commercial media. In this view, the free-market ensures that the free media are independent of governments, and hence it produces a diverse media system since all are free to publish. It also makes the media representative of the society, since media enterprises must respond to their audience, according to the neo-liberal school of thought. However, what actually happens is that media investors make arrangements with governments because they share agendas, and benefit mutually from cooperation (Hardy, 2014). Hardy's strong critical view of the neoliberal media, is interestingly also supported by the free-market media economist Gillian Doyle, who says that since the early days of printing, the ability to communicate with mass audiences has been subject to many forms of intervention by state authorities. Media industries are affected not only by 'normal' economic and industrial policy concerns, like growth and efficiency, but also by a range of special considerations that reflect the socio-political and cultural importance of mass communication (Doyle, 2013). In the end, the assumption that democratisation, in the sense that the more private media we have, the more

likely democracy and free media will prevail seems very challenging to materialise on the ground, if not impossible. And in our Egyptian case here, we can see that despite the country's fairly large private or commercial media market that includes a big news industry, the 2013 military coup happened, and it was also largely supported by most state's institutions and the masses that consumed the same private media.

This thesis founds itself in the field of critical political economy of communication, which I consider essential to understand Egypt's media market in relation to hegemony and social relations. I find this critical theoretical approach standing out in the whole diverse domain of political economy of communication. It is developed from the standpoint of Critical Theory, which in turn is born from the womb of traditional Marxist thought and its critique of classical political economy. Therefore, understanding critical theory is essential to understanding critical political economy of communication, where many of this particular field's scholars are themselves critical theorists who pay attention to communication research. One of the major scholars whom I pay particular attention to throughout my critical approach to communication is Vincent Mosco with his developed approach to understanding the "commodification" of media and how it relates to social change and power relations. Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky with their 'propaganda model' are also very important to this thesis as they help empirically understand the practice of control over the media from a critical political economy perspective, as well. Although the propaganda model of Herman and Chomsky is very American-focused, I find it very insightful in analysing hegemony in the American media, which shares some similarities with the Egyptian one, thus it includes many transferrable lessons (discussed later in this section). This section brings a theoretical discussion on my use of critical political economy of communication, how it originates from critical theory, and how it relates to Egypt's political economy and its press market.

Answering the question of what is political economy, the critical theorist Vincent Mosco argues that it is a broad-based and variegated approach to social analysis. He highlights two general characteristics, which have been used in communications research. One concentrates on

the social relations, particularly in power relations, governing production, distribution, and exchange of resources; the other on broad problems of control and survival of the elites (Mosco, 2009, p. 36). Mosco's understanding of political economy in relation to communications research and particularly power relations, I see as key to understanding the Egyptian private press market. And understanding this market goes through addressing the political economy of the country and the power of its business elite, which goes hand in hand with a critical discussion on their historical and contemporary background. This thesis has sought to situate cultural production of the private press, which is part of media and communication within the broader dimension of political economy (Morgan, 2013, p. 63). These specific interconnections of the political and the economic are both understood as structures that shape practices and strongly influence national media systems. And here, it is very important, in the Egyptian context, to ask ourselves who has the means and the power to produce media content and who has access to it? To what extend do specific political and economic structures form media institutions and thus regulate flows of information? And, conversely, how do media shape the economic and political practices that eventually create structures? (Richter & Gräf, 2015, p. 25) In his book 'Reading Marx in the Information Age', Fuchs (2016) argues that there are major principles that should be considered when studying political economy. The historical development of the economy; asking how are power and wealth related and how are these in turn connected to cultural and social life; and asking basic moral questions of justice, equity and the public good (Fuchs, 2016, p. 4). Therefore, in this thesis, it is very important to study the history of Egypt's business elite in period of political, economic and social transformations, i.e., Nasser's socialist state, Sadat's *Infitah,* and Mubarak's hyper-market-liberalisation, aided by his son Gamal.

In many cases, we can diagnose an increase in the intertwining of political elites and business elites in Arab countries. Increasingly, media institutions seem to become part of this trend, providing instruments of control and regime legitimisation. In the Egyptian case, Mubarak's last governments included several ministers in key sectors such as construction or transport, who were at the same time owners of major contracting firms of the very same ministries (discussed in Chapter Three). Also, very briefly after Mubarak's fall, many of these

business elite members surfaced again and enlarged their investment portfolios by adding TV channels and newspapers to them, which was clearly a politically charged move. The media market openly welcomed them under the disguise of the free and open 'new Egypt', which in turn has its media sector open for everyone in the newly revived democracy.

Mosco is always very critical of conventional economics arguing that it does not succeed only because economists agree on a set of narrow rules about research and discourse. Mainstream economics also succeeds because it serves power by providing information, advice, and policies to strengthen capitalism, which is something I have experienced in person in Egypt, whether working in the mining sector or the media. Important as it is to see the so-called 'normal economics' as a system of rhetoric, it is at least as important to see it as a system of power. And to understand this system and to propose ways to change it, now, we need political economy (Mosco, 2009, p. 64). And here is what makes critical theorists stand out in their analytical approaches to the economic, the political and the social: advocating change. And by doing so, critical theory is best to understand (and encourage) mobilisation and emancipation, which are two key factors in this research, as there was a revolution in 2011 to change and re-position power, and also there was a military coup in 2013, which by studying we can learn a lot about power and media control for the sake of political and economic influences. And here the instrumental character of media becomes obvious. Not only when one investigates the relationships between the owners of the media and the ruling elite, but also when one considers that the content produced is most often loyal to the regime (Richter & Gräf, 2015, p. 32). And this reinforces the need in this study to take a critical approach, which occupies a significant space in the history of the political economy of communication from a multidisciplinary perspective (Morgan, 2013, p. 45) in order to understand the Egyptian case and talk about change that might come, or even not. At least we need to know what is a critical change like, and thoroughly understand it.

According to the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, critical theory designates several generations of German philosophers and social theorists in the Western European Marxist

tradition known as the Frankfurt School. The theory was introduced in the 1930s by a group of German philosophers: Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer, and Teodor W. Adorno. Their starting point was the work of Karl Marx. They had to escape from the Nazi regime and stayed in the United States during the Second World War, where the atmosphere was hostile against anything German and/or communism as well. They used the name of Frankfurt School as a cover to protect themselves from being targeted as communist scholars (Fuchs, 2016). Max Horkheimer (1972), as one of the school's founders, distinguishes the theory from the 'traditional' one based on a specific practical purpose: a theory is critical to the extent that it seeks human "emancipation from slavery", acts as a "liberating influence", and works "to create a world which satisfies the needs and powers" of human beings (Bohman, 2005). The theory is a normative approach based on the judgment that domination is a problem, which is an essential theme in this thesis. The theory applies approaches that place emphasis on the unequal distribution of power and criticises the arrangements whereby such inequalities are sustained and reproduced. The concept of reproducing power is also very important to understand how the business elite and 'Mubarak's state' managed to survive the 2011 revolution and come back strong with the 2013 military coup. The term 'critical' is usefully broad and encompassing, but also has distinctive practices and values of critique in intellectual enquiry like questioning, interrogating, and challenging the adequacy of explanations of phenomena (Hardy, 2014). And here, my experiences as a critical journalist with familiarity of both Egypt's media and mining sectors come useful in investigating power and exploitation. Critical Theory though, goes beyond analysing, investigating or understanding social phenomena into calling for a domination-free society and informing political struggles that want to establish such a society. And based on this cause, this school of thought, critical theory, is currently commonly defined as an approach that studies society in a dialectical way by analysing political economy, domination, exploitation and ideologies. And I find this position of academic research, where scholars play a role in emancipating societies from control, which is very relevant to the Egyptian case, where significant political changes have been taking place taking place since 2011 until today. This in itself is a critical need of a critical approach to do research and inform the public.

The vast domain of Critical Theory stands out in its focus on studying a society in terms of how it is influenced by the media (Winseck & Yong Jin, 2011, pp. 3-48). And within the same area of focus comes the subfield of critical political economy of communication with its interest in the study of the social relations - particularly the power relations that constitute production, distribution, and consumption of resources, including communication resources. The development of critical political economy of communication started by defining communication as a social process of exchange, where its outcome is the mark of a social relationship. In keeping with the broad approach to the field, the definition includes both the transmission of information and the social constitution of meaning. And what makes Mosco's critical thought important to the theoretical approach of this thesis is his understanding and inclusion of very recent technological advancements in communications, as he includes face-to-face and mediated communication with all of its many forms, from traditional newspapers to Facebook in his work. Mosco's adapted approach to studying communications grew of concerns with the shortcomings of mainstream research, and with the policies that protected large media businesses from the development of a more democratic media system. And relevant to our Egyptian context here, he pays attention to the 'less developed world', where concrete political struggle over the shape of the post-colonial world played a large role in the growth of a political economy approach. This produced the first steps toward a global transcultural political economy of communication. Mosco also argues that the *commodification* of media content, audience and labour is the entry point from which to begin to theorise the political economy of communication. He defines commodification as the process of transforming goods and services, including communication, which are valued for their use, into commodities which are valued for what they will bring in to the market place (Mosco, 2009). This brings us back to the importance of communication to the economy. Not only to communicate economic messages relating to the marketplace, but also in conveying political ones. A form of directly, and indirectly, influencing and controlling a society. Jürgen Habermas insists that a critical approach would question the media as an attack of money and power, and in turn, as a structure that the elites use to dominate a society (Habermas, 1987, p. 375). And here comes the importance of examining this structure that the elites use in the Egyptian case (eras of Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak, and more importantly to this this thesis the 2013

military coup), despite the differences we can find in other media models (like the American one, which is discussed later in this section and briefly referred to in other chapters), where significant wealth concentration exits in the hands of the elites.

Following a critical approach, with all its several areas of research, has always seen rises in its use during times of crises in the capitalist system, like the 1968 protests and the world's financial meltdown in 2008. And here, it should therefore come as no surprise that it will be used in a thesis that investigates the political economy of Egypt during the 2011 revolution and the developments that followed, when the masses were chanting "bread, freedom, and social justice." This approach gives great importance to the role of media in controlling societies in favour of elites. Hence, I argue that it perfectly paves the road for relevant news overviews and analysis in Chapters Four and Five. Following an approach of critical political economy of communication *is* fundamental in understanding the power position of Egypt's business elite and why they paid significant attention to creating and controlling the private press market.

Generally speaking, we can see that one of the major structural patterns that relate to the Egyptian media system is that the extreme inequality of capital distribution in the Egyptian society was not affected or changed by the 2011 revolution, as power and wealth remained in the hands of the country's elites, despite the brief shaky period they experienced in 2011. Comparatively speaking, it is also true that even big and old democracies like the United States show extreme concentration of wealth. Most major US media are linked through ownership structures and boards of trustees connected to big businesses, which poses a serious challenge to media freedom. However, when comparing Egypt to the United States, one must note that not all capital in the US is 'loyalist' in the sense that it can be identified with a particular political player. The US media capital is somewhat more competitive, and political parties, social institutions and civil society at large are less vulnerable than they are in the case of Egypt (Hafez, 2013, p. 8). And here understanding the US media model can help understanding the Egyptian one. The 'propaganda model' of Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky is a critical approach to understanding the American news industry and how it is controlled by the elites and their

economic interests, which has many lessons to learn from while analysing the Egyptian one. Additionally, in the end, we cannot deny the American political and economic influences on Egypt since the signing of Camp David peace treaty in 1978 (discussed in Chapter Three). An influence that affected how a barber in an Egyptian village would promote a certain haircut seen in a Hollywood movie, or how the same person would crave for a McDonald's burger sandwich in the nearest town. Or in other terms: Globalisation.

In their book "Manufacturing consent: The political Economy of the Mass media", Herman and Chomsky see the mass media as a system that serves for communicating messages and symbols to the general populace. It is their function (the mass media) to amuse, entertain, inform, and to inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behaviour that integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society. In a world of concentrated wealth and major conflicts of class interests, fulfilling this role requires systematic propaganda (Herman & Chomsky, 2002, p. 1). Here both authors are mostly focussing on the politics of American media, which is largely privately owned. In our case, the Egyptian private media, which were introduced shortly before the 2000s (private media during monarch Egypt was nationalised following the 1952 military coup), were meant to produce more entertaining political and *apolitical* content in order to drag the public's attention back to local media after Al-Jazeera and other international media outlets had taken it away. At that point when new media strategies were introduced to gain back the masses' attention, the already existing business elite provided the service to the political one and stepped into the private media market.

Herman and Chomsky introduced a propaganda model that analyses the power games and relations between the business elite and government (in the US) on one side and the private media on the other. They argue that in countries where the levers of power are in the hands of a state bureaucracy, the monopolistic control over the media - often supplemented by official censorship - makes it clear that the media serve the goals of a dominant elite. They also argue that it is more difficult to see a propaganda system at work where the media are private and formal censorship is absent. This is especially true where the media actively compete,

periodically attack and expose corporate and governmental wrongdoings, and aggressively portray themselves as spokesmen for free speech and the general community interest. Herman and Chomsky argue that criticism against the elites in the American media is of a very limited nature, and does not question the entire system, thus effectively strengthening it rather than criticising it. Moreover, they point to the importance of the huge inequality in access to news sources in the American system, which in turn decides who has influence and who doesn't (Herman & Chomsky, 2002). Their propaganda model promotes the view that the elite domination of the media can lead to marginalising dissenting voices while operating the media institutions as 'objective' and 'neutral' players in society. This means that news coverage will inevitably be biased as seen, for instance, in drawing on certain official sources uncritically while ignoring dissenting sources. And similarly, to how American news media can depict "enemy states" in a certain way compared to the way they cover 'friend states", the Egyptian news media, was depicting the Muslim Brotherhood and whoever supports or sympathises with them as enemies of Egypt, and whoever takes an opposite position against the group is a friend.

Herman and Chomsky discuss how the private media is being used, willingly and unwillingly, to produce news contents that meet the political and business elites' interests, or at least to limit the harmfulness of news contents to the same interests, in order to maintain powers and protect the elite's position. The critical British newspaper, the Guardian, might though seem as an exception that goes against Herman's and Chomsky's assumptions, as it is both privately-owned and not-profit-seeking at the same time. The Guardian Media Group's negative financial operating performance reflects the fact that it is not run for the sake of conventional profit-maximising objectives. The company is not listed on the stock exchange, however it is wholly owned by a private trust (the Scott Trust), which one of their primary objectives is to ensure the continuation of its 'liberal' national newspaper (Doyle, 2002). Interestingly, the Guardian shares this similarity of being a non-profit-maximising newspaper with Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan (discussed in Chapter Three). However, I think both Egyptian newspapers are different in almost all other aspects, including the poor professional standards and the relative lack of critical content.

The 'consent' notion of Herman and Chomsky goes hand in hand with Mosco's understanding of hegemony, which draws its strength from achieving the consent of those it would control. He also argues that this hegemony requires the exercise of power to maintain consent under changing conditions. And communication here plays a central role in hegemony as both old and new media are vital to the successful maintenance of the hegemonic control as well as to resistance and the construction of counter-hegemonies (Mosco, 2009, pp. 209-210). I find the recognition of the presence of 'counter-hegemony', as Mosco puts it, very crucial in understanding the Egyptian press market and its imperfections. I indeed see it as a controlled market, but I also see that it has its own moments of failures like how the masses in 2011 slipped away from the mainstream narrative of events and managed to topple a strong president like Mubarak. Egypt does have a significant private press market, but it is not independent. This study's framework introduces a critique of the private press as a part of an emancipatory project of the people that almost succeeded in 2011 in seizing power from the elites, very quickly the elite won back, and probably there would be several more rounds back and forth. And because of the presence of hegemony and counter-hegemony in communication, I find critical theory and its approach of critical political economy of communication, the nearest and most adaptive to understanding of an Egyptian media model, like how Herman and Chomsky came out with their American propaganda model.

Tamarod: People's demonstrations on Friday for mandating the Army to stop civil war[4]

Reflecting on the article above, one should remember that there was no civil war, or even a sign that there could be one in Egypt's horizon before, during or after the 2013 coup. There was violence indeed, but still using the term 'civil war' was an extreme. And anyway, armies don't need people's mandates to stop wars in their countries, as it is simply the very reason why they

[4] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 24 July 2013.

exist and consume huge segments of a country's budget. Having this said, we can see that the above headline by Al-Masry Al-Youm sends obvious strong messages to the public. And by analysing and understanding these messages, the second part of the main question in this thesis, which is concerned with *how* did Egypt business elite control the press, can be answered. And in doing so, I will apply framing analysis.

In order to understand how exactly this type of news content worked on helping the business elite maintain their power, I think framing analysis is the most suitable approach to apply on this type of content. As we can see in the above headline, the conveyed message is very direct and very simple, I would even say blunt. And I think it gives strength to arguments, when we handle them by applying simple and straight forward approaches in order to understand and prove them, when the content is as simple and as straightforward. I also consider this content analysis choice technically complementary to the discussions and arguments brought to this study, which takes an approach of critical political economy of communication. And I think it is a solid choice to particularly use this approach, as framing theory is a widely applied method for analysing messages and basic themes sent through media contents. Many scholars agree that framing analysis provides a direct and reliable interpretation of the role of certain media in shaping ideas and public views about current affairs, and also tendencies of responses to covered issues (Norris, Kern, & Just , 2003; D'Angelo & Kuypers, 2009). Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan, like most newspapers (or media outlet) in the world did, and still do, influence the public through the content they produce and the messages contained within.

A 'frame' as a term refers to the means used by power groups to classify their collective experiences in specific categories, and then refer to these categories in order to understand and develop new information and experiences for further understanding of media content. Erving Goffman in 1974 explained that frames are the basic mechanisms of understanding what is happening in a society, and trying to make sense of occurring events. Since then, framing as a concept has been developing in communication studies with conceiving the media as a tool used in forming public opinions and determining individuals' trends and ideologies (Mattelart &

Mattelart, 1998). The theory has been utilised in different issues related to public policy, public trends and common interests. This approach assumes that certain media attracts the attention of the public to specific events, hence framing has significant influence on the recipients' perception of contents according to editorial agendas. And within framing theory, a 'news frame' was also developed as an important concept that considers and examines the role of news in influencing the public. The rising importance of the news frame concept is caused by the recently increasing dependency of audiences on the media in forming public opinions. The press particularly plays an effective role in forming public opinion, where it has become a social necessity (Gamson, 1996). It has also been argued that Journalists do operate within a set of assumptions or frames, which provide a way of organising and filtering the information that they receive, and in turn they transmit as news (Abercrombie & Longhurst, 2007, p. 94). Or in other words, journalists highlight *parts* of reality and ban or tune down the rest of it, while they are producing what they think is news. And to understand this process through the news content produced, framing and how it is considered to be a process of "centrally organising ideas or storylines that provide meaning to unfolding strip of events" (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p. 143), which is an essential argument for the research course of this study examining the content of our two newspapers 'telling the story' of events in 2013 . And in turn playing an important role in social mobilisation (Benford & Snow, 1988), where indeed millions marched in support of a military coup.

In news framing, a journalist might redesign an event in terms of words, meanings and images in order to represent a window for recipients to see the world (Tuchman, 1978). It is argued in the same direction, although much earlier that the world as we imagine through that window of news affects what people do and what they adopt (Lippmann, 1922). However, the background culture where this process develops is not less important than framing itself. It is important to realise the significance of news frames depending on the culture and the thinking of most people of a particular social stratum (Ibrahim, 2001). In general, news frames are specific tools like: keywords influencing the perception of recipients, metaphors making descriptions more powerful, and images impacting the memories of those recipients (Entman R. , 2004). And

to understand what framing can do in a particular society and its prevailing culture, we have to try thinking how and average Egyptian believing that Egypt is 'the land of peace and civilisation' (regardless of how accurate the statement is) as we can see on many billboards on highways, would feel when she/he is told there might be a civil war.

Understanding the 'invisibility' in sending messages by power groups or the elites through the media they own is very important to understand the influence of the probable credibility of the sources used in conveying these messages and themes to the public. The point about invisibility in this sense, and how it can be tied to a third dimension of power, is that the less contained the media agenda *looks* from the audience's point of view, the more effective it is likely to be in shaping *what* issues people think about, as well as *how* they think about them (Schlosberg, 2017). Al-Masry Al-Youm, by publishing an article with the earlier mentioned headline did not claim it is their point of view that a civil war is at the doorsteps of Egypt. They did not either claim this point of view is the army's or the business or the political elites'. It is simply what Tamarod, as a movement 'by the people and for the people' says, which gives this headline some sort of credibility (in the eyes of the readers) and the chance to be influential. And indeed it was influential, as these demonstrations 'mandating' the army were massive. On that day millions did march in the streets asking the army to intervene and rescue the country from 'civil war'. And I consider this headline a perfect example of hitting two frames with one stone: first, spreading fear of the Muslim Brotherhood, and second, promoting the army as the country's saviour. And what happens when the army takes over, is exactly what the counter-revolution (mostly business and political elites) has been wishing for since Mubarak's fall. The army would obviously protect their interests, as it was the case since Camp David and Sadat's *Infitah*. I see this particular media influence as a very good example of a commodified news content, produced by the private press, consumed by the public, and providing a service to the producer (the business elite) for maintaining their power (and the political elite's) by protecting the statuesque that had existed since Sadat's time and got briefly interrupted by the 2011 revolution. And understanding how this process technically happened around the military coup period is important to the course of this research by empirically proving the presence of control

over the private press, and complementary to critically understanding the interest of Egypt's business elite in maintaining their power and reinforce their hegemony and social relations with the rest of society.

2.2 Methodology

In line with my reference to the critical theorist Fuchs in the very beginning of this chapter arguing that culture and politics are part of the economy, where humans produce and communicate meanings and collective decisions in social processes, many scholars follow almost the same thread connecting press content to the elites and the control they maintain. Many journalists as well seem to reconcile the ruling class ideology with the news content they produce (Murdock, 2000, p. 7), as they tend to accept the frames imposed on events by officials and marginalise the voices that fall outside the dominant elite circles (Reese, 1990). In the Egyptian case, voices that, for example, said that there will be no civil war, were not heard, and the sound of war drums was much higher in the press and media in general. And hence I argue that the press plays a role in maintaining the authority of the elites, whether the political or business one. And in order to precisely define a particular case in a particular country an interpretive framework, like framing theory, is very useful in empirically interpreting and proving my critical analysis of Egypt's private press market. In this study, a two-dimensional methodology is applied: critically analysing the political economy of the Egyptian press from one side, supported by framing analysis form the other. A methodology which aims at proving, understanding and analysing the power of Egypt's business elite controlling the private press they own and use convey messages to the public that serves their own interests and those in the political elite.

The application of this tailored methodology starts with critical analysis of Egypt's business elite and their political interests in addition to the press landscape they dominate. A critical qualitative analysis approach on the available literature covering Egypt's political economy in general and the media market in particular since the 1950s till present will be applied

in Chapter Three and connected to the rest of chapters as they develop, when necessary. I will be paying particular attention to themes of hegemony imposed by the ruling elite and political, economic and social changes that might accompany the process of political enforcement, when available. Like for example the process of change under Nasser and the Free Officers Movement following the 1952 military coup and building a post-independence state, Sadat's *Infitah* and his approach reinforce his position internally to gain support from the west later, and Mubarak's relatively similar approach of Sadat's with several differences. All of these hegemony politics and their relation to the media are all critically discussed. However, and extra layer of analysis will be particularly added to the period from early 2000s until present. This period is where my own personal background might have an input to some of these analysis, as it is the period that my professional career history might come of value to narratives and their analysis.

I was working as an economic adviser in the mining sector for Marine Co.[5], from 2000 to 2006. I then moved to the private media sector in the same year, also as an economic advisor, for Ramattan News Agency[6]. In 2008, I moved from TV news to print press, as I was hired as an editor of the economy page at Al-Borsa newspaper, which is published in Arabic and owned by a company called Business Media Group (BMG)[7]. In 2012 the same company hired me as the editor in chief of The Daily News Egypt (DNE), published in English, when they bought it from its previous owner Egyptian Media Services (EMS)[8] after they declared bankruptcy. In May 2014, almost one year after the military coup, I resigned from DNE for political reasons and

[5] An Egyptian company operating from Egypt the UK, specialising in mining, shipping and stevedoring services to several countries in the world.
[6] A Palestinian TV news agency specialising in 'hard news', headquarters in Cairo, and running news operations from nice offices across the Middle East. The agency was the world's most important TV news producer from Palestine and Sudan until it was shut-down in around 2010 due to political complications following the clash between Fateh and Hamas in 2007.
[7] An Egyptian media investment company founded and owned by a group of middle-aged senior journalist in 2007 with the intention of producing 'independent journalism'. The company made big success, as their major and first newspaper Al-Borsa became Egypt's to economic daily, however, in January 2017 the government froze the company's assets and put a travel ban some of its board members and later in August same year the company got almost 'nationalised and now it is completely run by the state through Al-Akhbar Instutution.
[8] An Egyptian company established in 2007 by a small group of real-estate investors for the sake of producing The Daily News Egypt in cooperation with The New York Times, which then was The International Heral Tribune. This group of investors never invested in media again.

permanently stayed in Belgium. This particularly senior career history of mine provided me with privileged access to the business elite in the beginning when I was working in the mining sector, which is very highly connected to the political elite. My connection to the elite was beyond business relations, as it occasionally went social, as I attended their gatherings, weddings and upper-class dinners. I even me two of the media investors studies in this thesis (Naguib Sawiris and Salah Diab) a couple of times. Two of them were at dinners I've been invited to with former Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif and other members of Egypt's business elite. Working as an economic adviser in the TV news industry on a regional level and then being a chief editor of an internationally known newspaper, also gave me access to the same business elite that invests in the media sector and other political players. We can loosely say that I had access to experiences and practices that only happen 'behind closed doors', which most researchers don't have access to, and if they do it won't be for such a long period or that close. Having this said, my own non-academic experience will be very carefully used in this qualitative analysis, particularly when it comes to the period from the year 2000 and on. Objectivity is of course a very important factor conducting this analysis. And this is why proving my arguments by the support of some journalistic sources might occasionally happen. Especially, that this area of the political economy of Egypt's media is academically understudied and not deep or critical enough, when literature exists.

As we reach the second and last phase of application of the study's methodology, Chapter Five will be mostly dedicated to a framing analysis proving and further empirically building up on Chapter Three's critical analysis on the elites and their press. And for the sake of validity, reliability and introduction to the examined sample in Chapter Five, it is always suggested that a pilot study is conducted by selecting a sub-sample (Wimmer & Dominick, 1983). And here comes the importance of Chapter Four as a review of the private press coverage of both the first 18 days of the revolution (until Mubarak's fall), and the transitional period (before the presidential elections that Morsi won in June 2012) where the SCAF was the direct ruler of the country. Chapter Four plays an important role of stage setting and background before actual framing analysis in Chapter Five. I will apply the methodology introduced above to the press

coverage published in print and/or online in two significant periods in relation to the Egyptian revolution:

- Reviewing the private press during and after Mubarak's fall (Chapter Four)
- Applying framing analysis of the private press in 112 days of Tamarod (Chapter Five)

The first reviewed period, is divided into two sections: one during and the other after Mubarak's fall. The first section, which is commonly known as 'the first 18 days of the revolution', is extended to 20 days in this thesis (24 January – 12 February 2011). I decided to add the day before and the day after in order to see or examine if there was intended or planned news production available with certain predetermined frames. As a hypothetical example, covering news on the 24th of January with the intention of distracting the public before the date set for mass-protests on the 25th, away from participating or positively responding to the protests' calls. The same applies to adding one day after Mubarak's fall, in order to examine if there was a message that needed to be sent to the public, by the elites, for calming them down and pushing them to trust what looked like a new regime. The second section of the news review after Mubarak's fall is the period under the SCAF's rule. This section too, as explained earlier, works as a pilot review of press coverage. By doing so, we can sense what sort of frames that were prevailing in the news produced in this period. It is also important to make clear that the two periods of news production under examination (events around Mubarak's fall in 2011 and the military coup in 2013) are commonly known as 'January Revolution' and 'June Revolution' consequently. However, throughout this research, I call the later a military coup, since a democratically elected president was arrested, detained in a secret place and appeared months later in courts for several trials, while the leader of the operation and its public face, was a field marshal who's now the president: Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi.

As for the second period (112 days: 26 April – 15 August 2013), I applied the same one extra day concept at the end of it, the 15th of August, which is the day following one of Egypt's bloodiest incidents in modern history, known as the Rabaa Massacre (discussed in Chapter Five

and Six), where hundreds of participants in a pro-Morsi sit-in were killed and thousands were injured. As for the beginning of the same period, I chose the 26th of April as a significant beginning, which is the date the Tamarod (Rebel) Campaign was inaugurated in Tahrir Square (The foundation and related arguments around Tamarod are thoroughly discussed in Chapter Five). I chose 337 headlines by Al-Masry Al-Youm with the hashtag #Tamarod found in the newspaper's online archive and 345 by Al-Watan with the same hashtag and same period[9].

In this research, I only used headlines of the news stories, as most readers in today's digitalised news world tend to take their impressions through the headlines and share articles on the social media without reading the actual content. New studies show that the sentiment of the headline is strongly related to the popularity of the news and also with the dynamics of the posted comments on that particular news (Reis, et al., 2015). Like this, it is more realistic for one person to analyse almost 700 articles by only using headlines, otherwise this research will need a team of researchers to translate, digitise and analyse the whole content of these articles.

As argued before, frames can promote a particular understanding of events, and influence political outcomes among the masses in Egypt. As for the two above mentioned periods, they are both arguably the most important in the country's recent history as they were the periods that witnessed significant political changes, falls and rises of presidents in reaction to massive street protests. In order to address this inquiry, particularly in the period around the 2013 coupe, I examined the material chosen for uses of framing through manually checking for phrases and portrayals of events in the news. I did not use a software for this task, as this type of programming is rarely available in Arabic, and I'm afraid translation into English will make the texts partially lose native linguistic influence, as translation is never perfect. I first skimmed through the selected sample of the 682 articles by the two newspapers and found that there are two major themes that were highly repetitive. These themes, i.e. frames, are 'fear' and 'promotion'. For example, when we look at the following headline published by Al-Masry Al-

[9] This archive search was conducted online via both newspapers' websites on 24 May 2015. Results of the same research tags may slightly differ for any access time before or after, depending on change in the editorial policy of both newspapers.

Youm on 19 June 2013, we can directly sense the words “threaten” and “terrorists” in association with Morsi.

Tamarod: Morsi threatens Egyptians by terrorists… Thursday, our surprise[10]

Having a headline like this clearly sends a message / a theme / a frame of fear to the public. Thus, I give the frame of ‘fear’ one frequency in the examination process. As for the following headline, published by Al-Watan on 25 June 2013, we can see the use of “20 million”, which is an overly positive number, and I strongly doubt it is true.

Tamarod announces signatures pass 20 million, and discusses 30 June sinarios with Heikal[11]

Also mentioning “Heikal” in the headline is considered very high privilege, as he is one of the top ‘intellectual’ figures in the Arab World, and known to be almost unreachable. I consider a headline like this one a ‘promotion’ for Tamarod, which is also an indirect promotion for the Army, as Heikal himself is also historically a supporter of the Egyptian Army since Nasser times. And hear the frame of ‘promotion’ plays as complementary frame for the ‘fear’ one, as people would need hope and protection. Therefore, I give the frame of ‘fear’ one frequency in the examination process. Then the examination process goes carefully and slowly with each headlines of the sample evaluation the number of frequencies of each of the two previously suggested frames in order to reach our final results.

And finally, responses by Egyptian senior media personnel interviewed for this research get embedded into arguments and analyses throughout the core chapters, when relevant, regardless whether their views support the study’s hypothesis and findings or not. Interviews of primary sources in this thesis plays an important role from two perspectives. The first, is adding depth to

[10] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 19 June, 2013.
[11] Al-Watan, 25 June, 2013.

the arguments throughout the course of this research. And the second, is the importance of each person interviewed for this thesis and the special access she/he has to information that is not usually available to most others in the private press industry. The sources I interviewed are all very influential media professionals who (and the teams of other journalists they lead) provide a significant portion of the daily news production in Egypt's private press market, whether by being actual content producers or leading a news production business. Their strategic positions make them aware of the almost-inaccessible and strategic side of the news industry that takes place behind closed doors, where other junior or medium level media personnel can't access. In the second half of 2015, I interviewed five of these high-profile sources for this study, who happened to trust me and agreed to be part of this research. Four of them are very influential journalists or editors and one is a CEO of a private media company. And they are all aged between late 30s and late 40s. Some of them belong to the same newspapers studies here in this thesis. I gave relatively little details about the interviewees with the intention to eliminate any information that might reveal who they are, which might put them at security risk, especially that they are all still living in Egypt. Their security is a significant concern, as Egypt is known for its crackdown against media freedoms. The country is now considered one of the worst jailers of journalists worldwide (CPJ, 2015). Therefore, I decided to process their interviews anonymously throughout the whole thesis for the sake of their own personal safety. I gave them unisex pseudonyms as Nour Magdy, Alaa Zakareya, Reda Abbas, Wesam Shawkat, and Ihsan Sameer. As for my own security, which also relates to the previous challenge, I don't find it jeopardised by any means, since I'm currently living in Belgium and am not planning to return to Egypt in the near future, unless the current regime changes.

A challenge though surfaced one and half years after starting my research and conducting some field work in Egypt, particularly six months following the military coup, I could not return to Egypt again because of a very high personal security risk. Therefore, conducting my interviews via email was the safest and most feasible method to have their responses embedded into my research. Conducting those interviews via Skype was very difficult, as the interviewees were always delaying and cancelling the appointments, as they were always under the extreme

pressure of the usual daily news production demands. While giving them the flexibility in time to answer my questions in writing seemed most convenient for them. They all received the same list of questions. And once I received the answers of the entire group, I engaged in thematic analyses of their responses and added then to the arguments throughout the thesis, when relevant. In this research, I find the value of the interviewees' input as more of expert inside views from within the press industry and sometimes testimonies of high profile eyewitnesses behind closed doors.

There also other challenges in applying the above explained research methodology in this chapter. For example, my own relation with my former employers, whether in the mining sector or the media one. Having said this, I decided not to directly use any of my former employers' businesses as evidence or samples in my research for a number of reasons. First, seeking academic objectivity by avoiding the direct usage of my own individual or personal experiences or drawing evidences from such players I was strongly connected to. Second, none of my former employers had such a strong or direct influence on the public like the two selected newspapers, Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan, did. Ramattan had its strongest influence on Palestine and Sudan. DNE was, until its nationalisation in August 2017, a very influential newspaper when it comes to Egyptian affairs. However, this influence is locally limited to foreign readers living in the country, however more influential abroad through its website. This is simply because its content is produced in English. As for the two sample newspapers examined here, they are both produced in Arabic and are very well read among the public and frequently cited as sources in TV programmes. However, no one can completely isolate his/her own experiences from the course of viewing or analysing certain topics, which I carefully tend to do through utilising my former experiences in analysing both the power of the Egyptian business elite and the influence they have through their press, which I was both closely connected to.

Balance is an importance factor in most forms of writing, whether it is journalistic or academic. And here I was faced by another challenge. I had to deal with the fact that Al-Watan newspaper did not exist during the period of the first 18 days of the revolution in 2011, as it was

only founded in May 2012. And by having only Al-Masry Al-Youm as a single press source to conduct my analysis did not seem balanced enough. Therefore, I added to the analysis of the above-mentioned period in 2011 the relatively influential Al-Shorouk newspaper. I did so in order to avoid the slight chance that the thesis might be unbalanced, even if it was only for an overview of news – Chapter Three – not for the core framing analysis in Chapter Five, where both sample newspapers of Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan are both represented. Al-Shorouk anyway also has relatively similar characteristics: it is a privately-owned newspaper, with an owner, Ibrahim Al-Moallem, who has connections to Mubarak's regime. However, a notable difference between him and most other media investors of Egypt is that he does not have other non-media investments, as he is focussed on his major business as the owner of Dar Al-Shourouk, the biggest publishing house in the Middle East. For this reason, I ruled out Al-Shorouk for the framing analysis of the second – and core – period in 2013, when Al-Watan was already a top newspaper, and focussed on the two major sample newspapers.

One more challenge that I faced conducting this research, was accessing Al-Watan's archive. Unlike Al-Masry Al-Youm and other upscale newspapers, Al-Watan did not have an online archive for their print edition during the course of research. I directly contacted the newspaper's administration in order to provide me with access to their archive, but I received no response. Later I used my contacts inside their news desk, and I was directly told that Magdy Al-Gallad bans access to the archive of the newspaper's print edition, even to their own journalists. And this is why they ignored my request. Hence, I decided to use their general online archive, which contains all the print edition articles (news, features and opinion) together with the online ones. I decided to follow the same selection process with Al-Masry Al-Youm, although their print archive is accessible online, in order to create a balance between the two samples.

After addressing the above-mentioned challenges conducting this research, the stage was ready to conduct both the qualitative analysis based on the critical political economy of communication of Egypt's press market in Chapter Three and the framing analysis of private press production around the military coup period in 2013 in Chapter Five. While interviews of

local primary sources were added to most arguments in each core chapter from Three to Six. All together in order to empirically answer the main thesis' question of "Why and how does Egypt's business elite control the post-Mubarak press?" by the time the conclusion of this thesis is reached in Chapter Seven.

CHAPTER THREE: A critical review of the political economy of Egyptian press

> *"After the assassination of Sadat in 1981, his successor, Hosni Mubarak, leaned on the rentier economic structure for a transformist[12] politics toward the political opposition. Political prisoners were released, civil rights such as freedom of press and of association were restored – to a degree – and in 1984 parliamentary elections were held. Relations with the Arabic nations, which had soured over the separate peace with Israel, were improved. The political 'détente' was not a process of 'democratisation from above', but a tactical retreat of the dictatorship, leaving limited spaces open in civil and political society for contentious politics that remained subordinated to regime interests […] The rules of the new democratic game were set by the government and the NDP [National Democratic Party]. Elections were manipulated and voters were systematically bought or intimidated"* (De Smet, 2015).

The above quote by Brecht De Smet, who works on revolutionary politics, political economy of capitalism and neoliberalism in Egypt, draws a three-dimensional picture that echoes the focus of this study in general and this chapter in particular: political authoritarianism, the associated neoliberal economic model and the controlled media. This brings us back to the work of Vincent Mosco, discussed in Chapter Two, about the need for a critical discourse when dealing with conventional economics, which is mostly the case dealing with the political economy of Egyptian media. As Mosco argues, conventional economics does not succeed only because economists

[12] Here understood as a state form that keeps (to an extent) the economic redistributive character of its populist predecessor, but without the same political legitimacy or popular mobilization capacity (De Smet, 2014, p 194).

agree on a set of narrow rules about research and discourse. Mainstream economics also succeeds because it serves power by providing information, advice, and policies to strengthen capitalism, which is also the case I observed while working as an economic advisor in the mining sector (2000 – 2006) and the media sector (2006 – 2008). And as important as it is to see economic orthodoxy as a system of rhetoric, it is at least as important to see it as a system of power. To understand that system and to propose ways to change it, especially when we can see how Egypt's elites outfoxed the 2011 revolution into a widely supported military coup two years later, we need critical political economy to understand and inform the public about power games and social control. The game played by the Egyptian elites in order to maintain their powers as mentioned in earlier chapters will be critically discussed in this one. The chapter, which will be fed by interviews conducted for this research, will generally introduce the interconnectedness between the business elite and the media, as well as introduce the role of a newspaper's editor-in-chief and the politics behind the job.

The first section of this chapter, "A brief history of Egypt's business elite" lays the foundation for understanding the nature of Egypt's business elite by critically understanding their history and how they developed, paving the road for further detailed discussions by subtopics. Section 3.2, "A brief history of Egypt's press", is another foundational discussion on the history of the Egyptian press from Nasser's times with a focus on the present. Section 3.3, "The business elite's interest in press control" brings the business elite and the media together with the argument of the control practised by the first above the later as a theme of hegemony, which is essential in the whole study. Section 3.4, "Sample profiles of press investors", is an introduction to major players or controllers from the business elite along with their economic and political backgrounds in order to provide a clearer understanding of the interest in press manipulation in Egypt. And finally comes Section 3.5, "Sample profiles of editors-in-chief", as the last critical set of details concerning the role of the 'implementers' of the business elite's plans on the ground – the editors-in-chief – through the newspapers they own. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 are both essential to understanding the news review in Chapter Four and the sample news framing analysis in Chapter Five.

3.1 A brief history of Egypt's business elite

In order to better understand how Egypt's business elite controls the private media and particularly the private press, we have to go through their history to understand their nature, how they were created, developed and what are their interests. I will start this brief historical review from the beginnings of Nasser's state. The Cairo Fire in January 1952[13], where many of Egypt's colonially symbolic buildings were burned down in a mysterious way unresolved until today, is one of the major signs that the end of British colonialism and the rule of Mohamed Ali's dynasty in Egypt was nigh. The change in the world order following the end of World War II, the *Nakba* in 1948[14], the rise of nationalism, among other factors including the significant corruption and brutality of the local monarch-supported elite and aristocracy, were all important factors leading to the big change in Egypt that started on 23 July 1952. On that day, a group of young military men – The Free Officers Movement – led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, carried out a military coup against King Farouk I. Nasser was mostly the face leading the movement, however the group of young officers together launched a series of fundamental political, economic and social changes that played an important role in shaping today's Egypt. Social justice, abolition of feudalism, establishment of a strong national army, full independence and sovereignty for Egypt were all pillars of the Free Officers' plan for the future of the country (Al Khafaji, 2004). All, while building a post-independence economy, which was a main goal for the movement.

The Free Officers realised the need to build new political structures to approach the new Egypt they aspired for. The country was a stage for class struggles against the elite, especially the feudalists, where violence against farmers and small land owners was common. Nasser and his officers decided, with the support and blessings of big segments of the society, to push the monarchy- and the British-supported elite out of the picture, especially since the majority of them were considered from the counter-revolutionary camp. Internationally, there was also

[13] Also, known as Black Saturday when a series of riots that took place on 26 January 1952 burning and looting hundreds of buildings including Cairo Opera House.
[14] The defeat of Arab Armies of which the Egyptian was the largest, and the official beginning of Israeli occupation of Palestine.

mounting pressure on the new Egypt, as it was giving strong signals of moving towards socialism. Within six weeks, the movement passed a land reform law that significantly changed the whole rural social landscape by limiting land ownership, which in turn made hundreds from the pre-coup elite lose most, if not all, of their wealth. Farmland ownership was reduced to maximum 200 Feddans for individuals and 300 for a family. By 1969 about 12 percent of Egypt's cultivated land was in the hands of previously landless or near-landless farmers (Bush, 2007). The industrialists and big business owners also had their share of nationalisation, and by 1960 the state was responsible for 74 percent of the country's GDP (Beinin, 1989). "These actions, followed by the 1956 nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the Suez Crisis[15], brought on by the abrupt US withdrawal of support for the Aswan High Dam, are now remembered as a turning point in Egypt's politics. But Nasser and his fellow officers had not seized power with the aim of carrying out land reform or building a postcolonial state around the Aswan project. Concerned principally with the incompetence and corruption of the army high command, they took control when they suddenly feared their own arrest" (Mitchell, 2002, p. 43). I argue that particularly following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, the newly reborn state turned confrontational internationally and nationally in order to survive, and hence needed allies both externally – the Eastern block – and internally – a loyal elite newly created almost from scratch. A loyal elite that mostly consisted of military men and state bureaucrats.

I also argue that ambition and fear were both very important elements in shaping what followed the Free Officer's military coup, leading to the birth process of their post-independence state. Nasser and his colleague officers, with the support of Egyptian masses, and solidarity in some parts of the Arab region, had big ambition of building a strong pan-Arab nationalist state. This ambitious project was a hope of positioning Egypt and the region on solid grounds in the new world order following the post-World War II power adjustments, which was shifting compass toward the United States. However, fear was a dominant feeling present in their political and economic strategy planning, as they seemed aware that their ambition would be

[15] Also, called the Tripartite Aggression, an invasion of Egypt 1956 by Israel, Britain and France with the aims to regain Western control of the Suez Canal and to remove Nasser; the United States and the Soviet Union forced the three invaders to withdraw.

fought against by the former elite, which was very well connected to the west and its old colonialist powers and the US. That new post-WWII bipolar world provided the Free Officers and Nasser with a great chance to go through with their plans, since both the Soviet Union and the US were competing for alliances in the Middle East, which the young officers realised very well and took advantage of by claiming to keep a balance between the two powers. By doing so, they managed to create themselves a space to reinforce the country's national sovereignty (Gaddis, 1997). During the early 1960s, the formation of a new elite that Nasser could trust and depend on in building his socialist state project, almost completely replaced the previous monarch-supported free market one: a new elite of state bureaucrats, military men and a few rural and urban political leaders. In parallel, a media propaganda machine owned and controlled by the new state was established to guarantee a popular support for the Free Officer's ambition, which will be discussed later in Section 3.2 of this chapter.

The defeat of the Egyptian Army in 1967 and having Sinai – and other Arab territories - occupied by Israel[16] was a major set-back for Nasser's state. This defeat was followed by significant political and economic pressures, both locally and internationally, which marked the beginning of the end of the only one decade of relative success in attempting to transform Egypt into a socialist state. "The economic crisis in the second half of the 1960s and the defeat in the Six Day War undermined the material and ideological base of Nasserism. In order to attract foreign capital, ruling elites led by President Sadat forcefully reconfigured the dominant class alliances and accumulation strategy along neoliberal lines" (De Smet & Bogaert, 2017). This setback had its pace accelerated following the death of Nasser in 1970, when the Free Officers got divided into two factions: one pro-Soviet led by Ali Sabri[17], and another that later clearly became pro-American, led by President Mohamed Anwar Al Sadat[18]. The bureaucratic Pro-Soviet Nasserist left then was weak and uncomfortable with mobilising the masses (Farah, 1986).

[16] In addition to Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, West Bank and Gaza in Palestine, parts of Jordan and the Golan Heights in Syria were all occupied by the Israeli army.
[17] Ali Sabri (1920 – 1991) was an Egyptian politician of Turkish origin and one of the Free Officers' second row leaders.
[18] Mohamed Anwar Al Sadat (1918 – 1981) was the third president of Egypt (following Interim President Sufi Abu Talib), serving from 15 October 1970 until his assassination by fundamentalist army officers on 6 October 1981.

Hence, Sadat with the support of Islamists, mostly the Muslim Brotherhood, succeeded in winning the political battle against the Nasserist socialists, and enforcing new measures of re-shaping Egypt's political and economic model gradually towards a free-market economy in what is known later as *Infitah* or Open-Door Policy[19], which started around 1974. The Higher Committee for the Liquidation of Feudalism was disbanded right after Nasser's death. Land owners and some earlier feudalists were able to reclaim some of their farmland and rents were raised for the first time since 1952 (Bush, 2007). Later, in 1978, the Camp David Peace Accord[20] was signed between Egypt and Israel, which in turn took Sadat's policies to a higher level of economic liberalisation with the support of the United States, where the peace treaty was signed. "Transferring farmland out of village control into large commercial hands coincided with the interests of American agribusiness corporations, including Coca-Cola and Pepsico, for whom Camp David confirmed the ending of the Egyptian boycott of American soft drink companies and the opening up of an important new market. Both companies embarked on investment projects in Egypt in the late 1970s, including a twenty-thousand-acre citrus-growing project to produce soft-drink concentrates negotiated jointly by Taha Zaki (an advisor to the Egyptian government on 'food security') and a director of Pepsico — the White House advisor Robert Strauss" (Mitchell, 2002). And by this close economic and political cooperation between Egypt and the US, which started in Sadat's era, I argue that Egypt until today is still living, in a way or another, according to these ties. They might strengthen or weaken depending on the changes that might occur under consequent American administrations, but they still exist and shape a big part of Egypt's free market economic policies.

It is important to shed light on the fact that the change in Egypt's economic and political policies since Sadat are supported by three Washington-based institutions: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and The United States Agency for International Development (USAID). I argue that these institutions represent a post-colonialist practice that

[19] Sadat's policy of "opening the door" to private investment in Egypt in the years following the 1973 October War (Yom Kippur War) with Israel.

[20] Signed by Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on 17 September 1978, following twelve days of secret negotiations at Camp David in the United States.

was allowed by Sadat to penetrate Egypt's politics and economy following the death of Nasser, which were allowed to continue growing and enforcing change toward a free-market economy under Mubarak, who slowly followed Sadat's footsteps after the latter's assassination in 1981. A form of 'rentier capitalism' was in service for the benefits of state bureaucrats and the private sector at the same time. Rents were accumulating and being distributed centrally through the state based on relations. While private capital entered the rent distribution process through subcontracting and the black market (Farah, 1986). Under Sadat and Mubarak, a second phase of creating a politically loyal elite was in the making in order to replacing Nasser's military and bureaucratic elites: the business elite. The process of creating this new elite was due to the lack of confidence in Nasser's loyalists. Mubarak then followed Sadat's path and reinforced the newly emerging business elite. Some were from the former monarch-loyal elite that had their wealth nationalised under Nasser, some were state bureaucrats turning into businessmen using power connections to the state, and some were just an emerging result of the re-launch of a free-market economy. The central problem of political and economic reform since then until today lays in the ways it is conceptualised and implemented through a free-market ideology that transfers power from the state to new 'hybrid' governmental arrangements where 'state' and 'market' seem to become a symbiotic pair (Zemni & Bogaert, 2009). One supports the other, and vice-versa, which played, a pivotal role in creating political, economic and social consent, or at least attempting to. We can briefly say that Sadat's Open-Door or *Infitah* policy led to almost an erosion of Nasser's bureaucratic class and a rise of a new upper class concentrating its investments in the service and finance sectors rather than manufacturing as was the case before in the 1950s and 1960s. However, In Mubarak's time, this new upper class got massively richer after joining the Sadat founded NDP, which later became the regime's strongest ally.

Mitchell (2002) gives three examples out of many families who were supported by Sadat's and Mubarak's regimes in order to get well established in the new business elite in exchange of political support to the state. The Mansour family, who were cotton traders before 1952, managed to find their way back to the business picture in mid-1970s as major private investors. They managed to have exceptional access to international – mainly American – brands and

became local (in some cases regional) agents for western companies. Within such diverse pool of brands, the Mansours were sole agents for Chevrolet, General Motors, Caterpillar, Marlboro, McDonald's and other brands. Generally, besides the fast food sector, they dominated Egypt's automotive market back then, and still do have a leading position in the same market today. A second example, very much unlike the pre-1952 returning elite of the Mansours, is the Bahgat Group, led by Ahmed Bahgat, who has no aristocratic or elite history. The group is the biggest producer of televisions in the Middle East with a dominant position in the Egyptian market. Bahgat was always publicly seen as Mubarak's good and loyal friend, which gave him access to financing opportunities in other non-electronic sectors like irrigation systems, tourism, real estate, retail trade, and later being the founder and owner of Dream TV Network. The third example, whose rise also post-dates 1952, is the Sawiris family (They also had some business presence before the 1952 military coup, but it doesn't seem to be very significant in comparison to other families like the Mansours). Onsi, the father, was working as a contractor in Libya before Sadat's *Infitah*; the new policy encouraged him to return to Egypt. The family's wealth initially rapidly grew following their introduction to the market as local agents of Hewlett-Packard and AT&T, besides building US-funded communication networks for the Egyptian military. Later in the 1990s the son, Naguib, revolutionised the family's business reaching a much higher peak by investing in mobile network services and construction through their holding company Orascom with investments located in more than 20 countries in Europe, Africa and Asia. The son solely later became the founder and owner of ONTV Network and cofounder of the popular private newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm.

What the above-mentioned large investors have in common is that they all were established and had their investment portfolios massively and diversely grow under the few last years of Sadat and the whole period under Mubarak. During the period from the mid-1970s till the mid-2000s, the common features of cooperation with the state's political elite were almost the same. They were based on government contracts, projects promoted and supported by USAID, and special access to private banks funding, which were already owned or managed by relatives or members of the same business elite, born under Sadat and grown under Mubarak's

first 25 years in office. I argue that these three business elite examples represent important diversity within their power group: Mansour as a returning aristocrat, Sawiris as returning businessman, and Bahgat as a home-grown business tycoon. And despite these differences in backgrounds and beginnings they all had very similar benefits, interest and privileged access to resources, as explained above. Two of them, Bahgat and Sawiris own media companies and the third, Mansour, was trying to buy the giant Al-Hayat TV Network in mid-2016, but the deal did not seal. They all benefit from the political elite and they are all interested in the private media after being well established in other business sectors.

Arguably, the year 2004 represents an important shift within the Sadat-Mubarak era politics. It is the year when Gamal Mubarak was introduced to Egypt's political sphere as the Head of Political Committee at the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP)[21]. In the same year, the Egyptian-Canadian graduate of McGill University, Ahmed Nazif, whom I met in person several times in my capacity as an economic advisor and later a journalist, was appointed as the country's prime minister with two goals to achieve: one pushed by international Washington-based institutions, accelerating the privatisation process of the public sector. And the second goal was to provide the required support and the friendly legislative environment for Gamal to run for presidency when appropriate. Probably, after the father would decide to step down for the son. Or maybe leaving the presidential palace for the son as a political heir after Mubarak's death. Obviously, such a big plan failed after stumbling onto the 2011 revolution.

One could now judge that Gamal, the western-minded and neoliberally educated young man with sweeping ambition to inherit his father's throne, was too enthusiastic and insistent on reaching his goal. The change he needed in order to pave his road to presidency was not fast enough to adapt with his plans. I argue that he decided to introduce a new business elite to Egypt for this reason: a new power group that was younger and closer to him personally, in order to play as better listeners and faster respondents to his ambitious plans. Gamal's new elite, or 'new

[21] Founded by Sadat in 1978, considered a de-facto single party with authoritarian characteristics within an officially multi-party system until its dismantling in response to the January Revolution in 2011.

guards', were not planned to conflict with the already existing 'old guards', grown under Sadat and Mubarak. However, it was an alternative solution that was meant to work in parallel, as no significant conflicts occurred between the two sub-groups. Similarly, in persuasion strategies like his father and Sadat provided before, the new guards had privileged access to economic benefits and were allowed to grow very fast. This rapidly enforced political and economic project made the son come up with the idea of uniting forces in his favour, both the business and political elites, in one ruling elite. It worked well in the beginning, but I argue it was also one of the main reasons for accelerating the fall of the Mubaraks, when economic and political corruption reached an unprecedented high as a result.

One example out of many concerning that attempted merge of the political and business elites into almost one body is what is known as the Palm Hills court case. Going through the details of political, legal and financial corruption in this case shows how the elite promoted by Gamal Mubarak (the new guard) quickly spread economically and politically. Palm Hills is a company that was registered with a total capital of EGP 2 billion, 55 percent owned by Al-Mansur and Al-Maghraby Company. The two businessmen Mohamed Al-Mansur and Ahmed Al-Maghraby ran a variety of other investments in different sectors. While running their businesses with the state, they were both appointed in Nazif's cabinet. Mansur was the minister of transportation from 2005 to 2009, while Al-Maghraby served from 2004 till 2009 as a minister of tourism, and from 2009 till Mubarak's fall as a minister of construction. The Palm Hills company, owned by Gamal's close friends and new business elite, got richer and stronger, and the Mubaraks would financially benefit as well (Adly, 2011). Alaa Mubarak, Gamal's brother and shareholder of Palm Hills, was profiteering from state assets – public land allocated to the private sector in this case investigated by Adly – in exchange for huge amounts of money channelled in and out of companies he held shares in.

The strategy by Gamal Mubarak's new guards of not clashing with his father's old guards did not work perfectly in the end. It seems that the military did not fully approve of the presidential inheritance plan to the son, but did not want to clash with the father, who they were

loyal to as their military leader. An indication that supports this argument is the decision made by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), which took over following Mubarak's fall, to claim support for the revolution and to meet people's demands by putting many from the son's new guard under arrest in a media-scandalising fashion. The old guards, however, were only arrested when people went to the streets again demanding trials of Mubarak, his family and his corrupt old guards. Moreover, the members of the old guard were arrested in a subtle way, without planned media shaming, in marked contrast to what happened with the new guards. Another indication of favouritism and respect to the old guards by the military is drawn from the post-coup period starting late 2013. Many court acquittals were granted for both groups of the business elites, but the new guards are currently politically marginalised, in contrast with others who were not close to Gamal and his presidential ambition.

This position from Egypt's politics taken by the military is actually an interestingly complex one that need further research. Hazem Kandil in his book 'Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen: Egypt's Road to Revolt' published in 2012 argues that the military's destiny under Sadat and Mubarak was temporarily tied to the security apparatus, which he argues they had a stronger position at that period following Camp David. In the beginning of the revolution the masses chanted "The people and the military are one hand". This was due to the common understanding among Egyptians that the military did not intervene in the revolution in favour of the security forces, which I think is not entirely true. However, those who chanted praising unity between the army and the people began to chant furiously "The people demand the execution of the field marshal (then head of SCAF Mphamed Tantawy). Praise for the patriotism and integrity of the military has turned into sour denunciation by activists against the corrupt and complacent officer corps. Even passive citizens, who have not engaged in the revolution have come to observe the military with suspicion. Generally speaking, the public image of the army back then (2011 – 2012) deteriorated from a partner in the revolution to a leader of the counter-revolution. And here the military seems to have decided to cross to the other side into the usual territories of the security apparatus handling civilian security affairs and engage more in politics. According to Kandil, "It appears that the army had surrendered to the power formula by Sadat

and maintained by Mubarak, whereby the security apparatus dominates, its political auxiliaries, enjoy status and wealth, and the military watches passively from a faraway corner" (Kandil, 2012, p. 234).

I disagree thought with some parts of Kandil's evaluation of the military's position within the political sphere. Unfortunately for his great research, contradictory to his assumption that the army surrendered to Sadat's formula of leaving the space for the security apparatus, was not accurate, as in 2013 a military coup happened. But it was difficult to predict at the time the book was being written and then got published in 2012. I agree thought with the presence of what he calls a 'formula' for how power is shared or 'enjoyed' between the military and security apparatus. Indeed, there was what seemed like a retreat by the military from political life since Camp David agreement till the fall of Mubarak. Kandil though gives too much credit for the security apparatus and make it appear like a defeat for the army or a struggle. I would actually say that yes this is how it appeared from a distance to the public and academic researchers, but the reality was relatively different. Based on my experience in the mining sector and later in business journalism with Al-Borsa, I would say that it was a redistribution of power and authorities. It was an exchange of political power against economic power, where both sides win, and Egypt as a country wouldn't appear too militarised in the eyes of the west. Almost every seaport and airport in the country had its administration given to retired (or even early-retired) generals. The same applied to 100s of state and private owned companies. The army itself was given the chance to directly invest in a massive variety of business sectors from producing pasta to tourism, entertainment and even night life. In the mining sector, I would say from experience, that there's literally nothing in this sector that can be done from mining itself all the way to shipping without the approval and economic benefiting by the army. So, in the end, I don't see that the relation between the military and the security apparatus as a relation of struggle by the first. I see it as a period of divided territories of benefits, which lasted for a period since, since Camp David in 1978 and ended in 2013 by the coup, where the military took over the political sphere next to the economic one they have already enjoyed.

There is not enough literature published yet on the relation between Al-Sisi and the business elite. However, since the military coup of 2013, there are indications that he would follow Mubarak's approach on favouring them. However, Al-Sisi tends to sound more complex and ambiguous about his approach. In December 2013, I wrote my weekly editor's letter with the title "Sisi in Nasser's suit, Sadat's tongue and Mubarak's fist", discussing the complexity of the model and predicting failure. The article unsurprisingly put myself and The Daily News Egypt in trouble. I was arguing that, with the exception of the Brotherhood, Al Sisi's goal is to 'make all Egyptians happy'. Egyptians with all groups and colours; the revolutionary (or whoever seem representative), the political elite, the business elite and most importantly the masses that called for his 'help' on 30 June. For the masses and some fraction of the revolutionary activists, especially the widely supported and media polished Tamarod movement back then, he had to adopt a Nasserist approach. He flirted with the euphoric people in his military suit and spoke a language that finds nostalgic ears among the poor and deprived aspiring to have a dignified life. In Al-Sisi's other approach, he partially followed a Sadatist style in his concentration on his nationalist language about Egypt. The term 'Egypt above all' could be heard and seen on banners all over the country then. Sadat followed the same approach in the late 1970s, when he wanted to withdraw from the pan-Arab Nasserist commitment. Al-Sisi was similarly breaking the ties with the Arab uprisings bond that was created in 2011. On the other hand, the deteriorating economy was very challenging to Al-Sisi's plans. The general then had to approach the power group prepared to play this role: the business elite, the same group of businessmen that Mubarak and his son Gamal brought to power (Hamoud, 2013).

In 2016, Grawert and Abul-Magd published a book called "Businessmen in Arms: How the Military and Other Armed Groups Profit in the MENA Region," where they briefly discussed Al-Sisi's economic policies in Egypt:

> *"On the one hand, he imposes a state and military upper hand in running the economy and extends government support to the middle and lower classes, a la Nasser's model. On the other hand, he pursues market*

> *reforms by eliminating subsidies and stimulating the investments of the business elite, following in Mubarak's footsteps. Wrapped in ultra-nationalistic discourse, Al-Sisi aspires to revive Nasser's socialist state under military control, and yet he is in dire need of local and foreign capital that is only attracted to and thrives in a liberalized market. His confused economic policies have thus far not assuaged post-revolutionary discontent on the side of the very social groups that voted for him; on the contrary, unrest persists"* (Grawert & Abul-Magd, 2016, pp. 34-35).

Regardless of my predictions in 2013 or the analysis of Grawert and Abul-Magd concerning Al-Sisi's economic policies and his relation to the business elite, it is still early to clearly know where this is going. However, in the presidential elections of 2018, many issues will be cleared out and we will see if the business elite will still support him and the military or change position. And we will also see if the unpreviliged masses that voted for him out of 'fear' of the Muslim Brotherhood, will do so again or not, and if we would witness another uprising or not.

3.2 A brief history of Egypt's press market

Egypt is always seen as the leading force that shaped today's present Arab press or media in general. This is rather an exaggeration, as other places in the Arab World have played a vital role in developing the Arab media landscape before and after independence from colonialist powers and the rise of pan-Arabism. Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Morocco were also having their own pioneering experiences, some of which have largely influenced the direction the Egyptian press took in its development path. And although several newspapers appeared first in Egypt during the nineteenth century, Lebanon hosted the largest number of newspapers per capita (McFadden, 1953, p. 2). However, we still have to admit that the Egyptian media became the most influential in the region, especially under Nasser, as the rest of this section will explain.

Today's pan-Arab or regional media have grown into large industries operating under state control as well as self-censorship of those who own it in order to save their advertising revenues, or to remain in good terms with authorities. Most Arab news broadcasters are controlled by totalitarian governments that exercise great powers over media organisations. Although it is hard to see authoritarianism as a nurturing environment for commercially vibrant media systems, the Arab region represents a rather unique case where commercialisation and liberalisation of selected media industries have gone hand in hand with continuous state intervention and increasing self-censorship (Mellor, 2011). Today's situation of the Arab media with the heavy influence imposed by the authorities raises the question of when and how this tradition of censorship or control emerged and developed. And in order to answer this question, which applies to Egypt as well as almost every Arab country, we have to shed some light on the development of pan-Arab media in general before shifting the focus to Egypt, since Egypt has always been a major player in the region's politics.

Prior to Nasser's pan-Arabism, the concept of news was first introduced by the colonial authorities with the main aim of informing officials in their local administrations of laws and regulations imposed from abroad. The goal was therefore mainly instructive. Later, the local people, particularly the intellectuals, saw in the press a new form of communication, mainly as a new channel for their intellectual debates and literary productions. The printing culture is said to correlate with the establishment of the bourgeoisie, which emerged in the Arab region during the nineteenth century, particularly in Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria (Khodour, 1997, p. 5). In the first half of the twentieth century, the press was used as a forum to discuss independence. This developing role of the press was significant for mobilising public opinion against the imperialist powers. And because of this role, newly independent governments realised that the press was a powerful weapon and they sought to monopolise it. National governments then used the news media as a vehicle to promote their national policies and to mobilise pan-Arab public opinion. Nasser, for instance, used the Egyptian radio Sawt Al-Arab (Voice of the Arabs) to mobilise public opinion both in Egypt and the wider Arab world. Cultural genres have been also utilised in the mobilisation of the public (Mellor, 2005). Of course, also other media like cinema, theatre, and

books were utilised in the mobilisation of the public. However, these non-news media were not controlled to the same extent by the state, as news was.

Before the 1952 July military coup – known in the Arab world as the July Revolution – the media landscape in Egypt had been clearly diverse and decentralised, to say the least. This does not mean it was very developed or up to distinguished professional standards. But it did represent the views and agendas of diverse political colours from far right to far left in relative absence of state control. Toward the end of 1952, the Free Officers made sure all media outlets – print and radio – were in the hands of the state under one authority, *Wizarat Al-I'lam* (The Ministry of Information). This move was meant to provide support to the newly born state. It was also meant to practise control over how the state's sovereignty was perceived both locally and regionally. The pan-Arab Nasser was portrayed in the media more like a father and re-creator of the nation than a president.

Al-Ahram[22] is an example of a popular newspaper that turned revolutionary over night following its nationalisation. It actually became a voice of the state's propaganda, not only in Egypt but across the whole Arab World. It even expanded its reach to Arabs in the diaspora, mainly in Europe, with a huge circulation base and a large network of offices in many world capitals. Al-Gomhuria[23] (The Republic) is another example of state media propaganda, but unlike the older Al-Ahram, it was established after the July military coup. It followed almost the same administrative pattern and editorial line of Al-Ahram in being a tool in the hands of the state, controlling access to news and information to the people. However, Al-Gomhuria was more of a paper directed at the middle and lower classes, while Al-Ahram was directed at the middle class

[22] Founded in 1875, the most widely circulating state-run Egyptian daily and second oldest after Al-Waqa'e Al-Masriya (The Egyptian Events, founded 1828).
[23] Founded in 1954 following the July military coup using the facilities of the Al-Wafd Party's disestablished daily Al-Misri (The Egyptian).

and higher. Al-Akhbar[24] and Al-Masaa[25] are both other examples of state-run newspapers, the only allowed model between 1950s and 1970s.

All radio stations played almost the same propaganda role, especially Sawt Al-Arab[26], which was a very popular pan-Arab trans-border media outlet as mentioned earlier. It was heard from the Arab Gulf in the east till the Atlantic Ocean in the west. It actually had a motto known back then that says *"Umma waheda min al-moheet ila al-khaleej"*, which translates into "one nation from the Ocean to the Gulf". Nasser used the radio as a primary means to strengthen his position in Egypt and the Arab World in general (Ghareeb, 2000).

Al-Télévision Al-Masry (The Egyptian TV) was initiated in 1956, but its implementation encountered delays because of the Suez crises escalations, and it had its first signal broadcasted only in 1960. It fit the same state propaganda model as the newspapers and radio stations. Also in 1956, Nasser founded the Middle East News Agency (MENA), which was meant to serve the whole region (Abu Bakr, Labib, & Kandil, 1985). It also started a competition between Arab countries, each establishing their own national news agencies. Ironically, by the 1980s Arab editors acknowledged that they chose to concentrate on foreign news rather than local news because local news was boring protocol news (Turkistani, 1996).

In 1971 with Sadat's political victory against the pro-Soviet faction of the Free Officers led by Ali Sabri in what he called *Thawrat Al Tashih* (The Corrective Revolution)[27], the media landscape slightly changed. A few private, mainly partisan, newspapers were allowed to operate. However, they were all pretty much under the control and the censorship of the state. Al-Wafd, Al-Lewaa Al-Islamy, Al-Ahaly and Al-Shaab were all newspapers given a very limited space to

[24] Founded two months before the 1952 July coup by Akhbar Al-Youm newspaper, which itself was founded in 1944.
[25] Founded in 1956, Issued by Al-Tahrir Publishing House along with Al-Gomhuria newspaper.
[26] First aired on 4 July 1953 to the Egyptian population and later to the whole Arab World, Europe and North America.
[27] Also called May Events, a reshuffle of political power by Sadat in 15 May 1971 against the ultra-left faction of the Free Officers who attempted to have military coup against him, while giving a speech on state-TV.

operate and circulate. Actually, they all played an important role in giving Sadat's *Infitah* state a different face that seemed less authoritarian than his predecessor Nasser's. The media landscape remained largely unchanged under Mubarak until mid-1990s. All of them (Nasser to Mubarak) supervised the task of appointing new editors-in-chief. This consequently forced journalists into a vicious circle of self-censorship to ensure that their work would be published (Nasser M. K., 1990). This circle was broken, however, for a short period following the 1967 defeat, as the Egyptian government allowed the criticism as a way of absorbing public resentment (Abdel Rahman, 1989, p. 33). Briefly, the press development in Egypt under late Sadat era and then Mubarak's, was moving from being partisan to being the mouthpiece of one party (NDP) and later the privately-owned press emerged.

The introduction of satellite technologies to many Egyptian and Arab homes, Arabsat in 1976 and Nilesat in 1996, played a very important role in changing the media landscape in Egypt and the Arab World, especially after the establishment of the Doha-based Al-Jazeera TV Network in 1996. After the September 11th attacks in 2001, the region became the centre of international media attention. Al-Jazeera was already rapidly growing and gaining popularity since its foundation, however, with the attacks' after mass the channel provided an alternative of war coverage, beginning with Afghanistan then Iraq. This was almost the first time war has been seen through Arab eyes (Poniwozik, 2003). This new development in news production, drew attention even further away from traditional Arab media, which were either copying from Western news producers, broadcasting local governments' statements on these wars, or both. The population suddenly had overwhelming access to totally different editorial agendas and unprecedented narratives of news and documentary stories that contradicted the ones that existed since 1952.

The two satellite projects (Arabsat and Nilesat) were not meant to play a mind opening role, but what happened against the Arab rulers' will was the use of these facilities by Qatar's Al-Jazeera for producing and spreading their own regional political agenda. The initial reaction by the Egyptian government to Al-Jazeera's narrative of news and historical documentaries was arrogant and short-sighted. The Egyptian media thought it was enough to accuse the Qataris of

lying, thinking that the audience would believe what the state and its controlled media (state-run and private) would say. However, the Egyptian defamation discourse of Al-Jazeera failed and the network gained more popularity.

Even before the invasions of Afghanistan Iraq, the Egyptian authorities realised the danger of the rapidly growing influence of Al Jazeera and the loss of trust of Egyptians in their own national media outlets. They attempted to counter this by introducing and allowing new home-grown forms of critical news narratives that might be able to win back the trust of people in local media outlets and reduce their dependence on Al-Jazeera sometime in 1997 following the channel's success. They allowed already existing partisan newspapers since Sadat like Al-Sha'b[28] (Belongs to the Labour Party) and new ones like Al-Dostor[29] (The Constitution) to operate semi-freely. The experiment went out of control briefly later and the government did not tolerate their criticism. Al-Sha'b was forever shut down in 2000 and Al-Dostor was forced to soften their news narrative after frequent security and judiciary harassments. I remember in 1998, despite being completely legal and allowed by the government, that I had to buy Al-Dostor secretly from a friend working at a newsstand, who used to keep it hidden under other state newspapers. Also walking around with a copy of Al-Dostor in that period would make anyone subject to arrest by the State Security, known now after 2011 revolution as National Security.

Another tactic of attracting audiences to a state-supportive media outlet was the launch of Dream TV Network[30] in 2001, owned by Mubarak's good friend and business tycoon Ahmed Bahgat, mentioned earlier in this chapter as a member of the business elite and one of the old guards. The network actually succeeded in attracting significant viewership, but mainly as an entertaining network more than a news producer. The change was also a necessary safety valve to release public pressures and suppressions, and a way to absorb the inherent conflicts (Mellor, 2005), which were growing in Egypt as well as among audiences in the region. I argue, as well,

[28] The newspaper of the The Labour Party founded in 1978, which turned Islamist in 1986.
[29] Founded in 1995 by a license from Cyprus, closed in 1998, relaunched as a weekly in 2005, and turned daily in 2007.
[30] Ahmed Bahgat is also the founder of Bahgat Group.

that the success of Dream TV is a result of the highly unattractive media content screened on state TV channels, which became a material for humour against the state rather than being a trustworthy media outlet in the eyes of the average Egyptian. Reda Abbas, one of the interviewees in this thesis, says "The private media is a little bit more free. It has a wider space and [a variety of] subjects to work on more than the state-owned ones. Another difference is that private media tends to have a better pool of talented people." Wesam Shawkat however, gives a straightforward statement saying "Both [state-run and private media] are unprofessional. The state media serves the authority and the private one is directed based on the owners' visions and personal interests." Authorities actually realised that what the audience needed was serious programmes and not just entertainment (Elbendary, 2001). However, attention to proper news content was already growing towards Doha and its then growing giant Al-Jazeera. The channel that had put Qatar on the political map and gave it greater regional influence (Ghareeb, 2000).

The year 2004 marks a significant change in the position of Egypt's political elite towards freedom of the media. They started following a smarter approach attempting to bring back audiences to local sources of news, by introducing higher quality and more professional news content. It was the year Al-Masry Al-Youm was launched. The newspaper was co-founded by Naguib Sawiris, the richest member of Egypt's business elite and one of the world's richest. The newspaper was administratively chaired by another co-founder Salah Diab. Both business tycoons are discussed in Section 3.5 of this chapter. Al-Masry Al-Youm was privileged from its beginning with high profile access to news sources and connections with the political elite and its security forces. I argue that this access gave the newspaper unprecedented critical news narratives that brought credibility to the local news production scene for the first time since 1952. Ihsan Sameer, another interviewee in this thesis, says "The state's press lacks credibility and neutrality in the public sphere due to its support for all the state's policies. Same applies to partisan press, which always align with their parties. As for the private newspapers, they try in a way or another to benefit from such tendencies [lack of neutrality by state and partisan press] to attract readers searching for information that carry truth. However, complete truth does not

exist, in my opinion, due to the presence of complex interests between private newspapers' owners, the government and businessmen."

Al-Masry Al-Youm did produce truly critical news stories that could have been seen as damaging to the state and its political elite. However, I argue as well that it was part of a game with the double goal of attracting news audience to locally produced content, and giving Mubarak's political and business elites a democratic face. This new face was necessary for addressing the mounting criticism both locally and internationally regarding Mubarak's authoritarian rule. This was the case across the reign, as pressures from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund was already pushing for the deregulation of the media sector (Hafez, 2001, p. 8). Nour Magdy, another interviewee, says "State-run media changes its tone and the way of dealing with different issues according to who's in power, or according to what the security services want. As for the private media, I think that most of them put their editorial policies according to their owner's interests, which in many cases are linked as well to the different security bodies, or because they are afraid of those bodies, which can put several pressures on those businessmen for any reasons."

I argue that in 2012, a little after Mubarak's ouster, the military and the civilian political elite, decided to repeat the same model by launching Al-Watan newspaper, owned by another business tycoon, Mohamed Al-Amin. The newspaper is playing almost the same role as Al-Masry Al-Youm did since 2004 and on. Both newspapers have very similar agendas in relation to the business and political elites, but they slightly differ in editorial lines. They both maintain a solid position in the press market today as the two top newspapers in terms of circulation and setting the national news agenda, not only for the rest of the press market, but also as a source for broadcasters as well. "The sate-run media is the voice of the government. The private media is the voice of those with power. And between them there are small margins for expressing the street's opinion in order to secure attention to the media commodities produced by newspapers and TV channels," says Alaa Zakareya.

It is worth mentioning that the private media is not a completely controlled space for attracting audiences to local media, as some forms of freedom of expression can be found there. The Egyptian constitutions have guaranteed freedom of expression on paper (discussed in Section 3.3), but the reality has been a different matter. The government has often relied on laws that impede freedom of expression, including emergency laws and articles from the penal code, and has used them to censor content and intimidate journalists, bloggers, and broadcasters. Over the years this has caused many of those involved in media to censor themselves and has led to the acknowledgement of redlines that mark areas deemed too sensitive to tackle (Abdulla, 2014, p. 4). And this 'legal' control is one of the hands governments and political elites keep the private media on the track of their interests.

3.3 The business elite's interest in press control

When we see millions of people pouring out onto the streets demanding the fall of a regime, and when we see the same regime, which seemed to be in full control until a few weeks earlier to Mubarak's fall, losing that control and very quickly scattering and having to submit – or pretend to submit - to people's demands, we have to stop and ask ourselves the two basic questions of why and how. I believe one dissertation is never enough to fully go through a full discourse of the reasons answering the 'why' part or the full map of mechanisms explaining the 'how'. However, understanding the issue of economic injustice and the role of the business elite as a collaborator with the political one in the process of enforcing a free market economy and protecting both elites' benefits can play a significant role in understanding what was happing in Egypt at that moment in history. And almost equally important to understanding that elite and its power, we have to understand the tool in their hands that kept the regime surviving for long, and still does, which is the private media in general and its press market in particular.

Referring to Section 3.1, which discusses the history of Egypt's business elite and their relation to the state, we might understand the role of accumulating capital in the hands of a

business elite in a free market economy like Egypt's needs certain political decision-making to help and reinforce this process. Harvey argues that the private sector, whether business, financial or corporate is always for its benefits maximisation. This can counteract with the political elite or simply reinforce each other. In Egypt's case, reinforcement is more common, as the rest of this chapter discusses. However, this process of cooperation is complex, as it is hard to manage except indirectly (Harvey, 2003). And here we can see the relationship between the business and the political elites is in similar position to what Harvey is trying to explain. Both entities – with their controlled state and private press – support an aggregate trend: the free market economy. And clearly the institutional arrangements embedded within the state have an influential role to play in setting the stage for capital accumulation.

We can see clearly the dynamics between the political and business elites in Mubarak's politics - the same applies to Sadat and his *Infitah* (Open Door) policy, but on a smaller scale. In Mubarak's times, we can single out as one example from many the steel tycoon Ahmed Ezz, who managed to accumulate a massive fortune in an impressively short period of time. Ezz was allowed to dominate the Egyptian steel market, while at the same time playing a significant political role in Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP) as the Secretary General of Organisation and being a member of the high-profile Politics Committee in the same ruling party. With one man's wealth, power and several arms in the business sector and political sphere, he was a leading player in the process of political enforcement in a top-down fashion as it appeared in both parliamentary elections of 2005 and 2010, where fraud occurred, especially in the later one in favour of the NDP. The relationship between capital and political power seems to appear as a set of mutual interests, where the accumulation of control over the political sphere - as an end in itself – has negative consequences. The downside of this process is that a powerful member of the business elite like Ezz can become a liability to the political system, as he was seen by the public as a symbol of corruption and a representative example for economic injustice.

The need for capital accumulation in a free market economy and the need of creating a business elite in order to achieve a transformation from the dominance of public property to

private property is not a new phenomenon in Egypt. It was just briefly interrupted under Nasser's socialist state. There are actually interesting similarities between the 19th century Khedive Ismail's Egypt and Mubarak's in this regard. Creating an elite that could play the role of harmonising the local economy with the European colonialists' is what Ismail did in 1863, when he succeeded within eighteen months to allocate to those around him more than sixty thousand acres of farming land along the Nile valley, including one hundred acres to his coffee maker and another hundred to his head barber. The recipients were military officers, high officials, family members and household staff. In the same short period, he also added more than fifty thousand acres to his own estates (Mitchell, 2002, p. 54). Among the differences between the Egypt of Ismail and that of Mubarak is that Ismail had to deal with the British as an external superpower in the first case, while it is now the US-dominated IMF. As for the individuals, the differences are not significantly big in principle, as Ismail's head barber is replaced by the close friend of Mubarak's son – Gamal – and the former drummer Ahmed Ezz. However, there are many differences, given the big changes in local and international politics and the global economy of today.

I argue that today's Egypt has a top-down enforced neoliberal model as many evident realities show us. This model and the injustices it brought were a reason for the people to rise against the ruling elites. However, the 2011 January uprising was not born at that moment in history nor did it end with the fall of Mubarak (Abdelrahman, 2015). It is a whole chapter of recent history of free market dynamics, whether local or global, led to today's Egypt as an 'emerging market'. Actually, the rise of political activism and public discontent goes back to at least ten years before the masses had to pour out onto the squares demanding the fall of Mubarak and his regime. It was only Mubarak that was removed, but his regime and their legacy remained. The instability is more likely to continue since the reasons for the uprising's momentum eruption are still there. Abdelrahman argues, "After the initial euphoria and laudatory comments, the supposedly victorious masses were soon relegated to back seat while the focus returned to traditional political actors: the military, the [Muslim] Brotherhood and regional powers. The millions and their continuing struggle receive cursory attention and only in

so far as they are seen to have been subdued and defeated by counter-revolutionary forces […] Increasing poverty, high unemployment rates and a youth bulge combined with the absence of political freedom under an authoritarian regime are by now the stable ingredients of the mainstream narrative of the causes of the Egyptian uprising" (Abdelrahman, 2015, p. 3). I would add to the argument that this recipe and its ingredients, the role of the powerful media, especially the private one. And since this media is still powerful and controlled by the business elite until today, the masses will keep receiving the same cursory attention.

As mentioned several times earlier in this research, the media plays an important role in conveying political and economic discourses to the public. Egypt's private media and those who own it are in no different position and they do use frames conveying their messages to the masses attempting to direct their political compass, like how it happens in any form of media. Journalists have been found to use a multitude of ways to frame the news. Commonly used themes include emphasising the conflict, an emotional aspect of the story, and the grim economic consequences. These frames can promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, or moral evaluation (Entman R. , 1993) and thus influence debates and structure the political outcomes. Throughout this thesis, I argue that news production was influenced by frames, which in general match with interests of private newspapers' owners both politically and economically (Ratta, Sakr, & Skovgaard-Petersen, 2015). And regardless of this proven influence of news coverage on the public, we still have to deal case by case learning about how that might prevail within certain news agendas, and how politicians – members of the business elite in the Egyptian case – formulate their responses to both the same news agendas they might be controlling and the same public they target (Benson, 2004). We also have to pay attention to the fact that different news agendas have different influences on citizens and politics (Cook, 2006). However, in the case of the Egyptian media market, although citizens have access to several news outlets, agendas are mostly similar in their political and economic interests (Ratta, Sakr, & Skovgaard-Petersen, 2015).

It is not, however, that simple for a businessman to just step into the media market. Media systems are still conditioned on factors such as law and regulatory policies, general economic indicators and market size. However, the media ownership concentration is a significant variable and of great importance in terms of the power it brings to the owner. This is particularly the case, if the field of media is insufficiently monitored and regulated, and if media power can be used to project political influence, as an investor would aspire to gain. Naomi Sakr and others in their book 'Arab Media Moguls' see the Middle East as fertile grounds for media moguldom, where a general business tycoon – coming from the business elite with all associations with the political elite – invests in the private media. And I see that this argument is particularly applicable on the Egyptian case. As it happened in many countries in the region, the Egyptian media tycoons have emerged with the opportunities afforded by steps towards liberalisation and privatisation in the media sector – which I would not separate from the liberalisation and privatisation of the economy in general – and with the rise of an expanded media market. The media tycoons rose under the watchful eyes of political authoritarianism, but they made sure not to challenge the rulers directly. The autocrat rulers, on their part, envisaged tight media regulations and censorship, not to prevent media concentration but to curb political opposition and foster a submissive public. The authoritarian power-holders could live with the rise of media tycoons, and the media tycoons could live with them (Ratta, Sakr, & Skovgaard-Petersen, 2015). However, I argue that particularly in the Egyptian case, the media tycoons did not rise entirely organically in response to liberalisation; rather they were indirectly, or maybe even directly, pushed to play that role and bring about a submissive mass to their counterparts in power, the political elite. Ihsan Sameer confirms the presence of such a relation, the business and the political elites and says "Yes, I believe this relation exists, however in different variations. The business community desires to support its own activities through influencing the economic press." I also argue that profitability from media investments – especially in Egypt, where Naguib Sawiris is a strong case – is not a priority in comparison to other non-media investments. Other cases of Egyptian media tycoons to be discussed in detail in Section 3.4 in this chapter.

As I talked earlier about wealth accumulation, one of the biggest problems of democratic consolidation is the concentration of media capital. The UNESCO described the Egyptian private media as rather diverse in terms of ownership. However, there are increasing trends towards media concentration and no effective controls against that. Ownership concentration has spurred the downswing of pluralism in Egyptian media. For example, the prominent outspoken journalist Ibrahim Eissa, who founded Al-Tahrir TV right after the fall of Mubarak, it to Suleiman Amer, a businessman closely connected to Mubarak's elite (Hafez, 2013, p. 8).

If we look abroad again, we can find that the cases of Silvio Berlusconi in Italy and Rupert Murdoch in the UK and other countries are evidences that the concern about the abuse of media power is valid, and is by no means a thing of the past (Skovgaard-Petersen, 2015). These two media tycoons share many similarities with Egyptian ones like Naguib Sawiris, Salah Diab and Mohamed Al-Amin. These men, who are discussed in detail in Section 3.5 in this chapter, are all business tycoons who turned to the media with a high profile political agendas. Skovgaard-Petersen also defines a media tycoon as a person who owns and operates major media companies, who takes entrepreneurial risks, and who conducts these media businesses in a personal or eccentric style (Skovgaard-Petersen, 2015). A definition I agree with, however, I would like to make clear that in the case of Egypt, the risks are not high, since the gains in other non-media investments rise due to being within the inner circle of power and closer to the political elite. Reda Abbas goes along the same lines saying "A quick look at the media scene in Egypt, will tell you that all private media is owned by big business names. They all have huge investments in areas other than the media, and all have a foot in the media scene by holding one or more media outlet, and they defiantly control that space." An Egyptian media tycoon would win a favour with the political elite and hence have more access to economic power. We can see that clearly in the cases of Diab and Sawiris in their investment in Al-Masry Al-Youm and other media outlets, and Mohamed Al-Amin in Al-Watan and big TV networks that he owns (more on this in Section 3.5).

There's also another useful point in studying the behaviour of the business elite that steps into the media from a totally different background. We should assume that they would need someone to help them execute their media agenda professionally. And here comes the role of an editor-in-chief, at least for this research focusing on newspapers. The media tycoon may be supported by several 'assistants', who normally manage divisions or companies within the tycoon's larger interests. The assistant can be a chief executive, he may also take entrepreneurial risks, but he is not the ultimate owner or controller of the overall enterprises (Skovgaard-Petersen, 2015). And in this case I would clearly label Magdy Al-Gallad, the current editor-in-chief of Al-Watan and formerly Al-Masry Al-Youm's as an excellent example. He did not only work for one media tycoon, and apparently, he is highly demanded as they would compete to hire him, as it happened between Diab and Al-Amin. The list is of course longer including executives like Albert Shafik working for Sawiris and other examples, but Al-Gallad is a phenomenon definitely worth focusing on, as I do in Section 3.6 and occasionally in the following chapters.

For a business tycoon or a member of the business elite, as I discussed earlier, the media is not always a directly profitable business. It is a matter of making a favour to those directly in power, the political elite. Politics and economics often seem to be intertwined. In the case of Egyptian (and Arab as well) media tycoons, however, it is apparent that profit cannot be an overriding expectation, because distortions in the advertising market and restrictions on editorial content undermine the commercial potential of media operations. Where economic motives are involved, these are often related to the tycoons' other non-media businesses, which can benefit from belonging to an empire that controls one or more significant media projects. As for political motives, controlling a network of media is a good way to demonstrate loyalty and thus carry favours with a country's rulers (Skovgaard-Petersen, 2015). In Mubarak's era all the major media tycoons tended to be close to the regime. However, being close does not mean that they approved of the regime or that they actively sought its patronage. Rather, it was often an inevitable consequence of the economic importance and interests of the groups they were heading (Guaaybess, 2015). And here come the cases of Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan again, owned by Diab and Al-Amin respectively. I argue that these media tycoons produced news

frames through the newspapers they own in favour of the political elite, as I will empirically examine through framing analysis in Chapter Five. Nour Magdy elaborates a bit more saying "many businessmen, whether those who started their media outlets before or after the 25th of January 2011, used them [media outlets] to achieve certain goals, or to deliver certain messages to the recipients. This is very clear when comparing the way famous broadcasters and writers change their tones according to the outlet they're working for. In addition to this, some businessmen use those outlets to send direct messages, either by being hosted in one of the TV programmes, interviewed in their [own] newspapers, or even writing opinion article under anonymous names."

I see that there are lessons we can draw from Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model and use them in order to understand the Egyptian one and probably other examples in the Arab region as well. In the entire region, wealth and power have been concentrated at the top of the society, which in turn requires organised propaganda in order to normalise injustice and integrate citizens into a public moral conduct that accepts enforced norms by elites (Herman & Chomsky, 2002). In today's Egypt, the private media market has grown enough to be even more influential than the state-run one. I argue that the Egyptian media model, as shown throughout this section, is almost an American one. However, it is much smaller and more bluntly in favour of the country's business and political elites. Comparatively speaking, we might even consider that the Egyptian model in its regional context is similar in size and influence to the American one in the global context, but on a smaller scale. Alaa Zakareya says "All [Egyptian] private newspapers and TV channels owned by businessmen has limitations for [freedom of] expression regarding the public opinion in order not to lead to a clash between the owner and the government that might harm his [non-media] businesses. Businessmen are the ones largely in control of the media. They can control advertising in newspapers and TV channels, and stopping them if necessary in the case of crossing the limits criticising them or harming their businesses."

After the weak and non-influential reintroduction of private media[31] following the *Infitah* under Sadat as discussed in the previous section, the 2000s witnessed significant growth in the private media market. By the end of the decade, it managed to become much more influential than the state-run media. The privately produced contents were more appealing and critical. They provided information that attracted most of the audience away from the state-run media. However, I argue that there remained a certain measure of control and coordination between both (state-run and private media), protecting and serving the business elite that owns most of the private media outlets, and the political elite that regulates the market in exchange of mutual interest.

If we take an even superficial look at Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan, the two most-circulated private newspapers (about 150,000 daily copies each),[32] which dominate the access to high-profile official sources and information, we can observe the relationship between newspapers' editorial boards, investors, and the government. Al-Masry Al-Youm was co-founded by the Egyptian telecommunication and construction multi-billionaire Naguib Sawiris, who also owns ONTV Network and recently is a major shareholder of Euronews. The newspaper was co-founded in partnership with the paper's board chairman Salah Diab. He is also the founder and main shareholder of BIKO, the tycoon dominating agricultural trade in Egypt, which has very strong relations with Israel since Camp David Accord was signed. The other example, Al-Watan, was founded and board-chaired by a top Mubarak supporter and the diverse-investments-portfolio business tycoon Mohamed Al-Amin (also owner of TV networks), who interestingly hired the former most famous and most politically connected Al-Masry Al-Youm's editor-in-chief Magdy Al-Gallad as Al-Watan's editor. In the next sections, we will look deeper into the question how an editorial board is carefully formed to serve the business elite's interests, which in turn is beneficial to the political elites' interests as well. And unsurprisingly, most private media

[31] Following the so-called *Thawrat Al-Tashih* (Correction Revolution) by Sadat in 1971, a few partisan newspapers were launched. Some were re-opened old ones, and others were new.
[32] Both circulate about 150,000 copies a day according to Nour Magdy, who's interviewed for this research. No clear or reliable circulation figures available.

investments constitute a very small portion of the business portfolios of the same media owners, as profitability does not seem to be a priority, as the literature discussed earlier in this section.

The above-mentioned power connections between the business and political elites in the media market do not necessarily guarantee perfect coordination. Misunderstanding and disorganisation might occasionally occur. We should not forget that media regulations and censorship are still in the hands of the government or political elite. Indeed, I would argue that the private media is there to provide a 'democratic and independent' face to the system. A face that people tend to trust and believe through news contents that sound critical and challenging to government. However, sometimes this relation mistakenly goes beyond determined frameworks, at which time the censor immediately interferes with the scissors. One recent example is the investigative story produced by the pro-Mubarak and pro-military Al-Watan. The story was investigating the salaries of and tax evasions by workers in the state's *Gehat Seyadeya* (sovereign bodies), like the intelligence, the army and the interior ministry. The newspaper's issue on that day was confiscated[33] in the print house before distribution and the editors quickly covered up the scandal by printing another issue in a few hours with a different story hoping that it would pass unnoticed by the public. Apparently, the pre-censored edition of that issue of Al-Watan was photographed by a smartphone in the print house, posted to the social media and immediately went viral, not only in Egypt, but even regionally and internationally.

However, the above story of Al-Watan is a rare one. In most cases, they do succeed in controlling media contents. It has become increasingly difficult to air or publish voices that are not in total harmony with pro-regime propaganda. Several private newspapers have refused to publish pieces by contributors that failed to follow that editorial line. Examples include an opinion piece by Al-Ahram's former chief executive officer and head of the press syndicate Mamdouh Al-Wali, who ended up publishing the piece on his Facebook page. Activist Mostafa El

[33] Al-Watan issue confiscated for investigative [story] on sovereign bodies. Masrawy, 00:15, Wednesday, 11 March 2015.

Naggar published an article entitled “The Army: An Institution or a State” on his Facebook page after being denied publication in at least two major newspapers (Abdulla, 2014, p. 25).

The Egyptian private media market is clearly dominated by the business elite, which largely owns its news outlets and controls them. This happens through being either direct managers, or by delegating controlled editorial boards to serve the investors’ interests. These interests vary between direct business interests for corporations owned by the same investors, interests of other business groups and interests of the political elite with its two factions: the civilian and the military. However, this exchange of mutual interests does not happen in vacuum. There are laws and regulations that let this practice happen, or probably even especially made to strengthen control over the press in the hands of elites.

Despite the changes in Egypt’s press legislations since Nasser until today, the theme of control is always there with the purpose of protecting those in power, whether civilian or military. As mentioned earlier in this section, Nasser put the press industry under the state’s complete control. His presidency marked the beginning of the detachment of the Egyptian press from its main function, informing readers. Since Nasser, the main role of the press became to support the state; and it is this role that none of the governments since Nasser have undermined. Even more, they all directly and indirectly controlled and influenced the choices of appointed editors-in-chief (Nasser, 1990). Journalists were – and still are – under the influence of both government censorship and self-censorship out of fear that their work wouldn’t be published, or worse, being persecuted. Nasser once said at one occasion that there were “no restrictive laws on the press” and that journalists themselves chose to ignore certain issues out of self-censorship (Nasser M. , 1979).

The grip over the press freedom slightly softened indeed following the 1967 defeat. However, laws that allowed the government to control the press were never revoked, so that the government could always enact them again whenever the need arose to practise control again, depending on the political situation the country might be going through. Law 156 of 1960

turned journalists into public servants, and before that Law 162 of 1958 gave the president the right to declare a state of emergency and thus censor publications and hinder freedom of opinion if it is deemed to collide with national interests. The latter law is still in effect, however it was amended in 1980 and 1981, and has been evoked almost continuously since then. The Egyptian authorities always managed to extend it by decrees from the parliament, the People's Assembly (Maglis Al-Shaab). Although private ownership was (re)enforced by a law in 1980, the government at the time, under Sadat's rule, enforced the so-called Law of Shame (Law 148), which prohibits the publishing or broadcasting of pictures and texts that may offend the dignity of the state (Nasser M. , 1990). The press market was indeed 'less controlled' under Mubarak as explained in earlier sections, especially from the late 1990s. However, laws were pretty much the same since Sadat, which were not very different from Nasser's. As I said, they were always recalled when the state wanted to practice control depending on the political situation. During Mubarak's first two decades of presidency, the media faced substantial legal and regulatory challenges that limited their independence and ability to criticise and hold the government to account (Mendel, 2011). I argue that the situation after the fall of Mubarak and the relative freedom that followed in practising almost uncensored journalism or establishing new newspapers was due to a political chaos in the aftermath of 2011, rather than actual freedom. I also argue that this applies to both the brief periods of rule under the SCAF and then the Muslim Brotherhood, as I closely observed when I was there in the scene as a chief editor myself around the same time. Nour Magdy sheds a bit of a brief light on the period right after Mubarak's fall by saying that "Directly after Mubarak's fall there was a good margin of freedom. However, newspapers and TV channels didn't make use of it and engaged in self-censorship. Then gradually things returned back to how they were, maybe even worse." Additionally, the Egyptian Journalists Syndicate was long dominated by the Mubarak regime. In recent years and until the 2013 military coup, it has witnessed a power struggle between pro and anti-Muslim Brotherhood forces. As a result, it has never been able to fully free itself from state interference. Although at several points in history the Syndicate protected journalists, but it is said to have also tolerated corruption (Hafez, 2001, p. 9).

In August 2013, less than two months following the military coup against Morsi, the Interim President Adly Mansour[34] issued a decree changing the structure of the Supreme Council for Journalism (SCJ), which is the governing body of the industry in Egypt. The decree transferred the authority formerly given to The Shoura Council[35] over the press and its relevant regulations to the SCJ. This change is one of two new major changes made in the sector since 2011. The other one was the journalism law announced right after the fall of Mubarak, which was meant to allow new newspapers to be licensed without the need to be approved by SCJ.

Some facts about the press industry in Egypt can be found in a report produced by Al-Arabia Studies Institute[36] stating that until 2013 Egypt had 6378 journalists registered at the syndicate. Alaa Zakareya says "Following the fall of Mubarak, many were allowed to work in the media field. And it is enough as evidence, seeing the big numbers of those who join the journalists syndicate during a three-year period since 25 January 2011, as more than 2000 journalists registered. The same number joined the syndicate in a period of six years during Mubarak's times. However, now things are going into the direction of suffocating the media."

The reality can be a much bigger number, since many journalists are unregistered. According to the same report, by 2013 there were 56 state-run newspapers and 65 partisan ones (Wahid, 2013); this number should now be reduced to 64 due to the forcible shutdown of the MB's newspaper Al-Horreya Wa-Al-Adala following the military coup of 2013. There is no clear number available for the privately-owned newspapers, however there are many that have been licensed following the fall of Mubarak, and I estimate that the total number is in the hundreds based on observations of their presence on the social media and the internet in general.

[34] Former head of Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court, who served as the Interim President from 3 July 2013 to 8 June 2014.
[35] The upper house of the formerly bicameral Egyptian Parliament, which was abolished by the 2014 constitution. The name roughly translated into "the Consultative Council".
[36] A research centre belonging to the Dubai-based Al-Arabia TV Network.

In his 2011 report for Internews[37], Toby Mendel goes through the details of the journalism law concerning the part of issuing new private newspapers analysing the controversy and control that remains in practice by the authorities. According to Mendel, anyone wishing to publish a newspaper must obtain a license from the SCJ, and that the application for a license must include various types of information, including the title, the language, periodicity, business sector, budget breakdown, sources of funding, editorial structure, nationality, place of residence of the proprietor, name of the editor-in-chief and address of the printing house. It also mentions that no one who is prohibited by law from exercising their political rights may own or publish a newspaper. The SCJ is required to decide on a submitted application for a newspaper license within 40 days, while if an application is refused, the Council shall provide specific reasons for the refusal to the applicant, who may then appeal to the Court of Administrative Adjudication within 30 days, however the law does not indicate what might justify a refusal to issue a license. The law also states that obtaining a license to publish a newspaper is a "special privilege", a label that explains why strict conditions for the establishment of privately-owned newspapers exist. These newspapers must take the form of co-operatives, owned exclusively by Egyptians, with no one owning more than 10 percent of the overall capital. It is unclear whether these rules are enforced in practice, as at least some major newspapers appear to be owned, or at least controlled, by individual businessmen (Mendel, 2011). During my practice in the field, I learned that the manipulation of the ownership conditionality stated by journalism law is practised through dividing a newspaper's capital shares on fake partners, mainly relatives or friends of the private newspaper's major investor. The practice applies to the two examined samples in this research: Al-Masry Al-Youm, largely owned by Salah Diab and Naguib Sawiris, and Al-Watan, mainly owned by Mohamed Al Amin. There is no information at all that the SCJ ever tried to defy or investigate such claims or manipulations.

However, the law did not have much effect as the practice of having to apply for security permissions in order to obtain a license continued. I argue that ignoring such law is highly possible in Egypt, since there exists a very strong culture of asking for security permission for any

[37] An independent media development organization.

press activity from establishing a newspaper to holding a camera in the street or talking to average people. I argue that for example a new newspaper without a security permission will definitely find nowhere to print. The positive aspect of the change was that the SCJ's procedures became faster. However, being fast or not does not mean enough to Ihsan Sameer who strongly believes that "There are no differences. The deep state[38] is in control, and hence policies are the same." Wesam Shawkat takes a dimmer position saying, "It is going from bad to worse."

Despite the dim picture about the Journalists Syndicate, some changes that happened following Mubarak's fall are positive. For example, the membership and financial structures have witnessed meaningful reforms. However, small developments alone are not enough. For those in the syndicate calling for freedom of the press and expression, avoiding the gulf between rhetoric and reality is indeed a great responsibility—and increasingly consequential. A strong syndicate system can provide the backbone for such a transformation—but a co-opted one can also deeply stall progress (Berger, 2013, p. 20).

As a setback from the marginal positive developments that the syndicate witnessed in the two years following Mubarak's fall, a very recent update brought back the dim picture. There is a major development in progress, or almost accomplished, concerning issuing a new unified media law that is supposed to replace all the ambiguous legislations of the past since 1952. A roundup investigation by Mostafa Mohei for Mada Masr, an online activist newspaper, explains that the current Egyptian constitution (voted for and passed through a referendum in January 2014) mandates the formation of three media regulators. Article 211 stipulates the formation of the Supreme Media Regulatory Council, which will be responsible for "regulating the affairs of audio and visual media, printed and digital press and other media forms." Article 212 outlines the formation of the National Press Authority, which will manage and develop state-owned press institutions. Finally, Article 213 orders the formation of the National Media Authority, which will

[38] The "deep state" is a term that got very popular in Egypt after the fall of Mubarak. In general, it means a state within a state, which is a political situation in a country when an internal organ such as the armed forces, intelligence agencies, police, administrative agencies and branches of governmental bureaucracy do not respond to the civilian political institutions. In Egypt though the term is very loosely used.

manage and develop state-owned visual, audio and digital media outlets. And in accordance with the media regulatory agencies law, the Supreme Media Regulatory Council's board will be composed of 13 members, three of whom will be appointed by Egypt's president, including the council's head. The Journalists Syndicate then issued a statement reiterating its call for a unified media law that would adhere to the constitution, notably Article 71, which prohibits all punitive measures curtailing freedom of the press. The syndicate's position is in contrast to many pro-state journalists and the government itself, who see the regulation as a necessary means to combat what it considers the dissemination of false news, a claim that is often deployed to challenge positions other than the government's own (Mohie, 2016). Reda Abbas pessimistically says "Unfortunately, it seems that they will bend the laws to the benefit of the regime as usual."

In the end of the day, Egypt doesn't seem to be very particular regarding the its media legislations, which are unfriendly to freedom of expression. Examination of media legislations in other Arab countries shows that this regulatory environment generally exists throughout the region. Given this landscape, it is unsurprising that censorship by both government and private media topped the list of many complaints brought by activists during the Arab uprisings. Indeed, neither Egypt nor any Arab county receives a ranking of "free" on the Freedom House press freedom rankings and most receive completely "not free" rankings (Duffy, 2014, pp. 30-31).

3.4 Sample profiles of press investors

In order to understand the interest of Egypt's business elite in controlling the private press, I will go through the business profiles of the major private press investors. Understanding their backgrounds and going through their stories one by one can provide us with an extra dimension within the picture already drawn in earlier sections in order to confirm this argued strong interest in the press, which reinforces their economic and political powers. I chose three investors in particular based on the top two newspapers selected for the focus of this research. The first is Naguib Sawiris, Egypt's top general business tycoon and co-founder and shareholder of Al-Masry

Al-Youm and other private media outlets. The second is Salah Diab, the agribusiness tycoon and co-founder and CEO of Al-Masry Al-Youm. And the third investor is Mohamed Al Amin, a general investor and sole founder of Al-Watan and many other media outlets.

To start with, Naguib Sawiris is a son of Onsi and brother of Nassif and Samih, a Coptic Christian family known for being the richest in Egypt. Naguib followed his father's footsteps, who founded Orascom for telecommunication in 1979 under Sadat's *infitah*. He took his family's business to an unprecedented high starting from the 1990s by positioning the company as Egypt's communications giant and made himself the family's first billionaire. Orascom under the successful son started expanding operations off Egypt's borders to different directions including Algeria, Tunisia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, North Korea, and other countries that keep adding to his investments portfolio in almost every continent (Ahram Online & Jadaliyya, 2011). It is worth mentioning that in the 2006 Forbes list of the world's richest people, he was ranked as the 278th. He later rose to the 62nd in 2007 and 60th in 2008. However, his wealth dropped under the pressure of the world's economic turmoil in 2009, causing a sharp drop in his ranking to 196th.

Besides being an inactive co-founder of Al-Masry Al-Youm in 2004, leaving the responsibility to his friend Salah Diab, he launched the satellite television channels OTV in 2007 and ONTV in 2008. It seems that he has no editorial control over Al-Masry Al-Youm's agenda, nor it is documented that there was any incident of interference with the newspaper's editorial policy. However, Al-Masry Al-Youm seems to pretty much identify with what can be seen as his position from political and economic developments in the country since his first introduction to the public sphere in the early 1990s: advocating for a free market economy, which is also the newspaper's line. However, his ONTV network, of which he is the sole owner, sometimes suffer his editorial interferences every now and then, as some colleagues of mine working there say. He also briefly had his own TV show there called *Sawiris Yohawer* (Sawiris interviews), where he would host public figures and engage in casual conversations with them.

Sawiris always denies any pressure or interference in the editorial lines of any of his media outlets[39], however in an interview by The Financial Times in 11 March 2015 he was asked by the interviewer, "So why is it then that critical voices, coverage of human rights and presenters who challenge the state appear to have largely disappeared from the screen of ONTV?" He smartly answered without lying in a way that denies the interference, but clearly states his position from the revolution and Egypt's politics in general, "I did not ask anyone to [leave]," he said. "People are now fed up from [the] revolution, fed up from human rights, fed up from demonstrations, fed up with strikes. You can't blame [the] people for focusing on their lives, their bread, their work and their economy."

Regarding his political position before the revolution, Sawiris was not known for any significant political views. However, he was known to be close to powerful political figures including Mubarak himself and his family, despite the fact that he was never a member of NDP, which was almost conditional before the revolution for businessmen in order to guarantee the state's support and access to opportunities. Following Mubarak's ouster, Sawiris and a group of Egyptian businessmen founded a new political party and called it Al-Masriyeen Al-Ahrar (The Free Egyptians), which is a liberal party in favour of free market economy with a secular ideology. He always denied having any official position in the party, but it is obvious that he plays the Godfather's role for its members and associates.

In an interview with him, The Financial Times wrote that Sawiris's television network, ONTV, and the political party he founded were at the forefront of efforts to mobilise against Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. ONTV was "the dagger, the sword" against the Islamists, Sawiris himself said in the interview. After the Muslim Brotherhood had been ousted and the country was being led by Al-Sisi, Sawiris claimed he remained in politics because he wanted to "make sure the Egyptian economy will be built in the right way"[40]. Sawiris's last media

[39] Al Masry Al Youm, ONTV channels and Euronews.
[40] The Financial Times, 11 March 2015 https://www.ft.com/content/d5aa3aac-c70e-11e4-9e34-00144feab7de

investment is a majority share acquisition in the media giant Euronews.[41] It is not clear yet if he would manage to use this internationally prominent news outlet for his political agenda or not, as there's no information available in this regard.

Salaheddin Ahmed Tawfiq Diab, known as Salah Diab, is the second media investor in this thesis. He doesn't have a diverse media portfolio like Sawiris does, who was discussed earlier, or like Al-Amin, discussed later. However, his non-media investments can be seen as much more diverse. Unlike, Sawiris and Al-Amin, he has a relation with the media. His father, Ahmed Diab, was a journalist. However, it is not documented anywhere that the son ever practised journalism before deciding to invest in it. He is known to be Israel's best Egyptian business partner as mentioned in many sources including Al-Marefa Encyclopaedia.[42] He is also the CEO of PICO Group, the family company founded in the late 1970s. The group has a diverse range of projects that include PICO International Petroleum, PICO Energy Co., PICO Engineering Group, La Poire Touristic Projects (La Poire/Benos), PICO for Modern Agriculture, and others. The power of Diab lies in the portfolio of his family that controls about 70 percent of the American brands operating in Egypt. According to the American Chamber of Commerce, the family represents 43 American companies in Egypt, which is the biggest number today for a single Egyptian business family. One of the companies is the American oilfield services giant HALIBURTON (according to Al-Marefa Encyclopaedia), which is known for overseas corruption and been highly reported in the news, especially following the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. In general, the family dominates a diverse monopolistic portfolio that varies in investments in the oil sector, agriculture, gold, tourism and other fields.

Salah Diab was briefly detained once following the ouster of Mubarak and later released on bail, in a corruption case (out of 17 cases against him and others he engaged in business with). The case was about a deal between him and Mubarak's Oil Minister Sameh Fahmy, where the latter sold Diab's PICO a piece of land with potential oil investments for 10 times less than the

[41] A multilingual TV news channel, headquartered in Lyon-Écully, France, founded in 1993 with the goal of covering world news from a pan-European perspective.
[42] Al-Marefa Encyclopaedia http://www.marefa.org/صلاح_توفيق_دياب

market price. Later his office in Zamalek (a Cairo district) 'accidentally' caught fire on 23 December 2013 and all documents were lost.

Opposite to the model of Naguib Sawiris, the highly organised, internationally recognised and officially 'clean-handed' businessman, Mohamed Al-Amin, our third case in this research, came to the public sphere obscurely right after the fall of Mubarak. His wealth is estimated at about US$ 3 Billion (Al-Ahram Al-Arabi, 2012). However, his diverse investment portfolio, from toilets production to TV networks, is considered highly intransparent when it comes to documentation or public records, which is opposite to the very open Sawiris and his family. However, the three of the mentioned cases share very high interest in the media world and the news industry.

Only in September 2011, Al-Amin decided to step into the media industry, both TV and press, with heavy financial weight. Since then, he has managed to establish, buy or inject capital in what I estimated to be around 14 media outlets. No clear documentation found though. What is confirmed about his media portfolio, either full or partial investments, are the TV networks CBC, Al-Nahar, Modern, Panorama and Moga. He also bought the Cairo-based Arab News Agency from its Kuwaiti owners, and the local newspaper of Al-Fagr. However, most importantly for this research he founded Al-Watan and launched it impressively quickly in May 2012. The newspaper is now known to be Egypt's richest newspaper with the highest salaries ever paid to journalists. Extraordinarily, all these investments happened in a few months toward the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012. However, it is highly circulated in press circles that he has heavy Kuwaiti financial support. This Kuwaiti link is supported by the very special acquisition of The Arab News Agency, formerly owned by the highly regarded, both world-wide and in his country, Kuwaiti billionaire Mohamed Al-Kharafi, following his death. Another indication for the Kuwaiti involvement in his sudden media investments is his many and frequent one or two-day trips from Cairo to Kuwait around the same period he was acquiring all these media companies (Al-Ahram Al-Arabi, 2012).

While investigating Al-Amin's life and his beginnings for this thesis, the available information seemed conflicting. I found it very difficult to construct clear lines in his biography in order to provide us with a proper introduction to the openly pro-Mubarak and anti-revolutionary businessman. What seems to be confirmed about him in media circles as well, is that he was working as a construction site manager in Kuwait in his early career life. He later became a manager of a Kuwaiti construction company, and then returned to Egypt to start his own business at home. He started with an agriculture company licensed by then Agriculture Minister Youssef Wali, who's a controversial character known for his corruption and being a loyal Mubarak ally who served as a minister for more than 20 years. A little later he heavily injected investments in his friend's company Amer Group, owned by Mansour Amer, currently on trial for many corruption cases. Regarding Al-Amin's suspicious wealth and its undeclared sources, a lawyer named Tarek Mahmoud officially used the right of reporting against citizens with suspicious big wealth (Al-Ahram Al-Arabi, 2012), which the Egyptian law allows for. However, the General Public Prosecutor ordered the freezing of the investigation.

I argue that one of the indications that these three businessmen, who decided to step into and invest in the media, have similar goals and probably the same political agenda, is the connection of Magdy Al-Gallad to all three of them. Al-Gallad is a former editor-in-chief of Al-Masry Al-Youm, which is owned by Naguib Sawiris and Salah Diab, and now holds the same position at Al Amin's Al-Watan. However, I also argue that there are some differences among the three tycoons concerning their backgrounds and media practices.

When I asked my interviewees to draw comparisons between the three media tycoons in question, Reda Abbas thinks that "Some of them are more professional than others dealing with media they own. As an example, Diab was raised [in his family] close to the media, so he understands most of the process very well. Sawiris tries different ways with different outlets. Al-Amin jumped [into the media] from elsewhere with the aim of playing a big role in no time, which raises many questions." Wesam Shawkat goes very direct in his comment on our three media investors saying that "Salah Diab possesses enough experience to own a media institution and

use it as a magical stick. Naguib Sawiris is the furthest from the media and he is a dictator moved by his personal interests regardless of professionalism. Mohamed Al-Amin is a facade for executing what he's ordered to do." Nour Magdy, however, puts the three tycoons into two camps. The first one is for Sawiris and Diab "as both of them started their media activities before the revolution, whether their partnership in Al-Masry Al-Youm in 2004, which played a political role in many cases, or OTV and ONTV owned by Sawiris. After the revolution, the political role of their media tools became more noticeable to serve their economic interests, but we can't ignore their relations with the security services." As for Mohamed Al Amin, Magdy puts in the other camp and says "Nobody knew him before the revolution as he entered the media field suddenly with a huge amount of money invested in Al-Watan newspaper and CBC TV. What we know is that he represents the counterrevolution but nobody knows which camp he belongs to in this regard. We can't also ignore talks about relations that link him with security bodies." Interestingly, in a headline style like, Alaa Zakareya labels the three media tycoons as following "Sawiris, a liberal to the maximum represented in his TV channels. Diab, a media investor at the service of businessmen and their interests. Al Amin, a facade for a capitalist block for businessmen interests with the government."

3.5 Sample profiles of editors-in-chief

Going through the job description of The Guardian's[43] editor-in-chief published on the newspaper's website, one might think it is not very different from how a private newspaper is run in Egypt. This might be relatively true looking from a distance. However, in practice within the Egyptian press market, the difference observed in how a newspaper like Al-Masry Al-Youm or Al-Watan is run in comparison to The Guardian is huge and not in favour of either newspapers.

[43] London-based newspaper with wide news coverage over the world: http://www.theguardian.com

Generally, a chief editor is the head and most responsible person in a newspaper. She/he would have the final word on what is to be published and what not. A chief editor gives the final approval before sending an issue to the print house, delegates responsibilities and editorial tasks and is the one finally responsible of the editorial line of the newspaper. In practice a managing editor does most of the core work of a chief editor on daily basis, however the final decision remains to be the chief editor's. Chief editors always maintain and exercise significant power over their editorial teams. Theirs is a semi-dictatorial position that might make sense in the press business, since chief editors are the ones to be dragged to court if a junior reporter (hypothetically speaking) wrote by mistake that a chickens' farm produces 200,000 eggs a day instead of two million as a typo missing a zero digit if that caused the farm's owner a stock market loss. A mistake like this is legally the editor's responsibility, not the reporter's. From a different perspective, the chief editor is the only link (in most cases) between the newspaper's owner(s) and the editorial staff. She/he is the one responsible for translating the investors' desire for profit into editorial content that generates readership, which in turn brings advertisers to the newspaper. However, as I have argued, profitability is probably not the main aim of investors in the private media in Egypt.

In his book "Between Journalism and Politics", the highly connected former top journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, who served under Nasser as the editor-in-chief of Egypt's leading state newspaper Al-Ahram, talks about one of his many personal stories with all sorts of leaders whether Egyptian, Arab or international. He tells the story of his exclusive dinner invitation by the former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh[44] during the period of his visit to Egypt when he was still in power in the 1980s. Heikal writes that Saleh was telling him about a discussion that took place between him and Mubarak earlier during the same visit regarding an issue Saleh had with the Egyptian press.

[44] Ali Abdullah Saleh, President of Yemen from 1990 to 2012. Saleh previously served as President of North Yemen from 1978 until unification with South Yemen in 1990.

> *"The Yemini president had expressed [to Mubarak] how annoyed he was because of an article written by a journalist (who he mentioned his name). Mubarak's response was unexpected by the Yemini president. Mubarak asked him without an introduction "Hasn't Yemen become an oil-producing state?" Ali Abdallah Saleh was surprised by what [Mubarak's response] seemed far from what he was talking about, however Mubarak re-connected what he interrupted and continued "Man, shake your pocket, give him a bite and he will stop attacking you"* (Heikal, 1985).

Mubarak's response to Saleh's complaint about the annoying journalist tells a lot about how Mubarak was dealing with the media and what type of journalism he was encouraging. He chose to corrupt those with loud voices rather than using his predecessors' – Nasser and Sadat – heavy-handed physical punishment. Corruption worked well in the state-run press, and was already a common practice when the green light was given for a private press market to form itself through the business elite. And I think that our two sample newspapers in this research, Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan, are representative in this normalised financially corrupt media atmosphere since Mubarak's early years in office. Magdy Al-Gallad is known to receive the highest monthly salary (EGP 200,000) ever paid to an editor-in-chief in the history of Egyptian journalism.[45]

In Chapter Four, where I review the news produced during and after the fall of Mubarak, and also in Chapter Five, where I analyse the news produced around the military coup period, I consider the role of chief editors of both sample newspapers vital, because, as explained earlier, they are the one solely responsible of their newspapers editorially, legally and in front of their investors. Particularly, during the coup period in 2013, Yasser Rizk and Magdy Al-Gallad were the chief editors of Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan. Rizk later returned to his original state-run newspaper Akhbar Al-Youm, while Al Gallad is still Al-Watan's editor until today.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Al-Masry Al-Youm was founded in 2004. It is seen inside and outside Egypt, as an 'independent newspaper', which I prefer to label as private rather

[45] Masress, 6 March 2012 http://www.masress.com/gn4me/4086359

than independent, as I consider the later misleading. Many editors have run the newspaper since its foundation, but none had the power that Magdy Al-Gallad (later discussed as Al-Watan's editor as well) maintained, nor spent the number of years in his position (2005 – 2012). According to Gololy celebrities' website[46] Al-Gallad was born in 1964 in Menyet Al-Qamh village in Sharqeya Governorate to the north of Egypt. He graduated from Department of Journalism, Faculty of communication, Cairo University in 1986. He started his career as an investigative journalist at the state-run Al-Ahram newspaper before he moved to Al-Masry Al-Youm. He was listed among the top 100 influential Arabs in 2009 by ArabianBusiness.com, and he hosted at least three TV shows.

Al-Gallad smartly created a network of loyal editors and journalists, not necessarily loyal to the newspaper or their profession, but mainly to him as a person. The reward was appointing them in higher positions in his newspaper and in other cases finding them freelance opportunities in TV channels as programme editors or hosts using his very high-profile connections in the private media market (Kamal Eddin, 2013). Al-Masry Al-Youm's editor during the military coup period, which is analysed in Chapter Five, was Yasser Rizk. He is known in press circles to have a very good relation with Al-Gallad, his former boss before moving to the newly founded Al-Watan in 2012. I see that Al-Gallad just left one of his loyal men behind at Al-Masry Al-Youm before moving to Al-Watan. Al-Gallad is seen in the press market as someone who introduced a new image of an editor-in-chief. "Although work rules in newspapers forbid editors from working in more than one outlet or making use of their sources for others [media outlets], Al-Gallad introduced a new form of professionalism and a new system similar to Mubarak's logic. Hence, when the 25 January revolution broke out, Al-Gallad played an important role in how Al-Masry Al-Youm and the satellite TV channels he runs through "his children" dealt with it (Kamal Eddin, 2013).

Yasser Rizk is not as very powerful or very connected as Al-Gallad is. He was quickly appointed as Al-Masry Al-Youm's editor once Al-Gallad was chosen in 2012 by Al-Amin to lead

[46] Gololy, accessed on 29 May, 2017 http://gololy.com/cv/مجدي-الجلاد

the birth process of the anti-revolutionary newspaper Al-Watan. Rizk graduated from the same faculty of communication as Al-Gallad did in 1986. He worked as a journalist for the state-run newspaper Akhbar Al-Youm since he was a student at Cairo University. He later became a military editor at the same newspaper, and then a reporter at the presidential palace until 2005. In the same year, he was appointed as the editor-in-chief of the state-run weekly magazine Al-Itha'a wal-Televesion. One week before the 25 January revolution in 2011, he was appointed as the editor-in-chief of Akbar Al-Youm, the first newspaper he worked for. He was fired from his position following Mubarak's fall. Later August 2012, he joined Al-Masry Al-Youm as its editor-in-chief after his friend and former classmate moved to Al-Watan (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2014).

Rizk literally ran Al-Masry Al-Youm exactly like Al-Gallad did before him. The same policies and same editorial line continued. Rizk's journalistic career has grown mostly under the state-run press. He worked for Akhbar Al-Youm before Al Masry Al-Youm. And in late 2013 he returned to his old newspaper, as he was selected for CEO there. Rizk wrote an opinion article for Al-Masry Al-Youm on the occasion of its 10th anniversary in 2014, which was after his return to Akhbar Al-Youm. The article was published with the title "Yasser Rizk on Al-Masry Al-Youm: Days that have history[47]". This article in his own words reveals his political and editorial biases, and also tells us about Al-Masry Al-Youm's position towards politics in general and the 2013 military coup in particular.

> *"I remember each of those days with fondness and nostalgia, I turn the pages in Al-Masry Al-Youm's volumes in 2012 and 2013 reading through the stories and the wide coverage of the event of the year of rage under the Muslim Brotherhood's rule, going through the headlines: 'Down with the Guide's rule', 'The Forgers', 'Illegitimate', 'Morsi speaks about another country', 'The country atop a crater', 'Too late', finally '30 June Revolution' and 'Morsi deposed by the people's order'. I testify that the founder of Al-Masry Al-Youm Eng. Salah Diab never got back to me because of a*

[47] Al Masry Al Youm, 21st June 2014 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/editor/details/68

headline, a news story or an opinion article. At the darkest circumstances, he was a strongman that never bows, a supporter that never hesitates, a believer that Al-Masry Al-Youm [The Egyptian Today] would never betray the Egyptian this day or tomorrow. And what is most dear to me of those memories in Al-Masry Al-Youm is its exclusive first interview with – back then – Colonel General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi; the interview that had a huge political and media role locally and internationally and hit the Muslim Brotherhood and their tails with a case of rabies [dog disease] that its barking echo is still heard" (Rizk, 2014)[48].

Unlike Rizk, Magdy Al-Gallad would not use such a blunt terminology of editorial bias, or directly side with the military or the business elite. I argue that they both have the same compass toward political power, but Al-Gallad stays relatively subtle. Not always very successfully though, as he sometimes loses control over his linguistic slips. And here I repeat the passage I quoted from the article I referred to in the introduction of this thesis, "Life on the shoulders of Gamal Mubarak[49]"

"The ambitious and polite man walks his political path carrying on his shoulders savage creatures surviving on his blood, different in sizes from worms to rhinoceros and aggressive monsters. Most of whom [mentioned animals] don't like Gamal Mubarak as much as they are after gaining the most of political and financial gains from "his own living flesh". And the man is paying the price without knowing. And the price is creating more distance between him and the average citizen" (Al-Gallad, 2009).

Before moving to Al-Watan, Al-Gallad was heard in Al-Masry Al-Youm's newsroom warning his reporters from siding with the January Revolution in its first days. "Magdy Al-Gallad stood in Al-

[48] The article is now deleted from Al-Masry Al-Youm's website, but it is available at this link http://almogaz.com/news/opinion/2014/06/21/1533118
[49] AL Masry Al Youm, 8 July 2009

Masry Al-Youm's newsroom in the first days of the revolution and said: That whoever wants to go to Tahrir Square to participate in the protests and the revolution should not say that he belongs to Al-Masry Al-Youm, otherwise he will be sent to investigations." (Kamal Eddin, 2013) I argue that this position towards the 2011 revolution is in line with Al-Gallad's close relation with Mubarak's family, which clearly appears in the article quoted earlier about Gamal. However, following the fall of Mubarak, he always introduced himself as a supporter of the 25 January Revolution. He also continued to claim support of the revolution after his move to Al-Watan although it's funded by one Egypt's most openly anti-revolutionary businessmen. Al-Gallad was known for receiving news stories ready-written by State Security via fax, which he directly publishes them under other journalists' by-lines. These news stories were mainly defaming Muslim Brotherhood figures or businessmen out of favour with those in power (Kamal Eddin, 2013). Receiving stories written by security might sound like an exaggeration by Kamal Eddin, but to someone familiar with the press market in Egypt, this story does not come as a surprise. Historically, many journalists openly received these ready-made stories since Nasser times and published them as they were.

Kai Hafez (2013) argues that before the military coup Egypt was a rather immature and radically polarised but vivid public sphere. After the coup, however, he thinks that the country seems to have witnessed an authoritarian roll-back similar of Nasserist times. One can and must be critical of the Muslim Brotherhood, but their president Morsi was legitimately elected, and the military, is not aiming to stabilise democracy but seeks control over power and the economy. And it seems true that the media are hardly ever the avant-garde of democratisation because they are simply too vulnerable to political or financial manipulation (Hafez, 2013).

Conclusion

As a conclusion to this chapter, which brought a critical review of the political economy of the Egyptian media in general and the press in particular, I argued that the interest in control was

there as the literature and primary sources suggested and confirmed. The mainstream media succeeded in serving power by strengthening the elites' economic and political discourses, as it dealt with them as systems of system of hegemony. The control has actually been there since Nasser's era (1952 – 1970) Sadat's (1970 – 1981) Mubarak's (1982 – 2011) and until present. There have always been changes depending on the political situation the country was going through, like Sadat's *Infitah* for example. Freedoms were slightly restored, but they were always minor and temporary. The chapter also confirmed the recent interest by the business elite in the private press since the late 1990s and the acceleration that followed since 2004, which was associated with the introduction of Gamal Mubarak to the political scene. The press legislations in Egypt have always been complex and unclear, giving power to the state to control the market since the 1950s. But later since the late 1990s the legislations engaged in favouritism toward the business elite and the media they own. The very recent and unfinished legislative discussions around the new 'Unified Media Law' that will most probably pass might make 2017 the year that brings even more control over the press market. However, this control will come with less ambiguity in comparison to the previous laws that prevailed since Nasser and Sadat's eras. The sample profiles of business investors and editors-in-chief discussed and investigated in the last two sections of this chapter also proved the interest in control by the business elite over the press market, as interviewees also confirmed. In general, this chapter proved the first pillar of this research discussing the interest of Egypt business elite in controlling the press market both during and after Mubarak's eras and maintaining their power. The chapter also paved the road for the second major part of this thesis, which is focussed on the dynamics of *how* this control is being practised as I will review and analyse the news frames of the post-Mubarak press. In Chapter Four: A review of the private press during and after Mubarak's fall, I will go through the private press coverage during the first 18 days of the revolution, and then go through the post-Mubarak private press coverage until shortly before escalations that led to the coup of 2013.

CHAPTER FOUR: A review of the private press during and after Mubarak's fall

4.1 Private press coverage during the first 18 days of the revolution

4.2 Private press coverage following Mubarak's fall

"Hey, Uncle Presenter

Your words are transparent

Your appearance on the screen inspires cheapness

Stop lying and ridiculing our minds […]

Living in illusion, shame on you, media

Blood was flooding

And they were screening the Nile

Our TV, scandalised with bells

The people demand: cleansing the media"

(El-Manawehly, 2011)[50]

The state-run media was mentioning the protests in Tahrir during the 18 days (25 January – 11 February 2011)) leading to the fall of Mubarak with a lot of underestimation at least for a whole week. They were estimating the masses with a few hundreds and showing images of boats cruising in the Nile as if nothing significant was happening. This behaviour by the media was highly criticised later following the ouster of Mubarak, and has been used until recently in cynical art production. The activist singer Yasser El-Manawehly wrote and sang the above quoted song in response to the state's media narrative and it quickly went very popular then. Shibshi Al-Nizam (slippers of the regime) is a brilliant label coined by the youth activists for the state media. The term arose during the first days of the Egyptian revolution. It is a term that has two meanings:

[50] Song by activist-singer Yasser El-Manawehly, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3t29BB8Pdaw

slippers refer to both the notion of obedience, being worn by the government's feet, and also punishment, slippers being a weapon of choice within crowded Egyptian family homes. The state media, in effect, are used by the government to punish. This may mean targeting a person, a group or an idea that the government does not approve of (Hamoud, 2015, p. 156).

This brings us back to Jürgen Habermas who insists on following critical approach which should question the media as an attack of money and power, and in turn, as a structure that the elites use to dominate a society (Habermas, 1987, p. 375). And here comes the importance of examining this structure that the elites use in the Egyptian case, particularly at this phase of this research, how the private press was playing this structural role of hegemony over the society around the events during Mubarak's fall and after. Unlike the state-run media, the influential private media had a relatively different position from the rapidly breaking events during those first 18 days. By doing so, they attracted the attention of the masses away from narrative of events in the state media, which was trying to undermine the whole event by distracting attention of the public away from Tahrir. But some of the influential private media decided to engage. Among TV channels, ONTV was seriously engaged. As for newspapers, Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk were also among the most engaged in covering the events in Tahrir and across the country. Ihsan Sameer says "I think it [the private media] was the best [compared to the state-run media], as it focussed on the revolutionaries' demands, covered the security violations and did not take a supporting position from the ruling circle back then."

In this chapter I will review the private press coverage in two sections. The first, 4.1 "Private press coverage during the first 18 days of the revolution", goes through the very intense coverage of those 18 days (20 by adding one day before and one after, as explained in the methodology in Chapter Two). The second section, 4.2 "Post-Mubarak private press coverage", goes through a much longer period from after the fall of Mubarak until shortly before escalations that led to the coup of 2013. This chapter is *not* news analysis of either of the periods (during and after Mubarak's fall). This chapter is a general review of events and non-academic journalistic commentary by myself and interviewees in this research. I argue that this chapter

serves as an introduction for the following Chapter Five, where news framing analysis will be conducted on the 112-day sample of private press content, as explained in Chapter Two. By doing so, the reader of this thesis will not have a gap in following the major events, and will be familiar with the private press attitudes and editorial styles before analysing the coup's press content.

4.1 Private press coverage during the first 18 days of the revolution

As mentioned before, the first reaction of the state media was to ignore and downplay the events. When the events escalated more than the state-media narrative could manipulate, they switched to scare narrative. A little after the disappearance of the police from the streets across the country at the night of the Friday of Rage[51] (28 January), the state media, TV and newspapers, heavily focused on the theme of chaos and what they called 'foreign agendas'[52]. Eventually, this also did not work. Many people organised themselves in neighbourhood watch groups called *legan shaabeya* (popular committees), which prevented the chaos narrative from happening during the absence of police. The 'foreign agendas' narrative, which was focused on the idea that 'external elements' were behind all protests in order to 'Burn Egypt[53]', did not work either. Among the powers accused of involvement in the accelerated on-going events were Israel, Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, the EU, the US and some other randomly selected countries as well, which made people unconvinced of the state's narrative. "A day after pro-Mubarak forces were unleashed into Tahrir Square last week, inciting a bloody battle that left thousands wounded, Al-Ahram reported on its front page that millions of government supporters had flooded the streets, grossly exaggerating their numbers. State television called the anti-Mubarak demonstrators "destabilising" forces and accused foreign powers of instigating instability" (Fadel & Londoño,

[51] "Rage" was a name of given by protesters on that day who were angry at the police because of their brutality on Tuesday 25 January.
[52] A term often used by Egyptian elites fighting against unexpected or uncontrollable change as a part of fear tactics, which increases xenophobia.
[53] A term often used in the controlled media as another fear tactic that predicts chaos and destruction.

2011). The people very quickly ridiculed this narrative by spreading the joke that Egypt finally managed to bring Israel, Iran, the US, Hamas and Hezbollah all together.

The private press was very challenged in finding a convincing narrative that does not make the authorities angry and at the same time does not look very unconvincing to the audiences. Al-Shourouk[54], and Al-Dostor (discussed in Chapter Three) positioned themselves differently in comparison to most other private newspapers. They deliberately put themselves far from the state-run media narrative during that period. Reda Abbas, goes back in his memories says "As I remember, we passed all pressures after the first two days, where the main and only one pressure at that time was Mubarak's regime, other factors were loose. [Some were] waiting, others were running, while some factors just disappeared. So, I guess we had the best time in that period." As for Al-Masry Al-Youm, it already enjoyed a significant margin of critical news given by the authorities since its foundation in 2004. I argue that this relative freedom, which lasted for seven years before the revolution, had developed a culture of solid practice of freedom among journalists and editors working for the newspaper. And this freedom was very difficult to take away and make them adopt the simplistic state narrative of news. However, I would also argue that the management – business and editorial – practised some pressure and made strategic distances from the breaking events in order to protect themselves from losing journalists, readers or whatever remains from their connections with political power groups.

On the 24th of January, the day before the planned marches organised on Facebook[55], Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk (only added in this section next to Al-Masry Al-Youm, as explained in the methodology in Chapter Two) opened with lead stories on finding evidence by the Ministry of Interior on 'terrorist' connections to Alexandria's All Saints Church bombing[56],

[54] A prominent newspaper founded in 2009 and published in Egypt and several other Arab countries.
[55] "We are all Khaled Said" page, founded by the Egyptian Dubai-based young Google employee Wael Ghonim.
[56] An attack on a church in Alexandria on Saturday, 1 January 2011. 23 people killed, who were attending a new year service, and some 97 more were injured. Nobody was brought to trial, while various unfounded reports claim that Mubarak's Interior Minister Habib Al-Adly himself was involved in the bombings.

which happened on the New Year Eve, three weeks earlier. The newspapers' major headlines were:

Al-Masry Al-Youm: Al-Adly reveals: "Palestinian Islamic Army" behind "Saints" bombing with clear evidence[57]

Al-Shorouk: Suspect of planning All Saints Church bombing arrested[58]

I argue that the story failed to distract attention from the planned events on 25 January or from the revolutionary fever threatening to spread from Tunisia to Egypt, despite its significant importance and how it was top news since the bombings occurred three weeks earlier to 25 January. However, it well met the paper's standards of introducing serious and well-presented news, while consciously keeping low profile the planned protests.

On the day of 25th, and due to the failure of distracting the public from the planned protests the day before, both newspapers had to do so on that day:

Al-Masry Al-Youm: Early rehearsal for the "Day of Rage"… 12 protests in Cairo and other governorates demanding jobs, wage increase and rewarding[59]

Al-Shorouk: The day of rage[60]

The above type of headlines did not ridicule the papers' audiences by not talking about protests or ignoring them on the same day they were planned to take place. But at the same time, they

[57] Al-Masry Al Youm, 24 January 2011
[58] Al-Shorouk, 24 January 2011.
[59] Al-Masry Al Youm, 25 January 2011.
[60] Al-Shorouk, 25 January 2011.

did not mention a word on torture or police brutality, which led to the death of Khaled Said[61], whose death was a significant reason for the planned protests. By these lead stories, I argue that the private press was keen on giving a space in their news agendas for the protests that the public was anticipating and paying attention to. However, they cleverly did so by using a day's earlier small protests as an example of only having economic demands, unrelated to police brutality. This clearly ignores the fact that even the Facebook page which was calling for the protests was named 'We are all Khaled Said', which in turn gives the impression that they did not want to mention police brutality and keep it only economic.

On the 25th, the protests ended up being massive. And instead of a few hundreds, they were at least in tens of thousands. The protesters managed to storm into Tahrir Square, which was a fortress that no protests were allowed access to for long before. Nour Magdy says "Of course there were business and security power relations that affected the coverage during that time. the owners have their economic interests in addition to their security relations that serve those interests as well. In this regard, I'd like to mention Al-Youm Al-Sabea newspaper and their website, which at that time almost didn't write anything about Tahrir, as if everything was normal. This is due to the business interests and security relations of course." In its reporting, the next day, Al-Masry Al-Youm, insisted on sticking to the economic narrative. By doing so, they didn't produce false news, but they undermined violence and police brutality. Al-Shorouk, however, was slightly closer to the street reality. However, it was not as influential as Al-Masry Al-Youm, neither as well-connected to the political and economic power groups. The 26th of January's lead stories were titled as following:

Al-Masry Al-Youm: Warning: Thousands protest against poverty, unemployment, high prices and corruption… and demand the government's departure[62]

[61] A young Egyptian man whose death under police custody in Alexandria on 6 June 2010 and the way they tried to cover it up helped sparking the Egyptian Revolution of 2011.
[62] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 26 January 2011.

Al-Shorouk: Angry Egypt in the street[63]

The lead stories were again true and the stories' bodies did not contain false information. However, they (especially Al-Masry Al-Youm) emphasised the same economic approach to the events and continued avoiding police brutality or mentioning casualties. I argue that they well played the same game of Egyptian media freedom since 2004: blame the government (cabinet), not Mubarak or those close to him.

Graphic images and videos that flooded the social media on Friday the 28th, followed by the disappearance of the police all over the country toward the end of the day, brought a significant strategic change in the position of Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk towards the breaking events and the political elite in the first newspaper after the eventful weekend, on Sunday the 30th:

Al-Masry Al-Youm: Conspiracy by the interior for a scenario of chaos[64]

Al-Shorouk: The people advances and Mubarak retreats[65]

For some reason, with these lead stories the two newspapers decided for the first time to take a clear position against the interior ministry, marking the beginning of their demonization. This is an opposite position in comparison to the one taken during the previous five days since the 25th. Especially in the case of Al-Masry Al-Youm, as we can see from their lead story above. It seems that this was a decision from above – owners and their connections within the political elite – giving the green light to attack the interior ministry. Probably, it's the knowledge that very few like Magdy Al-Gallad with their high-profile connections to the elites can have access to. It was clear from that day (judging from the published news contents) that the political elite had

[63] Al-Shorouk, 26 January 2011.
[64] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 30 January 2011.
[65] Al-Shorouk, 30 January 2011.

decided to abandon the interior ministry, thinking that changing the minister Habib Al-Adly and a reshuffling its administration would do the job and protesters would go home. It didn't work as was proven later. Protesters' demands were rising to higher ceilings by the day in reaction to the state's violence and obvious state-media manipulations.

By the first of February, it was clear that Al-Masry Al-Youm remained a well-read newspaper and a relatively trusted source of news as a second option after the social media. Al-Shorouk was also growing more popular. But it was also clear that there was a shift in connections and loyalties. By focusing on the development of the two newspapers' editorial policies, we can see that after taking a position against the interior and Ahmed Nazif's government (loyal to Gamal Mubarak), they started enjoying a stronger connection to the military. Wesam Shawkat praises that brief experience saying "In that period, a status of political confusion prevailed, and no one knew where the events were heading. Hence the coverage was extremely neutral. However, quickly afterwards control was regained and coverage became in-line with whatever power that might seem to be stronger than the other." I argue that the military used both newspapers – now trusted by the public - as a means of communicating certain political messages/frames. This is clear by seeing the highly recognised Nasserist and pro-military intellectual Mohamed Hassanein Heikal[66] making it to the lead stories in both newspapers on the same day of the 1st of February. An exclusive interview for Al-Masry Al-Youm and a lengthy piece for Al-Shorouk.

Al-Masry Al-Youm: Mohamed Hassanein Heikal in an exclusive interview for Al-Masry Al-Youm: About the crisis: It is impossible that the army would shoot one bullet at the citizens, and placing the military forces in confrontation with the people is suicide[67]

[66] Born in 1923, an Egyptian journalist, who worked for 17 years (1957–1974) as the editor-in-chief of the top state newspaper Al-Ahram, and has been a commentator on Arab affairs for more than 50 years. He articulated the thoughts of Nasser earlier in his career and has been a member of the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union.

[67] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 1 February 2011.

Al-Shorouk: Heikal speaks about what is happening in Egypt now[68]

It is important to know that besides Heikal being known as a Nasserist supporter of the military, he was a person that would very rarely communicate with any sort of media, local or international since the early 1980s. He was also openly critical of Mubarak and his policies. In turn it was known in the media and political spheres that Mubarak did not like him, especially when Heikal talked critically about him on Al Jazeera a few years earlier in his very high profile TV programme *Ma'a Heikal* (With Heikal). On the 2nd of February, both newspapers allowed themselves again to be a messenger for calming down the streets through their lead stories:

Al-Masry Al-Youm: Mubarak promises not to run for elections, peaceful transition of authority, changing [constitutional] articles 76 and 77, investigating who caused the security chaos and prosecuting the corrupt[69]

Al-Shorouk: Mubarak: I won't run for a new term[70]

Mubarak's above mentioned decisions, which were part of his speech the day before, were introduced in a way to seem more firm and clear than Mubarak's flexible and loose promises in the same speech. This shows that the two newspapers were used again to convey a message to the people in order to calm them down and probably send them back home from the squares they occupied. It also shows that it was the beginning of understanding by both newspapers that Mubarak might not be taking decisions alone and there might be forces stronger than him at that moment. And at the end of the day, Al-Masry Al-Youm and AL-Shorouk maintained their image as trusted and engaging sources of news. This was not a very big challenge at that moment though, as the state-media then had already become the joke of the country.

[68] Al-Shorouk, 1 February 2011.
[69] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2 February 2011.
[70] Al-Shorouk, 2 February 2011.

As I argue that there was a shift by both newspapers in connections within the political elite and leaning towards the military while keeping their readership protected, I also argue that by the 3rd of February the editorial management of both newspapers realised – or were told – that Mubarak is falling for sure. Alaa Zakareya goes very direct and says "Simply, my opinion is that normally authorities are the ones determining editorial lines. However, during January [2011] the street interfered and events escalated in a way that no one could have ignored. And newspapers were at times written following the authorities' standards, and at other times by the street's, which was the main player at that time. And here came the confusion. This remained until the military and [some businessmen] took their decision to stand by the street against Mubarak's rule. And then later things went back to match with the previous normal." And here with the following headlines, editorial lines make another significant shift in its language and news focus: "the people" and "casualties":

AL-Masry Al-Youm: Tahrir Turns into a warzone… Homeland demands calm[71]

Al-Shorouk: Heikal writes: First complete Egyptian revolution in modern history[72]

Here with this title of that day's lead story, Al-Masry Al-Youm remains a messenger for the political and militarily elites. However, for the first time in 10 days it clearly recognises violence directly by Mubarak's state. I also argue that they still used the fear tactic through pictures of buildings on fire and did not mention a word on how the military – alongside with the police – used violence against protesters or who let the attackers on the Camel Battle[73] day pass to Tahrir to kill and assault protesters, who were already under a siege imposed by the army. Many videos circulated on the social media showing the military letting attackers cross the siege into the

[71] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 3 February 2011.
[72] Al-Shorouk, 3 February 2011.
[73] On 2 February 2011, security officials were witnessed bribing ordinary citizens into attacking protesters in Tahrir Square with knives, swards and guns, while riding camels and horses.

square without attempting to stop them (one exceptional and video-documented attempt of protection was by a small group of military men guarding Tahrir from Talaat Harb entrance[74]). Al-Masry Al-Youm did not mention any of these details and they insisted on the narrative of portraying the army as the protector of the people. Another delayed development in Al-Masry Al-Youm's editorial policy was switching terms from *mothahara* (protest) to *milioneya* (one-million march) on the 5th of February. This was the 12th day of the revolution where a number of *millioneyas* had already occurred since the 28th of January. The relatively less influential Al-Shorouk mentioned the term earlier in a few news stories, though.

Al-Masry Al-Youm: New milioneya message: Departure first[75]

Al-Shorouk: Egypt changed[76]

On the 7th of February (14th day of the revolution) and long after already hundreds were killed, thousands were injured, another glorifying term was introduced. Al-Masry Al-Youm started using the term *Shahid* (martyr) for those killed during confrontations with the police and Mubarak's *Baltageya* (civilian thugs). Al-Shorouk, as a voice of a publishing house, had a tendency to use short and poetic lead story titles toward the end of the 18-day protests.

Al-Masry Al-Youm: Egypt prays for the martyrs of freedom[77]

Al-Shorouk: Religion for God and the square for all[78]

[74] YouTube video of a group of military men guarding Tahrir Square https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=82R0nSCCp9M
[75] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 5 February 2011.
[76] Al-Shorouk, 5 February 2011.
[77] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 7 February 2011.
[78] Al-Shorouk, 7 February 2011.

Again, another term was introduced on the 8th labelling those in Tahrir Square and in other occupied spaces across the country as "revolutionaries" instead of "protesters". Similar to how "casualties" turned into "martyrs" the day before. However, Al-Shorouk on the same day led with a professional headline keeping the term as protesters.

Al-Masry Al-Youm: The Revolutionaries of Tahrir demand the return of stolen money[79]

Al-Shorouk: Prosecutor accuses Habib Al-Adly of deliberately killing protesters[80]

I argue that private media suspected since the Battle of the camel that Mubarak would leave, and that the army was waiting for the result of this attack on the protesters in order to take a final decision regarding their old leader. Hence smart private media knew who to ally with. Definitely it was not Mubarak nor his political elite, or at least the part of it that was not on good terms with the military.

Both Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk following that day – The Battle of the Camel – knew their position. They maintained their high readership, while at the same time they worked on protecting their owners' good relation with the military by glorifying them. At the same time, I argue that both newspapers – Al-Masry Al-Youm more though – saw no harm in glorifying the revolution and its 'martyrs'. The protesters were clearly the winners since at least a week before Mubarak's exit from his office, anyway, as it was only a matter of time. On the 12th of February, the day following Mubarak's fall, both newspapers led with emotional home pages glorifying the revolutionary and the military as well:

Al-Masry Al-Youm: The people wanted, and brought the regime down[81]

[79] Al-Masry Al Youm, 8 February 2011.
[80] Al-Shorouk: 8 February 2011.
[81] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 12 February 2011.

Al-Shorouk: And the people won[82]

4.2 Private press coverage following Mubarak's fall

Following the fall of Mubarak, it was expected that a fundamental change in the cultures of state institutions and among the employees who work for them would occur. This necessity was clearer in the context of state media than any other state institution. The Ministry of the Interior and others may have continued to operate after the revolution as they did before, in secrecy, with almost same hierarchies and lines of authority kept murky to outsiders. But the state media, despite the anger of its critics, continued its work in the tall, cylindrical monument to state centralisation on the Nile, its transmissions and hence its opinions in full view (Chammah, 2012, p. 16).

The private media, however, quickly turned 'revolutionary', in the sense that they adopted the narrative that the revolution was necessary to bring down Mubarak's 'corrupt state'. A position that most of them did not take, or did not clearly take, until the moment his ouster was announced on state TV on the 11th of February 2011. The private media (and later the state media) were faced with constant coverage by outlets like Al-Jazeera, which had cameras with almost 24/7 live broadcasting from Tahrir. Al-lJazeera also ran live commentaries by high-profile figures like the pan-Arab nationalist Azmi Bishara and the Islamist and pro-Muslim Brotherhood 'thinker' Yousuf Al-Qaradawi, who are both very critical of Mubarak and his legacy and also based-in Doha. Their job was to keep the momentum of the revolution going, and I think they did well, as they both caught the attention of audiences with secular and religious backgrounds. In addition to Al-Jazeera, social media helped change the private press' coverage as these outlets could see clearly how ordinary people were talking about the revolution outside the traditional

[82] Al-Shorouk, 12 February 2011.

controlled media. Additionally, western media, to a much lesser degree in comparison to Al-Jazeera's intense live coverage, CNN and BBC interviewing the so-called 'media darlings'[83] and English-speaking Egyptian youth, like Gigi Ibrahim, Hossam Al-Hamalawy, Mohamed Waked and many others, who's all famous activist faces, forced Egyptian media to take notice and follow suit later. Actually, Al-Masry Al-Youm (and other private newspapers), hired bloggers and popular social media users for their newly established social media department soon after Mubarak's fall, and even gave them fixed columns to write weekly onion pieces in traditional formats. In this section, I will focus on the editorial lines of Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan following Mubarak's fall using a few news stories in 2011 and 2012. And as explained earlier, Chapter Five will be all dedicated to deeper analysis of the whole period (112 days) of Tamarod Campaign[84] against Morsi in 2013 leading to his fall. The same period when Al-Watan extraordinarily quickly grew to be as influential as Al-Masry Al-Youm.

As mentioned in the previous section, Al-Masry Al-Youm started the new era of post-Mubark Egypt with the emotional headline "*The People wanted and brought the regime down"*. This was a case similar to almost every other private and even state-run newspaper in the country. Ihsan Sameer says "I think some changes happened with the arrival of the Muslim Brotherhood as a ruling power. Most newspapers made significant shifts, especially the state-run ones, which provided the brothers with support, since they became the rulers." Having said this, it does not mean that the period following Mubarak's fall was clear and editorially settled with a new and confident news agenda. 2011 was a very confusing year, editorially speaking, to almost every media outlet considering re-drawing editorial redlines and power loyalties. Al-Masry Al-Youm was a complex example of this confusion in 2011, given its importance as a highly influential and highly circulated newspaper that also had strong connections to different power groups in the country. However, for Al-Masry Al-Youm, there were a few settled themes considering their editorial agenda: The 'stability' promotion approach, the notion that 'the

[83] A celebrity who is especially popular and who receives frequent and very favourable attention in the news media.

[84] A grassroots movement that was founded to register opposition to President Mohamed Morsi and force him to call for early presidential elections.

revolution is over' and that the army is 'the people's protector' were all very present themes since the fall of Mubarak.

The Army: Workers' protests are dangerous for Egypt[85]

A lead story on the 15th of February, four days after Mubarak's ouster, which promoted taking a position against workers' protests. I argue that this is a message that worked in favour of both the military and business elites, which the newspaper had strong connections with.

Three from the previous regime behind escalating factional protests[86]

On 20 February, and through undisclosed 'informed sources', the newspaper pushes for the conspiracy theory model and demonization of workers engaging in protests. Al-Masry Al-Youm associated them with figures from the old regime, which was at that moment a symbol of 'evil'. Unsurprisingly, those three names behind the so-called 'factional protests' were never mentioned or disclosed later.

The day of democracy bringing down the illusions of tyranny[87]

Again, pushing for the notion that the revolution is 'successful and already over'. Al-Masry Al-Youm on 20 March, the day following a referendum on the first constitutional declaration[88], which was clearly a plan to protect whatever left from the old regime, the editor decided that

[85] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 15 February 2011.
[86] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 20 February 2011.
[87] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 20 March 2011.
[88] A measure adopted by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces of Egypt (SCAF) on 30 March 2011 after it passed through a referendum on 19 March with a yes majority voting of 77.2 percent.

full democracy (then) had been achieved. The newspaper totally disregarded the military and MB propaganda pushing the people to vote 'yes', which they both succeeded in achieving.

As mentioned earlier, 2011 was a confusing year editorially speaking. Al-Masry Al-Youm was clear in its position towards the military as the top political controller in the country, and towards the business elite that the newspaper's owners represent, or at least those who did not have overly open connections to Mubarak's regime. However, there was a clear issue of confusion regarding the 'old' and the 'new guards' and how to separate them, or to what degree the newspaper was free to publish critical/scandalising news about them.

Sources: Prosecution to call Nazif and Ibrahim Suleiman in hours[89]

This was a clear and easy editorial move for Al-Masry Al-Youm on 30 March to lead with this headline. Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif and Housing Minister Ibrahim Suleiman both belonged to the new guard, Gamal's close circle of business-political support that the army decided to abandon and hold responsible for all the wrongdoings of Mubarak's regime. Here the undisclosed 'informed sources' appear again; interestingly the newspaper knew in advance about their arrest, which I argue is a sign of coordination with the military, the only institution in control at that moment. Similar stories were published in that period, giving big news spaces to scandalising arrests of members of the new guards before they happen. I argue that the army was giving the media the chance to be present at the moment of such arrests for excessive coverage sending a message to the people that 'there is no place for corruption in new Egypt'. It worked very well, and the public were satisfied with the direction of change for a while.

The revolution's demands on the way: Asset freezing of the big three[90]

[89] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 30 March 2011.
[90] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 5 April 2011.

El Sherif detained for 15 days for investigations, Mubarak and his two sons receive investigation announcement in Sharm Al-Sheikh[91]

The above two lead stories on 5 and 12 April concerning the arrest of business and political figures in relation to corruption cases were significantly different from the other ones related to figures like Nazif and the group loyal to Gamal. This time they belong to the old guards, which were closer to Mubarak than to his son and had no direct connection with inheriting his father's rule. I argue that the army had no intention to sacrifice them as it happened earlier with the new guards, who were highly and deliberately scandalised in the media in general and Al-Masry Al-Youm in particular. However, their arrest came as a result of a mounting street pressure on the military. It clearly appears, while going through this type of news published about the old guards, that the newspaper did not know about their arrests from their so-called informed sources, as it happened with the new guards. The newspaper was also very careful not to scandalise them in the same way. They simply followed the street's beat in this kind of stories without attempting to make news hits. I argue that following up that street's beat in coverage by the private media is what Reda Abbas showing fascination about by saying "A huge difference [comparing news coverage before and after Mubarak's fall]. All power points who [were] always trying to control the press were gone. So, I think, with more than 20 years [of experience] in the field [I would say] that it was the golden age, no red lines, no forbidden subjects, no one was sacred." They did not conduct any special coverage or provide classified information about these individuals, and simply just transferred the street's response of disrespect against these figures and the happiness that prevailed because of their arrests. And by this, I also argue that the newspaper kept winning the street's confidence in their editorial line and the way they covered news 'in favour' of the people and their revolution. This was happening without making the military or other remnants of Mubarak's regime too angry as a precautious tactic, since it was an unpredictable period.

[91] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 12 April 2011.

I argue that there was another editorial policy by Al-Masry Al-Youm, which was to let itself being used by the military to convey messages to the public, again by referring to 'undisclosed informed sources'. However, the newspaper would also in some cases voluntarily convey these messages from open sources – the SCAF Facebook page and other public sources - in cases when the military did not give them exclusive access to information about a certain development.

Sources in the Military Council: Parliamentary elections in September and the presidential end of the year[92]

Here we see the privilege Al-Masry Al-Youm was given by the military on 22 March because of the appearance of the informed sources again. I argue that the military decided to empower (or reward) the newspaper for its military-respectful editorial line, by giving them the chance to break this very important and high profile news determining the political future of the country.

Friday night brings sit-ins back to Tahrir… The Army: We will protect the state of law[93]

In the issue of Sunday 10 April, I argue that Al-Masry Al-Youm was confused on how to cover the escalations that occurred late on Friday night – early Saturday morning. The story, as I witnessed in person, was about hundreds of protesters who remained in sit-ins, many were family members of those killed during the first 18 days of the revolution, in order to put pressure on the military with the goal of having the revolution's demands met and above all having Mubarak, his family and figures of his regime (not arrested yet back then) put on trial. Among those in the sit-ins a few young military officers were participating. It was not that clear what exactly they wanted, as they were very careful not to speak a lot in detail, but they demanded what they called

[92] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 22 March 2011.
[93] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 10 April 2011.

"purification of the army". In the early hours of Saturday, around 3 am (I was not present at that moment), the Military Police attacked, dispersed the already scattered sit-ins, killed two and injure 71, according to Al-Masry Al-Youm. Here the newspaper did not dare to mention that it was an operation of arresting the army officers who engaged in a sit-in. Instead they were called "individuals in military uniforms". I argue Al-Masry Al-Youm did this trying to distract the public's attention that they were actually army officers with demands for internal military reforms. The story remains ambiguous until today.[94] And Al-Masry Al-Youm never published any news about these officers again. Alaa Zakareya, seems to be uncertain about what exactly had happened in that period concerning the relation between the business elite and the military, as he says "In comparison to what was happening before the ouster of Mubarak, it seems that something went wrong between the businessmen owning newspapers and the ruling power in the transitional period [11 February 2011 – 30 June 2012 under the SCAF], which causes the newspapers to be [more] influenced by the interests of its owners. Sometimes, attacking the SCAF, and some other times agreeing with."

Later in 2012, the second year of the revolution, the editorial positioning of Mubarak as an ousted or sometimes imprisoned figure, the MB and Morsi were more clear in the then newly founded Egypt's richest newspaper Al-Watan. I argue the newspaper appeared carefully loyal to Mubarak, and hostile to Morsi and the MB, while the army was always praised. As a loyalist to Mubarak, the newly born and very rich newspaper was carefully bringing back a positive image of him and his family. The editorial line seemed to be anti-revolutionary. Al-Masry Al-Youm though, kept sounding 'revolutionary'. Generally speaking, I argue that it was a very difficult task to re-build Mubarak's reputation, as it entailed a big risk of having the newspaper failing its goal of being a dominant and mainstream news outlet. However, Al-Watan very quickly succeeded in becoming the second most circulated newspaper in the country after Al-Masry Al-Youm, as known in Egyptian media circles, rather than from official numbers.

[94] Interview by Arabi21 news website in 2015 with one of the officers after his release http://arabi21.com/story/805284

Mubarak's trial: The president's cook: I feel sad for His Excellency[95]

Mubarak's health deteriorates… Medical source: He became skin over bones[96]

In the above headlines published consequently on 31 May and 5 June 2012, right after the launch of Al-Watan, the newspaper is clearly, but carefully, drawing an image of Mubarak as an old sick man, who should be mercifully forgiven. I argue they were attempting to create sympathy among the readers. Interestingly, the editors mention Mubarak with the term "former president", not ousted president as most other private newspapers including Al-Masry Al-Youm would do.

Alaa Mubarak donates EGP 25,000 for the families of each dead and 12,000 for the injured in Assuit train accident[97]

Here the headline of the news story published in 22 November 2012 extends their attempt at reconstructing a positive image of Mubarak to his family. While Alaa was still in prison undergoing several trials for economic corruption, he decided to donate money for the families of the dead and injured in a tragic train crash in the southern governorate of Assiut. Moreover, according to the body of the news item, the money paid did not come from his own assets, which were frozen anyway. It was through a charity called after Mohamed Alaa Mubarak[98], his own son and the grandson of Mubarak, a child who passed away in 2009.

Again, I argue that promoting a positive image of Mubarak and his family was not an easy task, especially in 2012, when his ouster and memories of his regime's oppression and violence were still fresh in people's minds. Al-Watan was highly criticised for their position toward Mubarak and was labelled as a *Foloul* (remnants) or anti-revolutionary newspaper. Therefore,

[95] Al-Watan, 30 may 2012.
[96] Al-Watan, 5 June 2012.
[97] Al-Watan, 22 November 2012.
[98] Died on 18 May 2009, aged 12. It was announced that he had suffered a 'severe health crisis' (a brain haemorrhage). However, stories later emerged that he had sustained a fatal head injury while riding a quad bike.

the editors every now and then attempted to prove otherwise by publishing something negative about Mubarak in order to counter its anti-revolutionary image.

Mubarak's trial: A people winning and a tyrant waiting[99]

In the above headline published on 31 May 2012, Al-Watan acts as being on the side of the revolution following mounting accusations of being pro-Mubarak and anti-revolutionary. So, they called him a "tyrant" in this piece. Interestingly, it worked and people continued buying the newspaper until it reinforced its position as a top news sources in the country, which other media would use as a source.

From another perspective, the editorial narrative of Al-Watan is a clearly anti-MB one. In today's news style guide of the newspaper they actually do not refer to them by their name as the Muslim Brotherhood anymore. They literally call them *Al-Irhabeya*[100] (the terrorist). However, in 2012 that was still impossible, since the MB were still in power until the military coup of 3 July 2013. However, I argue that from the beginning and even under the MB's rule, Al-Watan's editorial agenda took two parallel lines: ridiculing and demonising them.

The Brotherhood to a voter: If you don't vote for Morsi, God will take back your motorbike[101]

Brotherhood songs: No for love, no for wife, yes for Morsi[102]

[99] Al-Watan, 31 May 2012.
[100] The Muslim Brothehood was banned and listed as a terrorist group by an Egyptian court ruling in 2014.
[101] Al-Watan, 24 May 2012.
[102] Al-Watan, 20 July 2012.

In the above two headlines published on 24 May and 20 July consequently, I argue that it was meant to make the MB exaggeratedly seem ridiculous and backward. Interestingly, it worked well and the newspaper saw its readership increase, and TV talk shows started quoting their news. And the MB anyway were not politically acting in favour of the revolution, while resentment to their rule was growing, which made many readers find this kind of stories appealing.

Khalid Youssef: The Brotherhood is more capitalist than Ahmed Ezz and will do to us more than Hitler did[103]

The Brotherhood continues with terrorism… Pro-Shater [Facebook] page: Al-Watan is next[104]

The above two headlines by Al-Watan, published on 31 July and 11 August 2012, illustrate the other strategy of building and magnifying fear among the public toward the MB by demonising them. The newspaper used public figures, politicians and artists who were known as opponents to Mubarak or at least did not have clear association with him in order to convey this message of fear and demonization in their words, not the newspaper's.

Copts of Europe: The Brotherhood met with the Mossad in Washington… The group: It didn't happen[105]

Former intelligence deputy to Al-Watan: Direct communication between the Brotherhood and the CIA started in 2005[106]

[103] Al-Watan, 31 July 2012.
[104] Al-Watan, 11 August 2012.
[105] Al-Watan, 24 June 2012.
[106] Al-Watan, 19 September 2012.

Wahid Hamed: The Brotherhood will ruin the country, a revolution of the hungry is coming and the Palestinians want to occupy Sinai[107]

The above three stories published on 24 June, 19 and 22 September 2012 take the element of fear mongering to an international level. They make the MB appear like a traitor and collaborator with foreign groups. Not only traditional "enemies" like Israel and the United States, which the media sometimes portray as such since Nasser's period, despite the change in relations with them since Camp David, but even the Palestinians had their own share of demonization since they received significant attention on the MB's political agenda, especially Hamas.[108] Again fear mongering worked, and Al-Watan continued getting quoted in TV talk shows, although such news hits had no factual foundations and were mostly manipulated or fabricated. Nour Magdy says, "Things started to change gradually to support the SCAF in everything it did at that time: indirectly supporting counter revolution's candidate in the presidential elections [Field Marshal Ahmed Shafiq]. By the end [mid] of 2012 when the Muslim brotherhood reached power, they were dedicated to attack them by all means, including accusing them of being behind January 25th uprising, as if it was an act of treason."

Experts warn against return of the security chaos… Other [experts]: The Army won't take it easy[109]

Politicians demand protecting the Army in the constitution and warn against the scenario of penetrating the Military Forces[110]

[107] Al-Watan, 22 September 2012.
[108] A Palestinian Islamic resistance movement against Israeli occupation.
[109] Al-Watan, 30 June 2012.
[110] Al-Watan, 22 July 2012.

Memish: The Army never attacked the people and the Military Council is the top of democracy[111]

Al Sisi: The Army is not a part of political conflicts, our only alignment is towards the people[112]

In the above headlines, published between May and December 2012, Al-Watan portrays the army as 'the saviour' of the country from 'the dangers'. I argue that it first protects itself and the owner's interests in maintaining good relations with the military. And second, it prepares the public mood to accept and probably support a re-takeover of politics by the military openly as it was before the 2012 presidential elections that brought Morsi to power. With the growth of fear of the MB by the day, I argue that the average citizen including those who supported the January Revolution were pushed to think that they had no choice but seeking the military's protection from the 'dangerous' Morsi and his MB.

Arms pour into Egypt, the army stops a smuggling [operation] of 50 surface-to-surface missiles and 96 thousand bullets[113]

The Army on maximum alert in Sinai, ready for any penetrations by Israeli fighter jets[114]

With the above two news-breaking headlines on 22 May and 16 November 2012 among similar stories, Al-Watan extends feeding the national image of the army as the only saviour from internally to externally. According to the newspaper's editorial agenda, it is not only the MB that

[111] Al-Watan, 25 August 2012.
[112] Al-Watan, 24 December 2012.
[113] Al-Watan, 22 May 2012.
[114] Al-Watan, 16 November 2012.

the army would protect the people from, there are also external or foreign forces threatening the country across the borders, including Israel, which ironically considers Egypt its best ally in the region.

Regardless of the aggressive news manipulations and biases in the private Egyptian press, some research show that it did substantially cover the political sphere in the months after the revolution, crossing boundaries that had formed under the previous authoritarian regime of Mubarak. Newspapers like Al-Masry Al-Youm readily responded to the dissolution of 'red lines' with a sharp rise in coverage of topics that were formerly off limits. Opposition protests that reflected this growing public sphere were recorded and disseminated in the press (Rayman, 2013, p. 21). However, the media and journalists are also responsible for the current situation. The heated and radically polarised public opinion during the Morsi period with their strong group biases and affiliations, often projected the image of what can be called a democracy without democrats. The Egyptian public opinion, once united in an anti-authoritarian movement against Mubarak, left the consensus behind and rallied behind antagonising camps. It seems as if the ground rules of democracy were ignored. While Islamists disrespected secular, their opponents showed contempt for elections and the peoples' vote whenever that turned out to favour Islamist parties, parliaments and presidents (Hafez, 2013, pp. 9-10).

Controlling this divided landscape became a major political dilemma between the different political forces in Egypt. The extremely polemic tone adopted by journalists, of being reverential toward their 'ideological friends' and scathing toward their 'ideological enemies', extended to the dissemination of all kinds of rumours and misinformation, creating great confusion among the public. From this perspective, the emergence of an aggressive radical/oppositional style of journalism against the Muslim Brotherhood can be explained more as an expression of 'collaboration' with the traditional political and military elites rather than a deliberate strategy to critically 'monitor' the new regime of the Muslim Brotherhood (Cammaerts & El-Issawi, 2015, p. 10).

Conclusion

This chapter briefly gave a general critical review of press coverage in two major periods before the 2013 military coup in examination of the structures that the elites use to dominate a society by dominating the narrative of events in the news they control. The first, which was focused on the first 18 days of the revolution, showed how private newspapers were positioning themselves according to developments on the ground in Tahrir Square. And at the same time, they were careful in maintain their relationship with political powers, as they were always waiting until it was clear which group of figures that lost the battle against the protesters. And clearly as well they were continuously pro-military, as the power group that remained the least shaky during the course of events in those 18 days. As for the second period of press coverage following the fall of Mubarak, the news reviews showed that the private press was highly critical of the Muslim Brotherhood, and mostly remained highly supportive of the military. This chapter's general review of news produced in 2011 and 2012 served as necessary overview of events in preparation for applying framing analysis on the press coverage during the military coup of 2013 in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE: An analysis of the private press in 112 days of Tamarod

5.1 The emergence of Tamarod: from independence to control

5.2 112 days of frames

5.3 Media production of the only saviour

5.4 Subtle power interference in editorial lines

> *"Under political transitions, the ability of media to play the role of a "market place of ideas" is crucial in providing a platform for alternative views, thus empowering a vivid civil society, although possibly aggravating conflicts and creating confusion (Voltmer, 2006:04). The political conflict marking these transitions, causes media professionals to struggle between the two opposite ideals of neutral journalism, presenting all sides of the controversy, and the need for using media for political mobilisation (Voltmer, 2006:06). This notion of a market place of ideas was accommodated by Egyptian journalists in the immediate aftermath of the uprising. During this time, the margin of representation of dissenting voices witnessed an unprecedented expansion to the extent that they were permitted a platform in state media. This diversity was short-lived as media professionals were less inclined to follow the Western ideals of professional journalism than to satisfy their political affiliation and what they consider to be their national or revolutionary duty"* (El-Issawi, 2014, p. 301).

The above quote by Fatima El-Issawi, who works on media in transition in the Arab World, underlines both the change that was already taking place in the media landscape since Mubarak's last decade in office and how this change remained in service of the political elite. El-Issawi's work can provide us with a foundational introduction to the relation between the Egyptian media – state-run and private - and the preparation for a military coup in 2013. As discussed in Chapter Two: Theoretical framework and methodology, framing analysis will be applied on a sample of

articles' headlines in this chapter. Media presentation is known to be affected by frames, where factual information can be introduced in several narratives, where information can also have several perceptions by audiences. This chapter digs deeper into the technicalities of this notion by analysing the frames used by the news industry, particularly in the two major private newspapers in the country, Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan. And by doing so, we will learn about the frames used by these two newspapers in order to serve and spread the narrative of news that serves the business elite represented by the investors that own them both.

The first section of this chapter, "The emergence of Tamarod: from independence to control", lays the foundation for the planned analysis by telling and investigating the story of Tamarod, which played a pivotal role in toppling Morsi. Section 5.2, "112 days of frames", is the actual implementation of the framing analysis of the selected sample of articles studies for this thesis, as it goes through the results and their implications. Section 5.3, "Media production of the only saviour", provides a review of articles that were already introducing Egypt's strongman Field Marshal Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi before the military coup and before it was announced that he would run for presidential elections, as the country's saviour. Section 5.4, "Subtle power interference in editorial lines", goes through the tricks and games inside the kitchen of news production and how political influences can reach a newspaper's published content.

5.1 The emergence of Tamarod: from independence to control

"Thank you for rebelling! Because of you the 30 June Revolution succeeded". This phrase is only what we can find now on the Tamarod (Rebel) Movement official website[115]. No forms, no explanations or any trace of demands. The data and information that existed on the movement's website before the military coup, and for a while after, are deleted. I argue that Tamarod was meant to bring democracy and freedom by bringing down the Muslim Brotherhood's rule, but

[115] Tamarod Movement's website http://tamarod.com

what it led to in today's Egypt is an aggressive military dictatorship that is more hostile to anyone or any group with a critical voice, in comparison to whatever governments the country had since the 1952 military coup itself. Let's start by briefly introducing Tamarod, who they are, and what their demands are, or actually were; almost none of which were met, except for the deposal of President Mohamed Morsi. The demands that were promoted to the public before 30 June 2013 do not bear any resemblance to the direction events took right after. The main demand, for example, was early presidential elections, not a death sentence like a politicised court ruled later in early 2015.

Tamarod was an opposition youth movement founded on 26 April, 2013, initially to withdraw 'confidence' from Mohamed Morsi - the country's president who was elected in 2012 – and call for early presidential elections. The movement had an organic idea of inviting citizens to sign an official document of 'confidence withdrawal', aiming to reach a larger number of signatures than the number of votes Morsi received in the 2012 presidential elections, the first democratic elections in Egypt's history. The movement launched its campaign from Tahrir Square and was planned to end on 30 June, the first anniversary of Morsi's rule in the presidential palace. Its co-founder and spokesperson Mahmoud Badr – later a highly militarily supported figure – declared that the movement managed to bring 22 million confidence withdrawal signatures, which is a 10-million more than the number of votes Morsi received in 2012. Not a single attempt was documented in order to investigate this 22-million figure since its announcement by the movement on 30 June.

In addition to the logically expected loud voices of criticism and hostility against the movement by the Muslim Brotherhood and their supporters since its launch, it was observed that following the 3 July military coup in the same year, non-Islamist voices of suspicion and criticism started to be heard across the country and the region and accused the movement of being staged and funded in order to facilitate the military coup that quickly followed (Al-Jazeera, 3 March, 2015)[116]. Later, two of the movement's founders were selected to join the committee

[116] Al-Jazeera, 3 March 2015 http://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2015/3/3

tasked with re-writing the constitution, which added to the heated suspicion. In October 2013, an internal split occurred as many members and a few founders accused one of the founders, Mahmoud Badr, and some of his companions of coordinating with the military and members of Mubarak's dismantled National Democratic Party.

In a story published by France24 – Arabic Service – on their news portal on 26 June 2013, four days before the big day, reporter Houssein Emara copied the following passage from the movement's Facebook page, which no longer exists:

> *"We [the Egyptian people] are obliged to rebel given the country's deterioration economically and politically following the arrival of the Muslim Brotherhood Group to the country's rule with their president, Mohamed Morsi, who disturbed all balances of justice and completely ignored the revolution and the Egyptian people's will, as if the revolution did not happen. The picture is now clear to the whole world that the Egyptian regime had moved from a gang [Mubarak's] to another, and that the revolution failed to achieve its goals and failed to fulfil the dreams of those who sacrificed for it in order to have a home that enjoys national independence, freedom and social justice after it has become controlled by traitors and they still do"* (Emara, 2013).

As mentioned earlier, the above-mentioned Facebook page does not exist anymore, and while many other Tamarod pages have mushroomed all over Facebook, none of them has that specific passage. However, it is easy to find this exact text on other websites through Google's search engine as archive or history. I argue that the movement had to remove such idealist and democracy promoting campaign from their website and Facebook page(s), since what happened three days after 30 June, was the opposite of what they called for or promised to achieve.

Morsi won the elections with a narrow majority of 51 percent of the vote. Arguably, his victory was facilitated by the fact that his opponent General Ahmed Shafik was obviously the candidate of the military and remnants of the Mubarak regime. However, there was a deeply rooted distrust of the Muslim Brotherhood within the security apparatus and the secular opposition, even before the elections; and also a distrust within the group towards the state's institutions and power groups. This situation made Morsi take a number of actions (like his above-constitutional declaration in November 2012 giving himself powers that meant to concentrate more authorities in his hands) that fuelled the suspicion that he was more of a president of the Muslim Brotherhood that the whole country. All of which made him a very easy target for most political groups, revolutionary and anti-revolutionary, except for the Islamist political groups. The Salafist Al-Nour Party was oddly in support of Tamarod. Later their position was understood, as they allied with the army, supported the coup and provided it with religious legitimacy.

Ahmed Abdo, one of Tamarod's leading founders told France24 "The movement will head to the High Constitutional Court in order to submit those signatures [the confidence withdrawal signatures on Tamarod's official forms], demand it to withdraw confidence from President Mohamed Morsi and announce running early presidential elections." He also added that according to Article One in the Egyptian constitution [written a few months earlier by a committee largely dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood], "the people are the source of authority" (Emara, 2013). Hence, popular expression of dissatisfaction with the president surpasses the legitimacy of elections, especially when the number of signatories largely exceeded the number of votes Morsi got in the presidential elections.

Here comes another very important point in the whole legitimacy issue of Tamarod, whether in calling for such campaign, which I consider a smart and creative political tactic to bring down Morsi, or in how the process continued after 30 June in the few following days, as Abdo continues explaining a few days earlier, that there is (back then) a big legal team that includes Khalid Ali – former presidential candidate with a revolutionary background – and

headed by President of Lawyers Syndicate Sameh Ashour in order to observe all legal procedures of the campaign and guarantee dealing smoothly with the High Constitutional Court and "examining signatures' authenticity". A whole plan that was promoted before 30 June, which was never implemented or even mention since that same day. This in turn makes the whole victory announcement of having 22 million signed confidence withdrawal documents nothing but a questionable number in a questionable movement with questionable connections. What makes it more suspicious is the change in the language of the movement's demands on 30 June: "confidence withdrawal" a few days before to "deposal" as one of the three major demands that were not even respected as observed later:

1) Deposing Dr. Mohamed Morsi from the republic's presidency and handing over his position to the President of the High Constitutional Court, who would only represent the country abroad.
2) Choosing a political person known for proficiency as the head of government in order to run the country's affairs during the transitional period.
3) Forming a government of technocrats with the goal of fixing the deteriorating circumstances in the country.

Last minute demands were manipulated, as the selected Interim President Adly Mansour - contrary to the first demand – was representing the country inside not only abroad. He also issued many presidential decrees that influenced political life during his term and even after, for instance a controversial anti-protest law. In the second demand, the chosen 'political person known for proficiency' to be a prime minister was Hazem Al-Beblawy, a Mubarak-era politician in his 80s known for his support for the military and for being anti-revolutionary without any significant history of 'proficiency'. While the government formed following Morsi's disappearance – who only months later re-appeared in a court room – was a group of pro-military figures that failed to fix 'the deteriorating circumstances in the country' as demanded by Tamarod. On the contrary the country has become under heavy security issues and pressure of

instability, significant economic deterioration and international financial downgrading despite the heavy funding for the military coup received in forms of aid, loans and investments from most Arab Gulf countries. After putting the interviewees' opinions on the issue of Tamarad altogether, they seem to have variations in judging on the Tamarod movement's relation with the army. They all go in the direction of agreeing in a way or another on what they see as a fact that there is a connection between Tamarod and the military. However, they differ in expressing or assuming how this relation is like or when exactly it started. Ihsan Sameer goes to the extreme assumption that Tamarod movement was totally controlled from the beginning, as he says "I believe that it was highly supported financially and organizationally by factions of the deep state: police, intelligence, businessmen and media."

I would actually argue against the scenario of the full military control over Tamarod since the beginning of their campaign, and lean to seeing Tamarod as a movement that was ridden by the military (and the elites) following its success in bringing many signatures from the people. Alaa Zakareya and reda Abbas were also very clear in their responses by refusing the scenario that Tamarod was controlled by the military from the beginning, and they believe that it got controlled later. And there is some evidences that support this point of view, which I observed during the Tamarod period in the few months before 30 June. Almost all news stories were nothing more than republishing statements issued by Tamarod and its supporters concerning violence they were met with by Islamists. It could have been much more professional from the press to investigate these statements in order to bring objectivity and balance to there news stories. However, there are also much more important news stories that were published mainly during May or early June, approximately within the first month following the movement's birth.

Cairo University Students remember the revolution's martyrs and the security arrests Tamarod members[117]

[117] Al-Watan, 12 May 2013

Two Tamarod members detained for four days for assaulting eight policemen in Sadat Metro Stop[118]

Tamarod is offered to meet with Interior Minister and responds: We won't sit with a "murderer"[119]

In the above three news stories published by both Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan on 12 and 22 May, and then on 6 June 2013. I argue that coordination between Tamarod and the Military started at some point right after the first week of June, three weeks before the 30 June mass protests occurred. Here we have to remember that the ministry of interior had always been controlled by the army since Nasser's military state. Army generals were directly appointed as ministers of interior in some periods, and in others Police Academy graduates could be hired, where the control over the ministry would soften (like the period under Mubarak). But at least the influence was always there. However later, right after Mubarak's fall, the military returned to full control over the interior through the SCAF which was the entity that directly appointed a number of interior ministers one after the other with obvious loyalty and submission to the military. And in many cases during clashes between protesters and the police throughout the three years following Mubarak's fall, in which I personally witnessed, I can confirm the presence of highly ranking army officers behind the backlines of the interior's forces watching and giving orders. Sometimes openly in the streets and some other times from balconies and windows overlooking clashes' locations. Having this said, I argue that having Tamarod members targeted by the police and later refusing to sit with the minister of interior Mohamed Ibrahim (later fully supported by Tamarod following 30 June) are all signs that the military at least until the end of the first week of June 2013 did not communicate or coordinate with Tamarod. So, the control, or at least the coordination, from the side of the army did happen, however not from the beginning. Or at least no one can confirm it was from the beginning, as Nour Magdy says "I'm

[118] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 22 May 2013.
[119] Al-Watan 6 June 2013.

not sure of that, some rumours say that it was pure revolutionary movement then some security body used it to topple Morsi. Others say that it was totally controlled by the military since the beginning. In all cases, it was used by the military to get rid of the Muslim Brotherhood, and at least that's how I see it."

5.2 112 days of frames

We have seen that it is not clear when exactly the military, the political and the business elites decided to give full support to Tamarod or use it in their interest; the same goes for the private media. Both Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan mildly started covering Tamarod since its launch on 26 April 2013. Reda Abbas says "Tamarod was press friendly from the beginning, moreover Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan hosted two early [press] conferences for them, and this support for sure happened long time before Morsi's deposal." However, I observe that the excessive and almost only-positive and heroic news about the campaign and its achievements started peaking around mid-May.

In order to trace this evolving relationship between the private media and Tamarod, in this chapter I will analyse articles by Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan in the period from 26 April 2013 (Tamarod's launch in Tahrir Square) until 15 August the same year (the day following the Rabaa and Nahada massacres). As mentioned before, Al-Watan was only established in May 2012, and this is why I temporarily added Al-Shorouk to my review (in the previous chapter) of the lead stories in the first 18 days' news sample shedding light on the influential private newspapers in 2011. However, for the current sample period, Al-Watan was already present in the market and highly circulated along with Al-Masry Al-Youm, for which reason it is included in this period's analysis. As explained in the methodology in Chapter Two, I chose 337 news stories by Al-Masry Al-Youm with the hashtag #Tamarod found in the newspaper's online archive and

345 by Al-Watan with the same hashtag and same period[120]. In this research as explained in the methodology section in Chapter Two, I only used headlines of the news stories, as most readers in today's digitalised news world tend to take their impressions through the headlines and share articles on the social media without reading the actual content. New studies show that the sentiment of the headline is strongly related to the popularity of the news and also with the dynamics of the posted comments on that particular news (Reis, et al., 2015). I initially applied a first reading on these headlines to see what message(s) they might frame to the readers and I found that there are two major themes that are highly repetitive. Many of the headlines would 'promote' Tamarod and/or the army and many others would spread 'fear' from the Muslim Brotherhood and/or violence and chaos. Here are a few examples:

Tamarod: We collected 22,134,465 signatures for confidence withdrawal from Morsi[121]

Tamarod distributes flowers to the police and army in Sharm Al Sheikh[122]

In the first headline above, we can see Al-Masry Al-Youm directly copy Tamarod's statement, making it big news, without any attempt of questioning or investigating facts. Even the body of this news item did not contain any word or thought of fact-checking or suspicion, directly or indirectly, regarding the figure of 22 million collected signatures, a claim that has never been confirmed or investigated to this day. Nour Magdy comments saying, "All what I recall is reports on how fast it was spreading and the number of signatures it was collecting." It was simply portrayed as a celebration of an early victory ahead of 30 June in promotion of the powerful Tamarod. In the second headline Al-Masry Al-Youm did not only promote Tamarod, or the army,

[120] This archive search was conducted online via both newspapers' websites on 24 May 2015. Results of the same research tags may slightly differ for any access time before or after, depending on change in the editorial policy of both newspapers.
[121] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 29 June 2013.
[122] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 4 july 2013.

they dared to indirectly promote the highly demonised police since January 2011 and before, not directly by their editors, but through Tamarod.

The fear frame was highly applicable, as explained earlier, where it appeared that the nature of news produced on Tamarod would have high tendency to cause fear among the readers by the thoughts of what the Muslim Brotherhood represent as a 'violent group', according to the editorial line and what would happen if Tamarod would not succeed in bringing their rule down. I argue that many of the news items produced in this period on Tamarod by Al-Masry Al-Youm were aimed at making the reader feel scared of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamists in general (fear frame), and inculcating in the reader hope for the success of Tamarod as a life boat (promotion frame).

Islamist-related plan for fighting Tamarod on 30 June[123]

Tamarod: People's demonstrations on Friday to mandate the Army to stop the civil war[124]

The above two headlines by Al-Masry Al-Youm, one before 30 June and one after, are two examples of many within the 112 days' sample that promote fear among the readers towards the Muslim Brotherhood. The second headline portrays the army as the only solution (promotion frame), otherwise the country drowns in a civil war.

Al-Watan was not so different from Al-Masry Al-Youm in relation to the position they both took towards Tamarod, the army and the Muslim Brotherhood. Considering the language used, maybe Al-Watan was slightly more biased than Al-Masry Al-Youm: more pro-army and Tamarod and more anti-Muslim Brotherhood. Regarding the promotion frame, Al-Watan

[123] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 9 June 2013.
[124] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 24 July 2013.

outweighed Al-Masry Al-Youm in the polishing process and support they both provided to Tamarod. The language and editorial position was more obvious in favour of the movement.

Tamarod: New electronic game that ends with "Game over, Morsi"[125]

Al Gallad: Tamarod has become a global model for peaceful protesting… Al-Watan is as old as the revolutionary tide[126]

In the first headline, Al-Watan in its promotion frame campaigning for Tamarod went beyond the idea of mainly positive news. They simply went for what we journalists call 'sexy news'. And by sexy here we mean highly attractive, light and generating high readership; something that traditionally belongs to the realm of the tabloid news industry. Actually, the above-mentioned anti-Muslim Brotherhood video game was very poor and did not create that much attention. What is more interesting is that Al-Watan could not wait to do proper production of the story at least for one more day, and quickly made a big headline out of it without any proper information or any quotes from those who might have played it. I argue that the truth and details were not important for Al-Watan here, as having a light and sexy headline that increases Tamarod's popularity and at the same time ridicules the Muslim Brotherhood was a more important goal for them than writing a proper news story.

The second story does not need a lot of analysis or explanation, as no biased news agenda can be more biased. The chief editor of Al-Watan stands next to Tamarod's co-founder Mahmoud Badr (now sole leader), in Al-Watan's newsroom telling his readers in a televised press conference that Tamarod is a 'global model', and that 'Al-Watan is as old as the revolution'. All red lines were crossed in a single article by the head of the head of the newspaper himself.

[125] Al-Watan, 21 June 2013.
[126] Al-Watan, 3 July 2013.

The fear frame in Al-Watan articles was, in one way or another, similar to how it was applied at Al-Masry Al-Youm, however stronger in the language used.

Brotherly rehearsal of 30 June: The group attacks Tamarod with weapons in Alexandria and the people fight back, destroy their office[127]

Tamarod on the Republican Guards Incident[128]*: The Brotherhood pushing Egypt for civil war… And [Tamarod] to Al Nour*[129] *and Abulfoutouh*[130]*: Go join Rabaa*[131] [132]

In the first headline, before 30 June, Al-Watan exaggerated a clash in Alexandria (not even officially investigated by security) and generalised it over the country and made it seem that this is the mentality of the Muslim Brotherhood: if you oppose them, they will bring weapons and fight you, but the "people" are there to stop them. Details of the news story were anecdotal and one-sided. As for the second headline, which was published after 30 June, again the spectre of the Muslim Brotherhood bringing the country to civil war was raised, although they were the ones killed by the military in that specific incident known as The Republican Guards Massacre.

The above first reading of the sample made it clear that the second reading is a reading with the purpose of spotting the two frames of 'promotion' and 'fear', whenever found in any of the 682 headlines of the sample under examination, as the following results show:

[127] Al-Watan 14 June 2013.
[128] 61 killed and 435 injured mainly from the Muslim Brotherhood and their supporter on 8 July 2013, who were in a sit in front of The Republican Guards Club, where President Mohamed Morsi was thought to be secretly detained. No investigations conducted till today and no clear explanation how it started, while all parties including the military condemned the massacre.
[129] Al-Nour is a Salafist political party formed after Mubarak's fall, it supported the Muslim Brotherhood in 2011 and 2012 and supported the military coup in 2013.
[130] Former Muslim Brotherhood leader who turned against the movement, and became President and founder of the post-Mubarak Strong Egypt Party. He also ran for presidency against Morsi and others in 2012.
[131] A square in the north of Cairo, which Morsi supporters were occupying in protest of the military coup, hundreds of whom were killed later by police and army forces in what is known now as the Rabaa Massacre .
[132] Al-Watan, 9 July 2013.

Regarding Al-Masry Al-Youm's 337 articles (Table 5.1 and Graph 5.1) on Tamarod published during the 112 days in focus, I found that that 197 of them (58.46%) promoted Tamarod (promotion frame) and 81 articles (24.03%) would cause fear (fear frame).

No. of Articles	Promotion Frame	Percentage	Fear Frame	Percentage
337	197	58.46%	81	24.03%

Table 5.1: Framing frequencies of Al-Masry Al-Youm



Graph 5.1: Framing frequencies of Al-Masry Al-Youm

Regarding Al-Watan's 345 articles (Table 5.2 and Graph 5.2) on Tamarod published in the same period with the same hashtag, I found that 221 of them (64.06%) promoted Tamarod (promotion frame) and 77 articles (22.32%) would cause fear (fear frame).

No. of Articles	Promotion Frame	Percentage	Fear Frame	Percentage
345	221	64.06%	77	22.32%

Table 5.2: Framing frequencies of Al-Watan



Graph 5.2: Framing frequencies of Al-Watan

For both newspapers' 682 examined articles altogether (Table 5.3 and Graph 5.3), I found that 418 of them (61.29%) promoted Tamarod (promotion frame), 158 articles (23.17%) would cause fear (fear frame).

No. of Articles	Promotion Frame	Percentage	Fear Frame	Percentage
682	418	61.29%	158	23.17%

Table 5.3: Framing frequencies of both Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan together



Graph 5.3: Framing frequencies of both Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan

It was clear that Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan were in a continuous polishing process of news production concerning Tamarod as the powerful, young, smart, revolutionary oppression fighter. The newspapers looked like almost a PR campaigner for the movement, which was not clearly the case before in late April until around mid-May. In turn, the movement would promote the army as the only solution out of fear of a 'civil war'. Alaa Zakareya says, "Tamarod was grown due to the militarisation done by the media against the mistakes of the Muslim Brotherhood. Even the movement itself held press conferences in the newspapers' offices, where Al-Watan was leading [the trend]." The difference in Zakareya's response in comparison to other interviewees is that Zakareya added the element of the Muslim Brotherhood's political failures as a reason for Tamarod's success in addition to what the movement received as very generous media support.

5.3 Media production of the only saviour

Fear of state collapse, violence and the exaggerated Muslim Brotherhood's religious authoritarianism in the media show how the business elite was dealing with daily news production. This control peaked during the 112 days of Tamarod, while swiftly preparing the people to accept - and even want - the army and Al-Sisi to step in and 'protect' the people and the country from the 'danger' of the Muslim Brotherhood. I argue that Tamarod converted at some point after its independent beginning (discussed in Section 5.1) into a Trojan Horse that brought the military and Al-Sisi to the centre of the picture and put them again atop the Egyptian state and the political sphere after about two and half years of sharing the power with the Muslim Brotherhood. The editorial agenda of the private press, mainly Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan as examined here, did not change in relation to the army as an entity almost above criticism (discussed in Chapter Four). One different new element introduced to the editorial policy was Al-Sisi as a representative of the military, a future leader and a saviour from the 'dangerous' Muslim Brotherhood. He was carefully and gradually being promoted in an emotional fashion, which I argue that the press knew well would be successful with public and

that they would positively respond and ask the 'hero' to step in and carry the heavy burden of running the country and bring it to safety. Going through the responses of my interviewees regarding the manufacturing of Al-Sisi as a leading figure, they more or less agree that both newspapers were highly biased in his favour. I asked the question "What do you think of Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan's coverage of Al Sisi as a person, a defence minister and a president?" Nour Magdy very much agrees and adds that the coverage of Al-Sisi is still biased until today. Magdy also says, "It was, and still completely is biased towards him, defending him and anything he does all the time."

Reading through more than one thousand headlines that included his name during the 112 days of Tamarod, I can see that our two influential private newspapers generally portrayed Al-Sisi in four major themes while covering and promoting the Tamarod movement. The first was a theme of "the average minister appointed by the Muslim Brotherhood," which was in the beginning of the Tamarod period. I think it was not clear yet then, what future was waiting for Al-Sisi. The second was a theme of "the powerful man who avoids politics," which was also prominent alongside the former theme and for slightly longer. This theme served Al-Sisi's reputation well, as it portrayed him as the man with 'high values' that stand above political interests. The third theme was "the people's protector", which started to rise after the fear frame (explained in previous section) became prominent. The fourth and last theme I'm introducing is "the people's beloved icon", which was a result of sensational content concerning well respected figures in the Egyptian society who emotionally support and believe in him and other very ordinary and simple people who exaggerate their love to him. like for example, a lady giving birth to a baby-boy and naming him after Al-Sisi (sample headlines following in this section). Alaa Zakareya says, "As a person the coverage was average. As a minister of defence under Morsi he didn't get a lot of attention. However, after 30 June [2013], he took the maximum attention of both newspapers and all [other newspapers]. As a president [June 2014 till present], they [Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan] don't criticise him, while at the same time they also don't superficially make him as holy as the state's newspapers do."

In all earlier chapters in this research I was always mentioning Al-Masry Al-Youm before Al-Watan for historical reasons, as it was founded first, and it was led by Magdy Al Gallad, before he moved to Al-Watan. However, in this section I have a tendency to switch positions and start with Al-Watan. I argue that both newspapers had almost identical treatment of Al-Sisi's character in the news. However, given Al-Gallad's very high-profile connections with the elites – military, civilian politicians and businessmen – Al-Watan was ahead of Al-Masry Al-Youm's news agenda when it comes to access to information as shown by the frequency of the appearance of 'undisclosed high profile sources' who are always used to send messages to the people through both newspapers. A news story published in February 2013, almost three months before the creation of Tamarod, titled "Electronic campaigns with the slogan 'Al-Sisi, president for Egypt' … The Brotherhood: Playing with fire",[133] suggests that Al-Watan and its well-connected chief editor knew that the then almost unknown figure of Al-Sisi would have a higher status in the near future. Al-Watan was indeed ahead of all other newspapers with more intense and more emotional news, as if their news room turned into an operation room with the goal of promoting Al-Sisi. Here below, are a few examples of news headlines published by both newspapers with the mentioned four themes during the 112 days of Tamarod:

1) The average minister appointed by the Muslim Brotherhood

Al-Watan: *Morsi and Al-Sisi launch projects executed by the armed forces tomorrow*[134]

Al-Masry Al-Youm: *Morsi, Qandil and Al-Sisi receive the freed soldiers in Almaza Airport*[135]

[133] Al-Watan, 21 February 2013. http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/134765
[134] Al-Watan, 30 April 2013.
[135] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 22 May 2013.

2) The powerful man who avoids politics

Al-Watan: *Sources close to Al-Sisi: The Colonel won't run for presidency and sees Egyptians' love for him as the greatest authority*[136]

Al-Masry Al-Youm: *Al-Sisi… The young leader who's aware of the army's boundaries in the political system (Profile)*[137]

3) The people's protector

Al-Watan: *In pictures: Al-Sisi warns: Don't play with the army… Honour for me to be a humble [servant] for this people*[138]

Al-Masry Al-Youm: *Al-Sisi decides to treat the child injured in Al-Mahalla clashes in Maadi Military Hospital*[139]

4) The people's beloved icon

Al-Watan*: Foad Negm*[140]*: Al-Sisi reminds me of Abdel Nasser… And he knows where "Satan is hiding his son*[141]*"*[142]

[136] Al-Watan 5 August 2013.
[137] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 4 July 2013.
[138] Al-Watan, 11 May 2013.
[139] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 23 June 2013.
[140] Egyptian satirical poet (1929 - 2013) who reflected on Egyptian life and inspired generations of the young to push for change.
[141] An Egyptian proverb referring to a smart person who knows all secrets and how to handle them.
[142] Al-Watan, 14 July 2013.

Al-Masry Al-Youm: *Al-Itihadeya Palace podium: A lady gives birth to a baby boy and calls it Al-Sisi… Al-Beblawy joins the [pro-Al-Sisi] protests*[143]

Reda Abbas and Wesam Shawkat cut it short by believing it was all planned for him, even earlier than being a president. The first said "Mostly, PR coverage. No real press work happened. Just PR.", while Shawkat reconfirmed in different words "All coverage was dealing with the person of Al-Sisi already as the president of the country." An assumption we can clearly see from the headlines introduced above, where both Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan played as a propaganda mouth for Al-Sisi, the president to come, and indeed did.

5.4 Subtle power interference in editorial lines

Most of my interviewees here in this research agree in a way or another on the observation that there is power interference in editorial lines, however, with slight differences from a publication to another. They also believe that there was a very brief period of press freedom right after the fall of Mubarak. I asked them a question in this regard which is "Have you witnessed any editorial interference (direct or indirect) by the military, the interior or members of the business elite during the whole period from the fall of Mubarak and on? If yes, in what form?" In response to this question, Nour Magdy carefully agrees without associating such practices to the newspaper working for and says "Yes, but not directly after Mubarak's fall. Sometimes the owners of the newspapers wanted certain editorial coverage for some events in a way that served their interests. In other cases, it was security interference directly or indirectly, like banning some newspapers editions because it contained news or information they didn't like or didn't want published. This didn't happen in my newspaper. In an indirect way, recently during the meetings that President Al-Sisi had with editors-in-chief, he asked them to publish only positive news and try to avoid criticising the government, claiming that this was in favour of the country's stability."

[143] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 26 July 2013.

Magdy's newspaper did engage in banning articles, which is the practice she/he avoided and I did not want to add pressure. It will be very difficult to give evidence here in this research, as it might expose the interviewee's identity. However, a quick online search on banned articles in Egypt would prove my point anyway, as it became very frequent since the 2013 coup, as mentioned in Chapter Three.

In addition to the earlier examined strategy of news framing in Section 5.2, there are several other ways of controlling or at least influencing editorial lines or a private newspaper. For example, I was never invited by the presidential palace to any of those annual gatherings, where the president meets editors-in-chief of major newspapers. However, Al-Sisi chose my former newspaper, DNE (The Daily News Egypt), to exclusively publish the two, and so far only, opinion articles he has ever written. The presidential Media Office as well, since Mubarak times till recently, was always keen on emailing us all their press releases, statements and invitations to press conferences. However, DNE was never given the opportunity to interview any of the presidents. The reason for this is that all presidents and their media offices were very careful with our critical news production style, and also very careful not to directly pressure us to publish – or unpublish – any news stories related to them. I argue that they – rightly – doubted that we would turn this interference into embarrassing news. But have they tried to put any direct pressure on us to change our editorial line? No, they have not. I argue that they have not for two reasons: first, DNE that was Egypt's most well-read newspaper in English abroad was giving the impression to the world with its critical editorial line that the country 'has democracy and media freedom', and the evidence of this is that they exist and they even criticise the president himself (this was before the government took control of the newspaper). A game that is very smartly played by the presidency. Second, the fact that DNE publishes news written in English, means it actually has marginal influence in local politics of the country, since the majority of Egyptians read their news only in Arabic, including those who might be fluent in English. It is controlling the Arabic language press, which has the real influence on local politics, that is important.

DNE, unluckily for those in power, is owned (among other publications) by a group of former journalists who do not belong to the business elite, which makes it difficult to put direct pressure on them to abide by a certain editorial line. However, indirect pressure, like random arrests or assaults of DNE's journalists, which happens to other journalists as well (Discussed in detail in Chapter Six), is an example of practicing pressure. In the end, those in power whether locally like Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi[144], or internationally like Ban Ki-moon[145], Catherin Ashton[146] and others are always interested in approaching a newspaper like DNE to publish their own carefully written opinion articles, but always avoid being interviewed by the same newspaper and be exposed to our journalists' questions.

There is also another important strategy for controlling press content by those in power whether it was the presidency, the military, the interior, or members of the business elite in forms of corporate leaders who can make it to news headlines as most other public figures. One could call it a culture of 'more for more and less for less'. For example, a journalist who writes good news about a certain public figure or institution would be given prioritised access to breaking or exclusive news before others. The less a public figure likes news about himself or his institution, the less the same journalist will have access - or probably no access at all - to important news in the future. Not every journalist would abide by that media cultural code between the source and the reporter, but the longer a journalist does not break or produce exclusive news, the faster she/he would lose significance in the press market. Therefore, there's always a high tendency from the side of journalists to keep a 'good connection' with sources, including the ones they might want to criticise in their work. And in the Arabic press in Egypt, I can judge from my work experience that the culture of good relation between a journalist and her/his source is highly relevant, and sources know how to benefit from it. I remember very well when I was once advised in 2007 by a high profile senior Arabic journalist, who was in his fifties

[144] The Daily News Egypt, 16 September 2014. https://dailynewsegypt.com/2014/09/16/egypts-blueprint-stability-investment-growth-president-abdel-fattah-el-sisi/
[145] The Daily News Egypt, 5 July 2014. https://dailynewsegypt.com/2014/07/05/crisis-syria-civil-war-global-threat/
[146] The Daily News Egypt, 27 July 2013. https://dailynewsegypt.com/2013/07/27/moving-egypt-back-to-the-democratic-path/

at the time, as I was having difficulty reaching some government source for an interview by saying "When you want to reach someone, gently knock his door right after publishing good news about him. If he still refuses to meet you, kick his door with your foot by bad news. Most probably he would seek you afterwards." However, I argue that 'kicking' too many doors by a journalist would most probably put her/him on the blacklist of his sources.

Another interesting strategy, which is probably logical in a corrupt private press market owned and controlled by the business elite in their own favour and those who they ally with, is the obvious absence of negative news about owners of such newspapers and their 'friends'. And if it happens 'by mistake', they are either unpublished (if not printed yet) or re-edited. A thorough search in news about Salah Diab and Mohamed Al Amin – owners/main owners of Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan) would show that there is not a single critical article that exists in the two newspapers' archives about them, although the two figures are highly associated by the public and a few other small newspapers with corruption, anti-revolutionary and pro-Mubark activities. This is an unsurprising observation but it tells a lot about what it means to own a newspaper in Egypt and what control exists over editorial lines. This culture is so deeply embedded in journalistic practices that it sometimes feels 'normal' among journalists and editors. It has existed since the private press model was introduced to the market under Mubarak, and was continued under Morsi, and now under Al-Sisi with probably higher pressure. The exclusively positive portrayal and promotion of the Tamarod Campaign, described in the previous section, is not an exception by any means. Wesam Shawkat confirms the editorial interference and says "Yes, some investigative stories and reports were being revised by the administration [Owners of the newspaper] in the case of stories that deal with names of businessmen or prominent political figures." The only interviewee who completely denied this editorial interference claim in my questions is Alaa Zakareya. I am not sure if he truly did not witness such practices or he just preferred to refrain from giving a direct answer in order to protect his/her job, as the response briefly comes as "Personally, I haven't witnessed that."

And by Zakareya's response, I again confirm that journalists are not completely innocent in this game of press control. Egyptian journalists struggled to incorporate the monitorial and facilitative normative roles in their daily practices post–Arab Spring. However, the radical-oppositional role against the Muslim Brotherhood government suited them much better, after which most Egyptian journalists re-assumed their traditional collaborative role in the service of the ruling (military) regime. The role was understood by these journalists as the need to liberate themselves from the dictates of official discourse as well as from the interference of media owners. However, this was not realistic due to the lack of a tradition of investigative reporting, poor professional skills, and a legacy of reverential journalism. This was furthermore exacerbated by the strong links between the owners of private media and the political and military elites. Private media are in other words not independent media (Cammaerts & El-Issawi, 2015, p. 10).

Conclusion

Based on my analysis of the headlines of the news produced by Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan during the critical period of the 112 days covering Tamarod, this chapter argued that the movement was used as a façade to promote Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi as a representative of Egypt's military institution. And by doing so, the army managed to take back the little space of political power that was earlier given to the Muslim Brotherhood following Mubarak's fall. Tamarod undermined the democratic transition process and paved the way for the return of the military to power, thus it represented a counter-revolutionary power (De Smet, 2014). The use of the fear and promotion frames showed that both private newspapers actively sought to create a basis of popular support for a removal of Morsi by the military. As described in Chapter Three, those responsible for the setting of the editorial guidelines are the editors-in-chief. And as discussed also in Chapter Three how Magdy Al-Gallad and Yasser Rizk were hired by the owners of their newspapers, the business tycoons Salah Diab and Mohamed Al Amin, it is found that the business elite had played a pivotal role in reaching the historical outcome of placing Al-Sisi on top of the state through the media they own and control. The chapter also concludes that

Tamarod movement and its campaign to overthrow Mohamed Morsi are a genuinely revolutionary move by the youth who overthrew Mubarak two and a half years earlier. However, the movement very quickly turned into a Trojan Horse manipulated, infiltrated and later completely controlled by the elites in order to tame the revolution of the youth and seek full control of the economic and political spheres, and maintain the power in hands of the elites, as a survival mechanism following Mubarak's ouster in 2011.

CHAPTER SIX: Press freedom in post-Morsi Egypt

6.1 Freedom of expression: Only against the Muslim Brotherhood

6.2 Violence against journalists: Police and the honourable citizens

6.3 Demonising critical news outlets

> *"The presenter Ahmed Moussa, known to be vocal in his support for the military, claims to have received exclusive 'information' from them, warning his audience: "The free army officers decided that anyone suspected of killing a security member will be killed by them directly in the street. There is no need for courts any more". The statement of this talk show host, clearly advocating unlawful killing in the streets, is not a unique feature in Egyptian media today. National Egyptian media shifted from an excess of attack dog journalism under the rule of the deposed Muslim Brotherhood President to an excess of lapdog journalism post-coup. State and private media alike are disseminating a uniform message of glorification of the military and exclusion of its opponents, presenting the latter as the ultimate danger to the State that needs not only to be silenced, but also exterminated. In this continuous orchestration of simplistic, propagandist media narratives, there is no room for a representation of the opposing camp – labelled terrorist by the State and the media – nor for any plurality of voices"* (El-Issawi, 2014).

With the above quote, Fatima Issawi gives a brief and dim image of the media in the post-coup or post-Morsi Egypt. Open calls for violence against opponents, Muslim Brotherhood or others, became a norm to the ears and eyes of media recipients in whatever format. Most of the Egyptian media outlets have gone to extremes to support the post-Morsi military regime, with a few individual exceptions trying to maintain some balance. Overall, the radio and television waves were filled with patriotic songs and talk shows that strive to glorify the military. For weeks following Morsi's deposal, Egyptian state television as well as most private satellite channels ran

a graphic banner with the Egyptian flag that stated, “Egypt fights terrorism,” in reference to the confrontation between the army and supporters of Muslim Brotherhood. Most talk show hosts did not shy away from biased commentary and leading questions, and their carefully selected guests responded with exclusively pro-military answers. Facts were routinely mixed with opinions on these highly popular shows, which have become the main source of news for many Egyptians (Abdulla, 2014, pp. 23-24).

As discussed in earlier chapters in this thesis, this study focusses on the social relations, particularly the power relations, governing the production, distribution, and exchange of resources, as well as problems of control and survival (Mosco, 2009). Control and hegemony are not an entirely technical process or an algebraic equation, where certain inputs would yield to certain outputs under particularly defined circumstances. It never works like this since social relations, which are important to the critical approach of this research, cannot be clearly or mathematically defined, hence an outcome cannot be completely controlled or precisely expected. Control and survival are not only referring to control by the elite and survival by the controlled. Both can actually be together in the camp of the elite. As we can see, the business and the political elites were threatened by the 2011 revolution, and for them taking an anti-revolution position was a form of survival. The revolution made them experience fear. Fear of being prosecuted, the least to say, for all the corruption and favouritism that they flourished under when Mubarak was in power. And because of this fear, desperation for surviving the revolution and converting it to something else in their favour they did all what they can to make the 2013 military coup work. But I think they might have done too much beyond what was enough to only support the coup and bring ‘stability’ back and their previous ‘normal’ to the country. Until today, this very same business elite is still dealing with various consequences of both the revolution and the military coup in a process that seems to be not ending soon. And for their own survival and maintaining hegemony, the media they own is obviously at their service.

I consider this chapter a necessary reflection on the previous chapters, which are discussing and analysing the role of Egypt’s business elite and their press. This chapter adds

details and colours to the current picture of the media landscape following the success of the military coup and the deposal of Morsi, in which the media acted as a pivotal element. By doing so, we can have a few steps forward beyond the focus of press control around the coup period, and see a few snapshots of the situation in the aftermath of 2013 as on-the-ground implications of the nature of controlled news content produced back then. The first section, "Freedom of expression: Only against the Muslim Brotherhood", provides details about the atmosphere of selective 'free expression' that is exclusively critical of the Muslim Brotherhood but almost nothing else. Section 6.2, "Violence against journalists: Police and the honourable citizens", discusses the results of calling for violence in the media against the Muslim Brotherhood, which resulted in violence against media personnel who were critical of this wave of violence by both the police and the so-called 'honourable citizens'. Section 6.3, "Demonising critical news outlets", adds more details to the general picture of the media in Egypt after the coup, where any critical media voice, local or international, was demonised and what consequences it brought to the scene.

6.1 Freedom of expression: Only against the Muslim Brotherhood

Chomsky and Herman showed how the US governments and the elite-controlled media waged a war against communism, communists and anyone that might seem sympathetic towards them in the early 1950s and how it had a long-lasting influence on American political life until today:

> *"Communism as the ultimate evil has always been the spectre haunting property owners, as it threatens the very root of their class position and superior status. The Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban revolutions were traumas to Western elites, and the ongoing conflicts and the well-publicized abuses of Communist· states have contributed to elevating opposition to communism to a first principle of Western ideology and politics. This ideology helps mobilize the populace against an enemy, and because the concept is fuzzy it can be used against anybody advocating*

> *policies that threaten property interests or support accommodation with Communist states and radicalism. It therefore helps fragment the left and labour movements and serves as a political-control mechanism"* (Herman & Chomsky, 2002).

Egypt's elites adopted almost the same approach and declared a media war against the Muslim Brotherhood and anyone that might sympathise with or slightly sound critical of the military coup. A facilitative role emerged through various attempts to tell stories from different angles and to bring political opponents onto the same debate platforms. This was short-lived. As a result of the increased polarisation of the political scene, ideological opponents of the military political agenda supported by the media outlets were more and more portrayed as the ultimate enemy, as 'terrorists' who are legitimate to destroy (Cammaerts & El-Issawi, 2015, p. 10).

And here back again to Herman and Chomsky as they discuss the phenomenon of those who 'converted' from communism to the 'centre', whom were enforced over the media scene in the US as eyewitnesses, a very similar phenomenon took place in Egypt. Former 'radicals', mainly from the Muslim Brotherhood, who suddenly 'saw the light' (a term Herman and Chomsky use) were turned into stars all over the media and got labelled as 'experts'. Former Muslim Brotherhood member Tharwat Al-Kharabawy is a clear example. Al-Kharabawy, a lawyer, was a leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood, until he left the group in 2002. However, his fame spread all over the country when his book "The Temple's secret: The hidden secrets of the Muslim Brotherhood" (published in 2012) got heavy airplay by the private media in 2013, especially during the 112 days of Tamarod. Unsurprisingly, in addition to his excessively frequent appearances on private and state TV channels, he became one of Al-Watan's regular opinion writers with a fixed column. His job, I argue, was to give a solid foundation to the portrayal of the Brotherhood as a dangerous cult more than a conservative religious political group. His personal history made him a perfect messenger, whom the public could trust, since he had been one of them and knew them as they 'really were'. Interestingly, Al-Kharabawy is not the only figure who left the Brotherhood and criticised them after he did; so did Abdel Moneim Aboul

Fotouh (mentioned in Chapter Five) and Mohamed Habeeb[147]. However, those two figures were not invited – or very rarely – to the media as was the case with Al-Kharabawy. Both figures were critical of the military and Mubarak's legacy that remained after his fall. And this critical tendency was not welcomed on TV screens or leading private newspapers like Al-Masry Al-Youm or Al-Watan.

"All Islamist TV channels SHUT DOWN… No signal #Egypt #Tamarod #SCAF"[148] was my tweet on shutting down the pro-Brotherhood Islamist channels: Egypt 25, Al-Hafez, Al-Nas and Al-Rahma, and other lower profile channels later. It happened exactly as I expected, as I was deliberately watching the televised military coup's statement read by Al-Sisi from a written document. The shut-down of these TV channels was top news all over the world the same night and the following days. It was a move by the military that showed what kind of a repressive regime they were going to introduce following the Brotherhood's fall. Almost three months after, on 25 September 2013, The Brotherhood's newspaper Freedom and Justice – same name as their political party – was shut down, had their office raided and all equipment confiscated.[149] This was a follow-up of a politicised court ruling banning all activities of the Brotherhood one day earlier.[150]

Having all the above said does not mean that the pro-Muslim-Brotherhood or Islamist media in general were innocent. In the end, it's almost all about hegemony and how much a media voice of a power group would control as much as possible of a society for the sake of gaining or maintain power. Spending on media and communication by the Muslim Brotherhood was estimated at EUR 417 million[151] in 2013 alone (Mellor, 2017, p. 207). Noha Mellor in her book 'Voice of the Muslim Brotherhood: Da'wa, Discourse, and Political Communication' lists the group's attempts of controlling the media, as on 9 December 2012, more than 200 journalists

[147] Former First Deputy of the Muslim Brotherhood's General Guide, who left the group right after the fall of Mubarak in 2011.
[148] Author's account on Twitter: @MaherHamoud1, 3 July 2013.
[149] BBC Arabic, 25 September 2013.
[150] BBC Arabic, 24 September 2013.
[151] Using an exchange rate for 2013 as 1 EUR = 9.6 EGP.

and presenters protested in Tahrir Square against what they called an Islamist attempt to control the Egyptian media[152], following a sit-in by thousands of Salafies in front of the Egyptian Media City. They were protesting against the so-called media atheists who publicly criticised the Islamist alliance and Morsi's government. Several media figures had also resigned their posts in protest against the Brotherhood government's attempt to curb freedom of speech. That was following the coverage of the clashes that took place in front of the Itihadeya presidential palace on 5 December 2012, leaving hundreds injured and ten dead, including Al-Husseini Abu Deif, an Al-Fagr newspaper journalist (Mellor, 2017, p. 200). I was actually present in this particular clash, when ant-Morsi protesters were attacked by Morsi supporters. On that evening, the riot police were present and did not seriously intervene to separate the two sides. I followed up how the media were covering the outbarking violence, and found that the state-media indeed not so critical of Morsi and his government. Islamist channels were supporting Morsi and his supporters in their attack on anti-Morsi protesters. Interestingly, the back then Sawiris-owned ONTV and Al-Amin-owned CBC (the first is a shareholder in Al-Masry Al-Youm and the second is the sole owner of Al-Watan) had the best coverage of the protest, violence against the ant-Morsi protesters by his supporters and the noninterventionist position the right police took.

I think the above incident of the Itihadeya palace clash in December 2012, besides similar but very much smaller clashes, the Islamist media support for Morsi and his supporter, all might have made the counter-revolution camp (mostly business and political elite) maximise their own efforts to counter a pro-Morsi media discourse that they have overestimated. As at the end, the millions who marched in the streets against Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood on 30 June, were an overwhelming evidence that all the pro-Mosri Islamist media together did not succeed in stopping the Tamarod hurricane. I argue that this massive success of Tamarod and the big failure of Islamist media on that particular day, gave a strong signal to the military that they can go for a full military coupe three days later on the 3rd of July, not only a civilian ouster Mubarak-style. And here as I was examining my assumption of the issue of anti-Brotherhood media practices –

[152] I attended this protest and noticed that many of the participant were Mubarak's loyalists from the state media. However, this doesn't deny the Muslim brotherhood's attempts of controlling, or at least influencing, the state media.

since Tamarod Campaign – I asked my interviewees this question in order to get a direct response whether by agreeing and disagreeing. I was trying to see if they can or cannot directly admit the bias against the Muslim Brotherhood: "Freedom of expression has become a practice mainly only allowed against the Muslim Brotherhood, not the ruling elites." How far do you agree or disagree with this notion?" Alaa Zakareya, Ihsan Sameer and Wesam Shawkat, all very briefly and directly expressed their strong agreement. As for Nour Magdy, who also agreed with the notion, said "I totally agree with it, all media outlets now can criticise the Muslim Brotherhood, even accusing them of false charges. While when it comes to the ruling elites, newspapers could be prosecuted under the accusation of publishing false news." Sameer goes along Magdy's view and says "[I] totally agree. Moreover, it's hard now to find a big difference between private and state-owned press when it comes to the president's coverage [for] example. I [would] say that we are living in a mono-tone era."

I see that this aggressive crackdown on pro-Brotherhood media by the military was one of the worst consequences following the military coup. Not that such shutdown media outlets were providing objective content, but it was a sort of a balance of lies: pro-military propaganda vs. pro-Brotherhood propaganda. Now the ordinary citizens are left with one form of propaganda coming from the pro-military camp. I would imagine that before the shutdown of these TV channels and newspapers, many citizens might have tended to believe neither sides. However, with one-sided propaganda, the military one, too much repetition of the same twisted news over and over through different sources in many media outlets and in different formats, would make newspapers' readers or TV viewers finally fall under some kind of influence and tend to believe the news in different degrees depending on their backgrounds or their tendencies for critical thinking as recipients.

Following the military coup, Fatima El-Issawi successfully managed to interview the almost unapproachable Magdy Al-Gallad for her research paper titled "Egyptian media under Transition" published in 2014, who wrote:

"For Magdy Al-Gallad, the editor-in-chief of Al-Watan newspaper, presumably close to the military institution, it was not possible for liberal media to adopt neutrality. He said: "this is a battle we did not choose. We were portrayed as evils: The spiritual leader of the Brotherhood called us the media of shame, the newspaper's offices were burned …" […] Beyond lobbying for views, the publication of "confidential" documents is a powerful tool frequently used by national media in smear campaigns. Al-Watan, known for mastering this game, had published various allegedly leaked documents, such as suspicious bank accounts for senior figures in the Brotherhood leadership or tax evasion for business projects owned by them. […] If the publication of leaked documents is not specific to the Egyptian media, the frequent use of these documents, with no independent channels to verify their content, exacerbated the political manipulation of media platforms. The fact that these documents are amplified, being re-published by news websites, the press and social media pages as well as being debated on talk show platforms, makes them a powerful political tool" (El-Issawi, 2014).

Ahmed Assem: the Egyptian photographer who chronicled his own death[153]

In response to Al-Gallad's position concerning his editorial agenda of Al-Watan, which is very similar to Al-Masry Al-Youm's, in relation to voices critical on the military, the above headline tells how these voices were dealt with. The story (text and video) published by The Telegraph and several other local and international news outlets on Ahmed Assem, the Freedom and Justice journalist who filmed his own assassination by a military sniper during the Republican Guards

[153] The Telegraph, 9 July 2013.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/10170307/Ahmed-Assem-the-Egyptian-photographer-who-chronicled-his-own-death.html

Massacre (mentioned in Chapter Five), where tens of pro-Brotherhood sit-inners were killed, while no investigations were made until today. It was obvious from the video, which managed to reach YouTube, that it was a violent attack by the military. The video is a disturbing graphic evidence that anti-Brotherhood voices are encouraged and supported, while criticism against the military and their allies is not allowed. Or even worse, shut down forever. And as discussed in the next section, Egypt has become one of the world's most hostile environments for journalists and one of their biggest jailors.

6.2 Violence against journalists: Police and the honourable citizens

In addition to state violence against journalists, there has always existed control over journalists and content they produce. A tremendous degree of state and military control continued to be asserted over the media through an oppressive regulatory framework which imposes restrictions on critical news reporting. For instance, the putting on trial of journalists was not only a frequent practice under the Mubarak regime but was also prevalent under Muslim Brotherhood rule as well as under the current military-backed government (Cammaerts & El-Issawi, 2015, p. 10). This has led to highly controlled news content that mostly matches with the army's narrative of events. Ahmed Asem's murder by an army sniper as mentioned in the previous section is rather symbolic than being the norm. Violence against journalists more often takes other forms: being assaulted or sometimes killed in less sophisticated ways in the middle of a protest that might turn into a clash; being arrested and tortured; being detained with or without a legal warrant. However, a more confusing form of violence against journalist is the one practised by the so-called 'Honourable Citizens', which will be discussed later in this section.

In its census report published on 17 December 2014, The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), which I will use more than once in this section as a known-to-be trusted source,

ranked Egypt as number six in the "list of worst jailers of journalists worldwide",[154] with at least 12 journalists behind bars as of the first of December 2014. I would say that the real number could have been much higher, but it is very difficult to track, as many are unofficially detained for short periods, even only for a few hours, and then released. Other arrests simply do not get reported at all, especially of freelancers, as they have no proper protection either by the publications they contribute for or by the Egyptian Journalists Syndicate, which they are not members of. However, for research purposes and due to the difficulty of tracking information on detained, assaulted or killed journalists accurately, I will stick to CPJ's data as a highly trusted source and ignore my assumptions of the possible higher numbers. I would start with this interesting quote from the same CPJ report, which says "Egypt's Minister of Interior Mohamed Ibrahim said in a press conference on Monday that he was monitoring media reactions to the killing of demonstrators and said some journalists had insulted him with their reporting. When asked about the detentions and harassment of the press, the minister joked that he would have arrested all journalists, not just those covering the protests this weekend, according to news reports."[155]

I asked Nour Magdy concerning the Egyptian police violence against journalists "Do you agree or disagree that there is organised violence against journalist?" She strongly approved the question's assumption and said "I totally agree, I see that they're [journalists] targeted all the time, especially photojournalists as they can be easily distinguished. This is clear with the increasing number of journalists and photojournalists killed or imprisoned now in Egypt." Interestingly enough, the police violence does not discriminate between any type of journalists whether working for critical news outlets like Ona or the very pro-military DotMasr. The police does not want any form of press presence in the streets while handling protests, which is evident in the following quote "Among the other journalists detained were DotMasr reporters Mohamed Wesam, Mohamed Amina, and photographer Ahmed Adel; Veto editor Mohamed Mahrous and photographer Moamen Samir; Ona News Agency correspondent Shams Eddin

[154] CPJ, 17 December 2014.
[155] Committee to Protect Journalists, 26 January 2015.

Murtada; Masrawy news website photographer Alaa Al Qassas; and Albawaba News website correspondent Iman Ahmed, according to JATO[156] and the Egyptian Journalists Syndicate. The groups said that all of those detained were later released. It is not clear if charges will be brought against any of them."[157]

Alaa Zakareya tends to generalise such police practices over a longer history "The policy is clear: Don't cross your limits [as a journalist] or you'll be made an example of. The Brotherhood practised the same actions, Mubarak did before, and the current regime is on their footsteps. I don't see it as a new phenomenon. We [journalists] were and will remain targeted, as we're considered the eye that might see what shouldn't be seen." Additionally, the relation between the police forces and digital media seems to be very much underdeveloped. The interior ministry tries to engage in the social media through Facebook and Twitter, but they still underestimate the power of this available less-controlled digital space, where their actions of violence turn undeniable once a video reaches YouTube for example, which is also documented in CPJ's report: "Masrawy showed video on YouTube of its photographer Nader Nabil and Al-Badeel photographer Amr Abdel Rahman running away after being hit in the head with bird shot by police while covering clashes in downtown Cairo on Sunday."[158]

During Mubarak and almost until the 3 July military coup, western journalists were almost immune from police targeting. However, since the return of the police forces to the streets following the coup, this rule does not apply anymore: "In a Twitter post, Orla Guerin, the BBC's Cairo correspondent, said her team was warned by a plainclothes police officer that they would be shot if they continued to film in the Ain Shams neighbourhood of Cairo, where police were looking for Muslim Brotherhood demonstrators."[159] Reda Abbas admits that the environment is hostile against journalists, but he dismisses my assumption that such violence is organised, as he

[156] Journalists Against Torture Observatory, an Egyptian NGO.
[157] Committee to Protect Journalists, 26 January 2015.
[158] Committee to Protect Journalists, 26 January 2015.
[159] Committee to Protect Journalists, 26 January 2015.

says “No! Not organised, but [still there is] a hostile environment for the press.” Ihsan Sameer almost leans towards Abbas’s opinion by saying “Most [cases of police violence against journalists] are individual incidents. And I think that the state in the past, prior to Mubarak’s fall, was harassing journalists more than now, however in different ways other than imprisonment,” he argued. Wesam Shawkat briefly denied the assumption and said “No! But some restrictions exist.” As we can see, Sameer’s and Shawkat’s responses contradict with CPJ’s reports and other interviewees.

Looking from a different angle at the phenomenon of violence against journalists in Egypt, it is very much worth observing the rise of this type of violence not only by the police, but also by other civilians. There civilians are commonly labelled as *Al-Mowatenoon Al-Shorafaa* (The Honourable Citizens). The early use of this term – The Honourable Citizens – was in the SCAF statements right after the fall of Mubarak, whenever they were announcing some political decision or addressing the public in an emotional explanation of some military move. However, the first use of the term in a negative context was in an incident of violence between the military and civilian protesters, known as Maspero Massacre[160], where the state TV called for The Honourable Citizens to ‘defend the army’ against the Christian protesters, while in fact it was the army that was attacking them. “What started out as a peaceful protest in Cairo turned into one of worst the massacres of Christians in modern Egypt,” Hossam Bahgat, a human rights activist, described that night to CBS News.[161] Nour Magdy goes for the assumption that the Honourable Citizen’s term was first used by the military and confirmed the link between them and violence against journalists as she says “The first time this term was used was by one of the SCAF’s members. Since then each one used it on his own way. And yes, there’s a link, either they’re [The Honourable Citizens] volunteering their efforts, thinking that they’re helping in assuring the country’s stability, or they’re pushed by security forces to keep them [journalists] away from the scene.”

[160] Maspero is the name of the area and the State TV building, where a group of Christian youth were protesting in late 2011.
[161] CBS News Website, 22 June 2014.

The Moheet news website, which published a whole investigation series[162] on the phenomenon of The Honourable Citizens, relates the emergence of the term to a few weeks earlier to the SCAF statements:

> *"The Tahrir sit-in in 2011 was a space for the conflict between the street vendors and the revolutionary youth protecting the squares from one side, against the Baltageya (thugs) and the ousted president's [Mubarak] lovers, who were attacking Tahrir from time to time in order to have the squares evacuated at any cost. During that period, a new term appeared, used to refer to the thugs and others defending Mubarak and attacking the revolution, which is Al-Mowatenoon Al-Shorafaa [The Honourable Citizens], as pro-regime media outlets back then started to dictate the term to viewers"* (Abdel Monem, 2014).

Randomness and ambiguity is another thought expressed by Reda Abbas as he says "This term is mostly used to describe people, who work with the interior ministry for most cases, [and] they are ready to move when orders are received. These days it's dangerous to do journalism in the street, you never know what is coming [your way]." What Abbas says can be inferred from the CPJ's reports on violations against journalists in Egypt, not only by the police, but by the volunteering Honourable Citizens as well.

> *"Sara Hashem, a reporter for the independent daily Al-Fagr, said in a YouTube broadcast that she was arrested near Tahrir Square while covering demonstrations. She said that police handed her to pro-government demonstrators after telling them she was an anti-government protester. One of them dragged her to the ground while others punched and slapped her, she said. In a statement broadcast on the Al Fagr YouTube channel, Hashem said she fainted during the attack and was briefly hospitalized. A video on the Cairo News website showed Hashem being taken away by what she later said*

[162] Moheet.com, 21 June 2014.

were pro-government protesters, while screaming for mercy and saying she is a journalist" (CPJ, 2015).[163]

Interestingly, Ihsan Sameer and Wesam Shawkat refused to comment on this issue. Sameer laughed in reaction to the question and only said, "Usually, this is only the beginning," referring to this type of violence. As for Shawkat, he simply gave no answer at all. I think that both Sameer and Shawkat refrained from answering my question out of probable fear of persecution.

6.3 Demonising critical news outlets

As discussed in Chapter Three, Al-Jazeera has always been a concern for all Egyptian governments under Mubarak, and it continued to be for the Military after the 2011 revolution, which Al-Jazeera very intensely covered and heavily supported. When Mubarak toured Al-Jazeera's headquarters in Doha, he said ''all this trouble from a matchbox like this'' (Whitaker 2003). For Mubarak who preferred his news media to be compliant, Al-Jazeera has caused plenty of trouble by fostering debate about topics that many in the region did not favour (Seib, 2005). This account by Seib in 2005 is still very valid until today, and even more valid given how Al-Jazeera have grown much bigger and much more internationally influential. The growth of influence by this channel, or news empire, lead to a significant growth of hostility between Egypt and Qatar since Mubarak's era. The network was clearly in support of the 2011 revolution, and the Qatari rulers (Hamad then and now his son Tamim) chose to support the Muslim Brotherhood, who they already had a good relationship with years before the revolution. A complex and old conflict that had its violent consequences against the network's journalists (among other foreign and local journalists) during the period of the 2013 coupe. In the end, Al-Jazeera is a politically charged project representing the interests and ambitions of Qatar with its own regional agendas and international power relations, including the US government as

[163] Committee to Protect Journalists, 26 January 2015.

Wikileaks classified documents have shown, when former CEO Waddah Khanfar was holding secret meetings, with The US ambassador in Doha for example, negotiating changing editorial agenda and news content, which surprisingly he was responsive to (Chatriwala, 2011). Khanfar had to resign a few days after the release of these documents by Wikileaks. However, the critical voice of Al-Jazeera that always makes Egypt's ruling elites angry continued.

One of the reasons for violence by civilians against journalists as portrayed in the previous section is the demonization of any form of media with a critical voice against the military coup. Critical media coverage, especially back in the 112 days of Tamarod period, was understood by readers or TV viewers as sympathy toward the Muslim Brotherhood. This media was trying to cover the other side of the picture, which is violence by the state targeting the Brotherhood. Both the state and private media accused this critical media, whether local, regional or international, of being pro-Brotherhood. In response, this discourse generated anger among the public against these media. Therefore, when a clash or a protest would take place, angry civilians start attacking journalists randomly. However, for all forms of media – for or against the military coup – these angry civilians were unable to distinguish between their targets. In some cases, journalists from the pro-military media, like the case of Sara Hashem of the pro-military Al-Fagr discussed in the previous section, would fall victim to random violence against journalists.

Al Jazeera, channel of "The coup against professionalism"[164]

Yousef Al Houseiny: The Qatari Al Jazeera is Zionist by excellence[165]

I argue that the phenomenon of extreme violence against journalists started by the rise in demonising the Doha-based Al-Jazeera Channel and its Cairo-based channel Al-Jazeera

[164] Al-Masry Al-Youm, 14 August 2013.
[165] Al-Watan, 21 July 2013.

Mubasher Masr[166]. Al-Jazeera was showing another image of Tamarod, the military and the Brotherhood that did not match with the image the military propagated. They were showing images of graphic violence against pro-Brotherhood protesters, and were hosting anti-coup figures at their programmes. As we see in the above two headlines by Al-Masry Al-Youm on 14 August and earlier by Al-Watan on 21 July 2013, a demonization mood had been spread by the private press, especially, our two newspapers in focus. In the beginning, the anti-Al-Jazeera campaign worked very well. The anti-Brotherhood protestors responded angrily in line with the private press (and the state-run as well). They started chanting against Al-Jazeera in their protests, and shortly after started physically attacking its crews. I argue that following the success of demonising Al-Jazeera, which made it impossible for their crews to work on the ground, the authorities and the private press started following the same pattern against any other media with a critical voice. As I said earlier, protesters started attacking all sorts of reporters on the ground including – by mistake – those working for pro-military press, while many other journalists from international and regional media outlets were also violently targeted.

In order to be more specific and focused in my argument that there was organised demonization of critical news content, I asked my interviewees this question "Do you think that local private press is engaging in demonization of western media and local "independent" media with critical voices? Yes or no and why?" Nour Magdy said "Yes, as I said before [Section 6.2] there are relations between private newspapers and security bodies, which affect their editorial policies in this regard. So, they either publish what they're told by those security services or try to defend the regime by attacking western media in order to convince the readers that everything is OK." Later, on the 2nd of September 2013, and after it has become already clear for media observers how a press-hostile environment was growing more dangerous by the day, a world's top media freedom watchdog Reporters Without Borders (RSF) issued a report with the title 'Heavy toll on journalists in two months since army takeover'. The report documented different forms of violations against journalists by the military, the police, pro-military protesters

[166] There was incitement against foreign media and foreigners in general during the first 18 days of the 25 January Revolution. However, it was brief and incomparable to the scale of 2013 around the coup period.

and pro-Brotherhood protesters. The report also documented the incitement against critical press outlets that were attempting to provide any picture of the situation on the ground that differed from the military's narrative of events.

Reporters Without Borders, or Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF), provides some important data in their report regarding violence against journalists during July and August 2013. They mention that a total of five journalists had been killed, 80 journalists had been arbitrarily detained, and at least 40 news providers had been physically attacked by the police or by pro-Brotherhood or pro-military protesters. The report says "Several journalists sustained gunshot injuries, while the security forces were dispersing pro-Morsi sit-ins on 14 August. They included Asma Waguih of Reuters, Tarek Abbas of Al-Watan, Najjar Ahmad of Al-Masry Al-Youm, Mohamed Al-Zaki of Al-Jazeera and an Associated Press journalist". As we can notice from the news outlets names, protesters did not distinguish between journalists, as they attacked pro-military and other news reporters alike.

RSF also reported violence by anti-coup/pro-Brotherhood protesters: "In one of the gravest cases, journalists Aya Hassan [working for pro-military Youm7] and Mohamed Momtaz [working for the pro-military Veto] were held for several hours by Morsi supporters inside sit-in tents in Rabaa Al-Adawiya Square on 9 August and were violently assaulted. Momtaz had to be taken to hospital." Later in the report RSF shifted the focus to the pro-military protesters' violations against journalists, which I argue were much more frequent, as they were widely and indirectly incited by the state and private media. The report says "Self-appointed 'popular committees' that protect their neighbourhoods from the Muslim Brotherhood have also been responsible for violence against journalists. Freelance journalists Jared Malsin and Cliff Cheney were accosted near Ramses Square on 16 August by members of one of these groups, who took equipment from them and slapped Malsin."

I argue that while trying to understand this violence from civilians against journalists, we should focus on two aspects that are also well documented in the same RSF report on the violations against journalists that happened in the same period. First, RSF says:

> *"Of a total of 80 arrests for short periods, 23 involved foreign journalists: Daniel Demoustier on 5 July, Emmerich Dirk of RTL on 8 July, Murat Uslu and Zafer Karakas of Star Haber, and Fatih Erand Tufan Guzelgun of A info on 9 July, Sebastian Backhaus on 14 August, Hibe Zekeriye of Anadolu Agency and Metin Turan of TRT on 16 August, Dorothée Olliéric, Stéphane Guillemot andArnaud Gidon of France 2 on 17 August, Patrick Kingsley of The Guardian and Hugo Bachega and Mathias Gebauer of Der Spiegel on 18 August, Tahir Osman Hamde* of the Ihlas News Agency on 20 August, Mitsuyoshi Iwashige on 21 August, Marcin Mamon and interpreter Przemyslaw Szewczyk on 25 August, a Reuters correspondent on 26 August and Wayne Hay, Russ Finn and Adil Bradlow of Al-Jazeera on 27 August" (RSF, 2013).

All the arrested journalists here are foreigners working for foreign news outlets, and that was not a secret for the public, as the news of their arrests were always going viral all over the traditional and social media, whenever one or a group of them were taken from the streets. And since the authorities – mainly police and army – were the ones fighting against the Brotherhood, who 'the people wanted to bring down' through Tamarod, the anti-Brotherhood protesters reflexively sided with the same authorities' narrative of events in which those journalists are portrayed as working for pro-Brotherhood media. And since it was a context of almost chaos in the streets with attacks and retreats between pro-Brotherhood protesters from a side and the military, the police and pro-military protesters from the other side, violence by civilians was not a surprising reaction against those demonised journalists. Reda Abbas thinks that this demonization is still being practised, as he says "Most of the press now is engaged in propaganda in best cases. So, many [of the private press] volunteered to do such thing [demonization of Western media], even without [being] asked to do so."

The other aspect of understanding the reason for violence against journalists as a result of state-demonization of critical media – and mainly any media that did not follow the military's narrative of events – is derived from how the State Information Service, just like other official institutions including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, state media and private media, openly dealt with any form of critical media. Here I quote RSF again:

> *"The foreign media's perceived "bias" was the subject of a statement that Egypt's State Information Service issued in English on 17 August: "Egypt is feeling severe bitterness towards some western media coverage that is biased to the Muslim Brotherhood and ignores shedding light on violent and terror acts that are perpetrated by this group in the form of intimidation operations and terrorising citizens"* (RSF, 2013).

I think, once an authority in almost full control of major media outlets in a country issues such a statement against other media outlets in the context of violence and chaos against one side, the other side might violently react, which actually what happened then. Alaa Zakareya tends to believe that critical media demonization mostly happened following the military coup, but now it doesn't anymore. Zakareya adds, "Newspapers deal with them [western media] by piece. [Meaning that] those who positively write about us is made a good example of, and whoever takes us as an enemy, we make a bad example of. The reason for this is the crises of Rabaa's dispersal and what followed, where western media attacked policies of the 30-June state, so they [western media] were attacked in response. But now things are relatively calm, and the western media down-tuned their criticism. Therefore, there's no need to demonise them. It is already enough not to publish what such media say in local newspapers. At the end of the day, how many Egyptians read western newspapers anyway?"

Conclusion

As a continuation of enforcing hegemony by the business elite through their private newspapers, this chapter found that freedom of expression was a practice allowed and encouraged mostly against the Muslim Brotherhood during the brief period of their rule and became almost only against them, or in favour of their demonization, towards and following the military coup. Other entities like Tamarod, the military or other groups working against the Muslim Brotherhood were mostly above criticism, at least for the 112 days of Tamarod. Generally speaking, Al-Sisi's efforts to silence dissent and shutter outlets affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood have produced a media environment in which most public and private outlets are firmly supportive of the regime. Authorities continued to employ a variety of tools against journalists and media outlets that strayed from officially sanctioned narratives, including legal prosecution, gag orders, and the halting of operations. Dozens of journalists were physically assaulted during the year by both security agents and civilians (Freedom House, 2016). The rise of violence by civilians against journalists in public domain was in a high peak, as documented by media freedom watchdogs and other media outlets, while the role of the so-called The Honourable Citizens in a way or another was the label given to these actions of violence committed by those who do not belong to any form of official authority. Demonising critical news outlets was an organised, or at least a deliberate, practice by the authorities and the business elite's press, which in turn fuelled the violence by civilians – The Honourable Citizens – against journalists with critical voices or working for critical news producers whether local, regional or international. The chapter also found that violence went out of control, given the randomness of the attacks and the fluid violent atmosphere that prevailed during the Tamarod period, which made pro-military journalists accidentally fall as victims besides others the private (and state) media incited against.

CHAPTER SEVEN: Conclusion

> *"The people in the public relations industry aren't there for the fun of it. They're doing work. They're trying to instil the right values. In fact, they have a conception of what democracy ought to be: It ought to be a system in which the specialized class is trained to work in the service of the masters, the people who own the society. The rest of the population ought to be deprived of any form of organisation, because organisation just causes trouble"* (Chomsky, 1997).

Relating the above quote to George Orwell's saying, "Journalism is printing what someone else does not want printed: everything else is public relations,"[167] I find Chomsky's rant on what is introduced to the public as journalism applies to the case of Egyptian media. A form of PR, which is ready-made by Egypt's business elite and generously working at the service of the political one. This descriptive study examined the relation between the private press and the two groups of elites by answering the thesis's major question of:

- *Why and how does Egypt's business elite control the post-Mubarak press?*

And during the course of answering this major question, the thesis also addressed other sub-questions that fed into the process of understanding the nature and dynamics of hegemony and social relations concerning the privately-owned Egyptian press:

[167] This quote is very commonly attributed to George Orwell in many texts, however, it is not clear he said it in which context.

- What is the background of Egypt's business elite and their affiliation with the media market?
- Why was Egypt's political elite interested in a new private press market, and how did this interest develop?
- How did the private press respond to Mubarak's fall?
- How did the private press market develop following Mubarak's fall?
- How did the private press *frame* the news narrative in favour of the military coup of 2013?
- As an outcome of such news frames, how did the status of freedom of the press change following the coup?

And in order to address the above-mentioned research questions, this study followed an approach of 'critical political economy of communication' followed by conducting 'framing analysis' for the private press production around the military coup period in 2013. Hegemony, which draws its strength from achieving the consent of those it would control, was a major theme in this research. Hegemony requires the exercise of power to maintain consent under changing conditions, like the 2011 revolution or 2013 military coup for example. And communication here plays a central role in hegemony as itis vital to the successful maintenance of the hegemonic control, as well as to resistance and the construction of counter-hegemonies. The mass media here *is* a system that serves for communicating messages and symbols to the society. It is their function (the mass media) to amuse, entertain, inform, and to implant within individuals the values, beliefs, and codes of behaviour that integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society. And in a world of concentrated wealth and major conflicts of class interests, fulfilling this role requires systematic propaganda. And here came the role of framing analysis in this study to empirically prove the hegemonic practice of the business elite and understand how it worked. Framing analysis provides a direct and reliable interpretation of the role of certain media in shaping ideas and public views about current affairs. This thesis chose the popular and private-owned Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Watan, while like most newspapers in the world do influence the public through the content they produce and the messages contained within. And throughout the research course, interviews with high-profile primary sources from within the private press industry were conducted and embedded into all arguments. This study is an

addition to academic research in the understudied area of 'the political economy of Egyptian media'. Previous research near this area is mostly focussed on topics that have to do communication studies or political economy in general, but rarely combines the two together, as the available literature shows. As an academic researcher with previous business experiences in working with Egypt's business elite in the mining sector and later in the media market, I think I have followed a research approach in this particular area, the political economy of Egyptian media, that benefited as much as possible from my past practices in the field and academic theory combined. And as the field of critical political economy of communication had generally benefited in its beginnings from the academic research findings in Latin America in the 1970s under authoritarian regimes adopting aggressive free-market politics and how this had influenced the private media there, and how these findings enriched the field in Europe and North America, I think this academic contribution is an extension of this trend. I believe that this research can be simulated in other parts in the world and see what results it might yield to.

7.1 Findings and conclusion

Conducting a critical review of the political economy of the Egyptian media in general and the press market in particular, the thesis found that elites' interest in controlling the press has been there since Nasser's era (1952 – 1970), continued to be during Sadat's (1970 – 1981) and Mubarak's (1982 – 2011), until today. Freedoms were sometimes slightly restored, during Sadat's *Infitah* for example, but these relaxations were always minor and temporary. The thesis also confirmed the recent interest by the business elite in the private press since the late 1990s and the intensifying of this interest since 2004, which was associated with the introduction of Gamal Mubarak to the political scene. The press legislations in Egypt have always been complex and unclear, giving power to the state to control the market since the 1950s. But in the late 1990s the legislations engaged in favouritism toward the business elite and the media they own. The sample profiles of business investors and editors-in-chief chosen and investigated in the thesis

proved the interest in hegemony by the business elite over the press market, as a means to maintain their power and social relation to the political elite and the rest of the population.

This thesis also provided a general review of press coverage in two important periods. In the first one, which is the first 18 days of the revolution, it is found that private newspapers were positioning themselves according to developments on the ground in Tahrir Square. And it also found that they were careful in their relations with 'old' political powers, as they were always waiting until it was clear which group or figure that lost the battle against the protesters before criticising. They were also clearly consistently pro-military. As for the second period of press coverage following the fall of Mubarak (13 February 2011 – 30 June 2012), the news reviews showed that the private press was highly critical of the Muslim Brotherhood, and also highly supportive of the military.

The thesis found that the two sample newspapers, represented by their editors-in-chief Magdy Al Gallad and Yasser Rizk, in coordination with both business tycoons Salah Diab and Mohamed Al-Amin, were all highly in control of the news content communicated with the public in favour of the political elite with its two factions the military and the civilian. The thesis found that Tamarod Movement and its campaign to overthrow Mohamed Morsi was a revolutionary move by the youth who overthrow Mubarak's two and a half years earlier. However, the movement turned into a Trojan Horse manipulated, infiltrated and later controlled by the elites in order to take full control of the country again. The research found that the private press produced news through two frames: 'fear' and 'promotion'. And based on the examined sample of news headlines produced in 112 days around the coup, the results showed that the private press played an important role in magnifying 'fear' of the Muslim Brotherhood among the public in 23.17% of the examined content. And they also 'promoted' Tamarod, which in turn was a promotion for the army, in 61.29% of the same sample.

Like how the propaganda model suggested the presence of 'anti-communism' in the American news media, the thesis also found that freedom of expression was a practice allowed

and encouraged almost exclusively against the Muslim Brotherhood during the brief period of their rule, as a form of 'anti-Brotherhood'. The portrayal of the group later became mostly a process of demonization, both during and after the military coup period. Other entities like Tamarod, the military or other groups working against the Brotherhood were mostly above criticism, at least for the examined 112 days. The same period witnessed significant increase in violence against journalists by either the police, the military or in some cases both. The rise of violence by civilians against journalists in public domains was also found to be at a high peak, as the presence of the so-called Honourable Citizens had increased. Demonization of critical news outlets was found to be an organised, or at least a deliberate practice, by the authorities and the private press.

This thesis concludes that since the 1952 until early 2000s, the mainstream media, which was mostly state-controlled, succeeded in serving power by strengthening the elites' economic and political discourses, as it dealt with them as systems of hegemony. And opposite to how believers of the democratisation theory and free-market economy recognise the private mass media as a potential and influential democratisation actor since and tend to inaccurately call it 'independent' media, what happened in Egypt from early 2000s and on with the expansion of the private media market, is that media investors made arrangements with governments because they shared agendas, and benefited mutually from cooperation. In general, the thesis concludes that the political economy of the Egyptian private press, particularly in the post-Mubarak era, is highly controlled by the business elite in favour of themselves, the political elite and the military. Hegemony has always existed since the foundation of this market, however it had to be maintained and reinforced following its relative shake caused by the 2011 revolution. And in order to achieve and maintain this hegemonic position they engaged in significant news framing in support of the 2013 military coup, particularly 'fear' of the Muslim Brotherhood, violence and chaos, and 'promotion' of the military as a saviour. And as a result of all of this, the country now suffered extreme violations of press freedom and significant violence against journalists more than ever documented in Egypt's contemporary history.

7.2 Future research

This study can directly provide a foundation as a model to re-apply, almost as it is, on the private broadcast industry in Egypt, also around the same period of the 2013 coup. Especially, when some of the private press investors studied in this research, like Mohamed Al-Amin, are the same ones investing in the TV business. This complementary extension of research application can lead us to useful findings concerning the similarities and differences in hegemonic practices in the privately-owned Egyptian media in its different sectors.

Another related topic to this thesis is the study of the role of social media, particularly Facebook and Twitter, during the same military coup period. This research would be focussed on the influence of the so-called 'electronic committees', or *legan electroneya* in Arabic, which are mainly paid groups of people, whether by the state of the business elite, who try to influence the online circulation or virality of certain news that might help power groups or undermine the opposition or critical content available. I believe that this activity is very advanced and highly organised in Egypt. It actually started around mid-2000s by only commenting against critical online news contents, and later developed after 2011 revolution into a highly sophisticated and organised business, following the failure of these groups in addressing the overwhelming social media content around Mubarak's fall and Tahrir events. Their success during the military coup period was epic, the least to say. And I believe this activity is very much worth studying and contributing the findings to several media-related and social sciences' academic domains, besides the input this research can provide to those interested in studying the current worldwide fake news phenomenon, which is not necessarily new, as some might think.

The influence of the privately-owned media, studied in this thesis, on Egyptians living in the diaspora can also be an interesting extension of this research. Given the advancement in communication technologies and the accessibility available to the ordinary citizens to news sources anywhere in the world through the internet and particularly smartphone applications, it is highly probable that the same media has a trans-border influence on those who follow it

wherever they live. And since the literature shows that particularly the diasporic Arab communities have very high tendencies to follow news from sources operating in their countries of origin, it would be very important to examine this hypothesis among Egyptians in the diaspora and see how, if it was the case, the news frames studied here have reached and influenced them. Repeating the case with other Arab countries and their communities in the diaspora with different news frames can also lead to very insightful findings that can enrich the field. Similarly, the influence of transnational pan-Arab news agendas by for example, Al-Jazeera vs. Al-Arabia, can also be studied in certain Arab communities whether within the region or in the diaspora. I suggest that theme of 'militarism vs. Islamism' following the recent Arab Uprisings in the news contents of the two suggested pan-Arab channels can be interesting as a start for this research thread. I think we can come to very insightful and different findings concerning Arab news consumers in their home countries and, for one example, EU citizens from Arab origins.

Still in the area of political economy of communication and its influence on social, political and economic domains, policymakers are not immune from this influence. However, this time I suggest studying the political economy and the influence of international English-language news media. One example out of many, is how did EU policymakers understand, and hence respond, to the international news covering Egypt's coup in 2013. From my own personal experience and observations after meeting almost 100 EU politicians in Brussels around and following that period, I could see that there was significant confusion, which influenced the process policy making. The European Parliament as an example, which I also recommend for research focus given its relatively faster responsiveness in comparison to other bureaucratic EU institutions, has in its archives more than 500 diverse documents only issued around the coupe period trying with significant confusion to address the pressing political escalations and violence on the ground with significant failures. This of course is also affected by other European political and economic agendas toward Egypt and the region. However, I clearly see that the observed confusion by these policymakers in reading the news frames is a result of the confusion existed among the international news producers themselves in interpreting the contradiction of having a military coup that the masses were supporting and celebrating in millions. The 2013 coup is

only one case out of many that can also be studied under the same criteria of research. The Syrian conflict is also another interesting theme. The recent developments in Saudi politics, both nationally and regionally, and how this is covered in the news, can also provide academia with rich findings in the area of transnational or international news agendas, and the political economy behind them whether on societies or policymakers.

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[168] Articles published in newspapers, YouTube videos and other social media material are referred to in footnotes throughout the study's text, unless they add to the academic or investigative arguments of the thesis, hence, added to the bibliography. Articles used for framing analysis in Chapter Five are explained and referred to as data shown in tables and graphs.

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